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Preface

A n authentication protocol essentially provides a mechanism for verifying the identities
of nodes in an insecure network, and for the safe distribution of secrets. The subject of
authentication protocols is enormously subtle. It is surprisingly easy to design incorrect
protocols. A typical authentication protocol consists of an exchange of just a few
messages, m a y appear intuitively correct, and still not work as intended. It is c o m m o n
to find examples of published protocols in the literature which have subsequently been
found to contain flaws. As a result, methods for verifying the correctness of protocols
have proliferated. A pioneering work in this area is a modal logic of Burrows, Abadi
and Needham. Their work has led to the development of a substantial number of
logics of a similar kind, often referred to as "authentication logics". If authentication
logics are to be used to verify the correctness of protocols, then there is a need to
verify the correctness of the logics themselves. The latter is the metalogical problem
of obtaining assurance about the soundness of a logic. A meaningful solution to this
problem requires the development of an independently motivated semantics for the
logic. However, as compared to the formalisms in which authentication logics are
couched, the development of semantics for such logics has generally lagged behind.
Indeed, despite some notable previous work in the latter direction, it is rare to find a
rigorous proof of soundness for an existing authentication logic.
There are several other interesting areas in the study of protocols besides authentication logics. These include alternative methods for analyzing protocols, and models
for analyzing protocol efficiency.
This thesis makes some contributions to the areas of authentication logics and
protocol analysis; the contributions made are summarized below.
1. Authentication logics
(a) A critical appraisal of an authentication logic of Gong, Needham and Yahalom:
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It is shown that the above logic exhibits several undesirable features, including instances of unsoundness, incompleteness, and redundancy. These
observations are used to highlight the need for a semantic basis for authentication logics.
(b) A modification to the logic of Gong, Needham and Yahalom for automatic
analysis of protocols:
The proposed modification lends to a simple technique for automating deductions in the modified logic. Not only does the automation provided serve
as an aid in analyzing protocols, but it also proves useful in confirming some
of the difficulties in using the original logic.
(c) A computational model for authentication logics:
The proposed model decouples the syntax and semantics of notions that are
central to existing authentication logics. The import of the resulting model
is that it provides a solid foundation for devising such logics.
(d) A n authentication logic and its proof of soundness:
The model developed above is used to devise a new authentication logic and
to establish a soundness theorem for the logic in a rigorous manner.
2. Protocol analysis
A model for reasoning about lower bounds on rounds:
The proposed model is primarily motivated by the need to verify the correctness of some informal bounds found in the literature. It provides a precise
definition of the metric number of rounds and a theorem which relates lower
bounds on rounds with security requirements.

The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 1 is an introductory survey on authen
cation logics. The Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5 cover parts (l)(a)-(d) above, respectively.
Chapter 6 covers part 2. Chapter 7 contains our conclusions.
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Mathematical preliminaries

This section contains a concise summary of some standard mathematical notations,
definitions, and results used in this thesis.

Integers
The notation Z denotes the set of all integers {..., — 2 , — 1,0,1,2,...}.

Sets
If X is a finite set, the rank of X is the number of elements in X. Let X be some set
(finite or infinite). The powerset of X, written 2X, is the set of all subsets of X. Let
Y and Z be any two sets. The cartesian product of Y and Z, written Y x Z, is the set
{(Uiz) I V £ ^

an<

i z £ ^ } - -^ partition rr of X is a set of non-empty subsets of X such

that: (1) the elements of n are pairwise disjoint, and (2) the union of all elements of -K
is the set X. A n element of a partition is called a block.

Relations
Let X be some set (finite or infinite). A binary relation on R is a subset of X x X. If R
is a binary relation on X, we usually write xRy instead of (x,y) £ R, for x,y £ X. A
relation Ron X is: reflexive if, for every x £ X, xRx; transitive if, for every x,y,z £ X,
whenever xRy and yRz, then xRz; euclidean if, for every x,y,z £ X, whenever xRy
and xRz, then yRz. A relation R on X is irreflexive if, for every a: £ X, (x,x) 0 X ;
anti-symmetric if, for every x,y £ X, whenever (x,y) £ R, then (y, x) $ R.

The

reflexive transitive closure of a binary relation R, written R*, is the smallest reflexive
transitive relation that includes R as a subset. A partial order is a binary relation that
is irreflexive, anti-symmetric, and transitive. Let R be a relation on X, and let X' be a
subset of X. Define the relation R' on X' as R' = Rf] (X' x X'); if R is a partial order
on X, then R' is a partial order on X'. W e normally use the symbol -< to denote an
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arbitrary partial order. If -< is a partial order on X, the ordered pair (X, -<) is called

a partially ordered set, or a poset. A partial order R on X is a total order if, for ever
x,y £ X, xRy or yRx. W e normally use the symbol < to denote an arbitrary total
order. If < is a total order on X, the ordered pair (X, <) is called a totally ordered
set. If R is partial order on X, then an infinite descending chain with respect to R
is an infinite sequence xx,X2,-.- of elements of X such that xn+xRxn

for all n; R is

well-founded if there are no infinite descending chains with respect to R.

Strings
A n alphabet is afiniteand non-empty set of symbols. If S is an alphabet, the set of
all finite strings of symbols from £ is written as S*. W e write the empty sequence as
(). If S is a finite sequence and s £ E, then S • s denotes the sequence obtained by
extending S by s. If Sx, S2, • • • is a (finite or infinite) sequence offinitesequences with
the property that Si is an initial segment of Si+X for each i = 1,2,..., then call the
shortest sequence of which all the Si are initial segments the union of the Si.

Graphs
A digraph is an ordered pair G = (V, R) where V is a set and R is a binary relation on
V. The elements of V are called the nodes of G; the elements of R are called the edges
of G. A n edge e = (a, b) is said to originate at node a and terminate at node b; the
node a is called the initial node of e and the node b is called the terminal node of e.
The number of edges which originate (respectively, terminate) at a node a is called the
outdegree (respectively, indegree) of a. Afiniteor infinite sequence of edges is called a
path if the terminal node of each edge in the sequence is the initial node of the next
edge, if any, in the sequence. A path is said to originate in the initial node of the first
edge and end in the terminal node of the last edge, if any, in the sequence. A path
that originates from a node a and ends in a node b is called a path from a to b. A path
that originates and ends at the same node is called a cycle. A digraph that does not
contain any cycles is called acyclic.

Trees
A tree is a digraph with a nonempty set of nodes such that: (1) there is exactly one
node, called the root of the tree, which has indegree 0; (2) every node other than the
root has indegree 1; and (3) for every node a of the tree, there is a path from the root
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to a. A tree is calledfinitelygenerated if each node of the tree has afiniteoutdegree.
A tree is called finite if it has only finitely m a n y nodes; otherwise the tree is called
infinite. A branch of a tree is a path that originates at the root of the tree.

Konig's lemma
Every finitely generated tree with infinitely m a n y nodes must contain at least one
infinite branch.
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Chapter 1
A survey of BAN-like logics

This chapter surveys some prominent logics for reasoning about authentication pro
cols. The seminal work in this area is a modal logic of Burrows, Abadi and Needham [1],
usually called, the B A N logic. This logic has been extremely influential in the authentication protocol literature; it has stimulated widespread interest in the formal analysis
of protocols. The logics we will survey are more or less classified in the literature as
BAN-like logics. This nomenclature is somewhat loose, yet sufficiently descriptive to
convey our intent, viz: The BAN-like logics share the following two traits. (1) They
appear to be somehow related to the original B A N logic. (2) They were suggested by
others subsequent to the B A N logic and were motivated as extensions or improvements
over this logic.
W e follow the usual convention of naming BAN-like logics after their authors. In
addition to the B A N logic itself, we will survey the BAN-like logics proposed by:
• Gong, Needham and Yahalom [2] (GNY);
. Gong [3] (G);
• Gaarder and Snekkenes [4] (GS);
• Kailar and Gligor [5] (KG);
• van Oorschot [6] (VO);
• Mao and Boyd [7] (MB);
• Abadi and Tuttle [8] (AT);
• Syverson and van Oorschot [9] (SVO);
• Wedel and Kessler [10] (WK).

1

1.1.

Introduction
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W e will survey these logics in the order presented above, which is more or less chronological, with one exception. The logic of Abadi and Tuttle appeared prior to that of
Kailar and Gligor; however, we make the above rearrangement for the sake of convenience.

1.1 Introduction
We begin with some terminology which is commonly used to describe mechanisms
referred to as: authentication protocols. Broadly speaking, an authentication protocol
consists of a sequence of message exchanges designed to achieve some security objective
using cryptographic functions. The design of authentication protocols usually makes
the following two characteristic assumptions (cf. Needham and Schroeder [11]). (1) A
protocol is subject to an adversarial environment: it is assumed that there is an enemy
who can see and manipulate messages exchanged in the communication network at will,
with the purpose of subverting the protocol objectives. (2) The cryptographic functions
that underlie a protocol are assumed to be secure—for example, an encrypted message
is considered to be impossible for anyone to decrypt without knowing the decryption
key. The goals of authentication protocols can vary depending on application, but they
broadly fall into the following two categories: entity authentication, in which the aim is
to verify the identities of one or more communicating principals; and authenticated key
exchange, in which the aim is to make available a shared key between some principals.
Some of the earliest examples of authentication protocols can be found in the paper
by Needham and Schroeder [11].
The terminology used to describe authentication protocols includes the following
terms: principals, keys, and nonces. A principal is an entity which takes part in a
protocol run. Typically, the keys used by a protocol are classified as: the long-term
keys (also sometimes called terminal keys), which are cryptographic keys assumed to
be available initially; the session keys, which are cryptographic keys to be securely
obtained via the protocol itself. Usually, a session key obtained in one run of the
protocol is deemed unsafe for use in subsequent runs of the protocol. In particular, a
sound protocol should be robust against replay of session keys. In other words, if A
and B are two principals wishing to establish a session key via a suitable protocol, then
it should not be possible for an enemy to manipulate the protocol messages to make
the principals believe that an old session key is a new one. A nonce is a quantity which
is typically used for verifying the freshness of messages [11]. The simplest example
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of a nonce is a random number: if A generates a random number r and sends a
message containing r, then A can be assured that any message which cannot be feasibly
constructed without the knowledge of r cannot possibly be made prior to the message
in which A originally sends r.
In the literature most protocols are schematically described by means of syntax
representing a sequence of message exchanges between some principals. It is worth
noting that a typical protocol description identifies the order in which the protocol
messages are meant to be exchanged in a successful run of the protocol. Specifically, a
message exchange of the form A -» B : M means that, at the point where this exchange
appears in the associated protocol, (1) principal A is supposed to send a message M,
and (2) that this message is supposed to be received by principal B. This exchange
might be accompanied by additional checks which are performed by B upon receipt,
if any, of the message claimed as M ; typically B does not proceed with the rest of the
protocol if the stipulated check is unsuccessful.

1.2 BAN logic

The BAN logic [1] is a logic for reasoning about authentication protocols in terms
of belief statements. It provides a useful formalism which reflects at a high level of
abstraction how authentication protocols are intuitively understood to work.
The syntax of the B A N logic distinguishes three types of primitive objects: principals, keys, and nonces. A protocol message is expressed as a formula of the logic. Let
P, Q, R range over principals; let K range over keys; let X, Y, XX,X2,... range over
formulas. The formulas of the logic along with their informal semantics can be given
as follows.
P P\=X
believes X; P believes that X is true.

P<X

P sees X; P has received a message from which it can read X.

P ^x

P once saidX; P has sent (or uttered) a message containing X.

P^X

P has jurisdiction over X; P is trusted on the truth of X.

»(*)

P&Q

X is fresh; X has not been sent previous to the current protocol run.
P and Q share key K which is good in the sense that it remains
confidential to P, Q and principals trusted by either P or Q.

4F

P has K as its public key. The corresponding private-key K~l remains
confidential to P and principals trusted by P.

P^Q

P and Q share secret X in the sense that it remains
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confidential to P, Q and principals trusted by either P or Q.
{X}K

X encrypted with key K.

(X)Y

X combined with Y; Y serves as a proof of origin of X.

The notation used above is from the original presentation of the logic [1]. A lat
presentation of the logic [12] uses a more verbose but mnemonic notation; for example,
PbelievesX instead of P ^ X. However, we retain the original notation here. The logic
also includes as formulas the following expressions: (1) {X}K

from P, which means

that the encrypted message identified originates from P; (2) (X,Y), which means
the conjunction of X and Y (the B A N logic uses ',' as the propositional conjunction
operator). The logic treats conjunction as an operator on sets of formulas, leaving
properties such as associativity and commutativity implicit.
Essentially, the inference rules of the logic reflect intuitive consequences of the
semantics of the logical constructs. Typically, an inference rule is read, 'if formulas
Xi,...,Xn hold then formula Y holds', written more concisely as:

Xi,..., Xn
Y
The main inference rules of the logic are [1]:
• Message-meaning rules:

P^P&Q, P< {X}K

P^QY^X
This rule allows the identity of the sender of an encrypted message to be deduced
from the encryption key used. It makes up one of the three message-meaning
rules of the logic; the message-meaning rules for public-keys and shared secrets
are given along similar lines.
• Freshness rule:

pN am
This rule allows the freshness of a message to be deduced from the freshness of a
subpart of the message.
• Nonce-verification rule:

P^l(X),

P^Q^X

P\EEQ^EX
This rule allows beliefs from freshly uttered messages to be derived.
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• Jurisdiction rule:

P^Q^X, P^Q^X
P^X
This rule allows beliefs based on jurisdiction to be derived.
There are several other inference rules which reflect other properties of the various
logical constructs; however, the ones given above are central to the logic. For the sake
of convenience we list the original set of inference rules in appendix A.
A protocol to be analyzed using the logic is first transformed into an idealized protocol, which is essentially the sequence of protocol message exchanges expressed in terms
of a set of logical formulas. Roughly speaking, a protocol idealization reflects some
intended interpretation of the protocol messages. A n example helps convey the basic
idea behind idealization. Consider the message exchange S —> A : {Na,B,Kab}Kas->
in which a trusted server S distributes a session key Kai to be shared between A and
B. Here Kas is a key shared by A and S, and Na is A's nonce, which is used by A to
verify that the message is not a replay. Suppose the above message exchange is part
of some protocol, and that this message exchange implies that S asserts Kab to be a
good session key for A and B. Then this assertion is typically reflected in the protocol
idealization by the formula: (1) A < {Na, A *¥ B}i<as- To proceed with the analysis,
some formulas which express initial assumptions about the protocol in question are also
asserted, and the inference rules are then applied to determine whether the formulas
expressing the goal of the protocol are derivable using the logic. For example, the above
idealization can be accompanied by the following assumptions: (2) A ^ fj(iV0); and
(3) A ^ S |=>- A *hb B. It is easy to see that we can derive the formula

A ^ i ^ B

from (1), (2) and (3) using the logic. The import of the logical analysis is that it forces
us to make explicit the various assumptions needed to obtain the desired goals. If the
desired goals do not follow from an application of the logic, the pre-conditions to the
inference rules often provide a hint to further assumptions that might be needed. Intuitively, if an unreasonable assumption is found in the process, it suggests the presence
of a protocol flaw. For example, the B A N logic has been used to verify a flaw in the
Needham-Schroeder protocol pointed out by Denning and Sacco [13]. In analyzing the
protocol using their logic, Burrows et al. [1] show that thisflawmanifests as a dubious
statement amounting to the assumption that one of the parties believes that the session
key distributed via the protocol is fresh.
The logic has also been used by Burrows et al. [1] to analyze several other wellknown protocols from the literature. As concerning their example protocol analyses
using the logic it is worth rehashing an observation of van Oorschot [6]. Namely, that
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the protocol analyses presented by them might give the impression that all assumptions
needed in a protocol analysis are known a priori. However, it should be stressed that
the assumptions included in their analyses are made beforehand only for the sake
of appearance. The main idea in the using the logic is to detect various unobvious
assumptions which might be needed in addition to those assumptions that are initially
m a d e at the outset.
As noted by its authors [1], [14], the validity of the inference rules of the logic
depends on a number of subtle assumptions that are made outside of the logic. For
example, the validity of the message-meaning rule above requires the assumption that
P has not sent the encrypted message { X } # himself. This is reflected simply by
writing the encrypted message as '{AT}#- from i2' in the original rule together with
the side condition that P ^ R. Another important assumption concerns the nonceverification rule above. There it is assumed that the message X

does not contain

any encrypted subparts (i.e., any subformula of the form {Y}x), since intuitively a
principal m a y not necessarily believe in a message that it cannot read. If we suppose
that this assumption is satisfied, the rule effectively implies that principals are honest,
in the sense that all message parts which a principal can read from the messages it sends
must be believed by that principal. However, Burrows et al. recommend a rather strong
operational notion of honesty: they require that a principal believe every message he
sends. This strong notion of honesty has drawn some criticism of the logic, despite
the fact that the soundness of the nonce-verification rule does not strictly depend on
this requirement. For example, Heintze and Tygar [15] note that such a requirement
precludes a B A N logic analysis of the Needham-Schroeder protocol, since this protocol
requires a principal to send an encrypted message he m a y not believe in (Message 3).
However, it is fair to say that the strong version of honesty recommended by Burrows
et al. appears to be an inadvertent slip; if we retain the weaker version of honesty, an
analysis of the protocol using the logic still goes through as intended. Moreover, the
original B A N logic analysis of the protocol does not conform to the notion of honesty in
the strong sense. O n the other hand, the weak notion of honesty appears to be a quite
useful requirement to make in the logic. For example, Engberg [16] also enforces the
same weak notion of honesty while applying the logic; he shows that absurd conclusions
can be drawn using the logic otherwise.
The B A N logic also makes two general assumptions concerning encrypted messages, (a) It assumes message integrity in the sense that encrypted messages cannot
be spliced or aggregated without destroying the message structure—for example, that
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an encrypted message {M, M'}K
two encrypted messages {M}K

cannot be obtained from the sole knowledge of the
and {M'}K

(and vice-versa). However, there m a y be

protocols where the cryptographic mechanisms used do not provide such guarantees
(cf. Boyd [17] and Gligor et al. [18]). (b) It assumes that encrypted messages are verifiable in the sense that the result of a decryption can be somehow verified to be genuine.
To put (a) and (b) another way, the logic cannot be used to detect the lack of message
integrity or message verifiability in protocols.
Although the B A N logic is simple to use, proofs carried out in the logic require
subtle interpretation. A n early example of the underlying subtlety is provided by a
protocol due to Nessett [19] (we omit Message 2 from the original protocol since it is
not relevant to the present discussion):
Message 1. A -> B : {Na, Kab}K-i
Here B trusts A to generate a session key Ka\, to be shared between them.

The

nonce Na is used by A to convince B that Message 1 is fresh. K~x is A's private key
for use in a suitable public-key system. The corresponding public-key Ka is publicly
known. Nessett [19] asserts some formulas meant to reflect the initial assumptions,
which include amongst others the formula A ^ A «4b B, and shows that the B A N logic
can be used to sanction the protocol in the sense that the formula B ^ A «4b B can be
derived from Message 1. The protocol of course is insecure, nevertheless, since everyone
knows Ka and can thus decrypt Message 1 using Ka to obtain Kab- Based on the above
example protocol analysis, Nessett claims that the B A N logic is flawed. However,
Burrows et al. [20] refute the grounds on which Nessett advances his claim. They
object to the assumption A ^ A if B above as being unjustifiable since Message 1
contradicts this assumption. The essence of the controversy surrounding Nessett's
point and the counterpoint of Burrows et al. is not novel: a 'proof is only as good as
the assumptions it makes. However, it does accurately point out a practical difficulty
in appealing to proofs in the logic.

1.3 GNY logic

The logic of Gong, Needham and Yahalom [2] is one of the earliest BAN-like logics.
Their logic largely modifies and adds to the B A N logic notation and rules in an attempt
to provide more features than the logic on which it is framed.
Unlike the B A N logic, the syntax of the G N Y logic distinguishes between messages and assertions about messages. The former are represented in the G N Y logic
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as formulas (which do not assume truth-values), whereas the latter are represented
as statements. Essentially, this distinction precludes messages from being treated as
believable expressions in the logic.
Let X, Y range over formulas, and let C range over statements. The formulas of
the G N Y logic include the following:

{X}K encryption of X with shared key K.
{X}^1

decryption of X with shared key K.

{X}+K

encryption of X with public-key +K.

{X}_x

decryption of X with private-key — K.

H(X)

one-way hash of X.

F(X, Y)

a many-to-one function of X and Y which is one-to-one and invertible
when either X or Y isfixed;for example, X © Y.

X ~» C

X with extension C; C reflects some interpretation of X.

Let P, Q, R range over principals. Essentially, the new notions introduced in the
G N Y logic are expressed by the following statements:

P < *X P has received a message from which it can read X and
X is not-originated-from P in the sense that X has not
been previously sent by P in the current run.
P ^ ®(P)

P can identify that certain messages never-originated-from him
in the sense that they have not been sent by P in any run.

P 3 X

P possesses X; P has received X or can compute X.

P ^ <i>(X)

P believes X is recognizable; P recognizes X in the sense that
P can forecast part or whole of the contents of X without
receiving X.

P ^ $ = ^ Q N *

P believes Q is honest and competent in the sense that
Q has jurisdiction over all his beliefs.

The remaining statements of the logic are made along similar lines to the BAN log
except that they are formed within the scope of the belief construct; for example, the
G N Y logic includes a statement of the form P ^ l(X), but not j(X). The term shared
secrets is used to encompass both encryption keys as well as other types of secrets in
the G N Y logic. Typically, the symbol S ranges over secrets. The logic uses a single
construct in place of the two B A N logic constructs f* and # . However, the G N Y logic
notation for sharing of secrets is rather loose: P ^ P O- Q. This notation is rather
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restrictive since it does not admit of statements of the form R ^ P A

Q when the

principal denoted by R is distinct from the principals denoted by P and Q. However,
such statements are often needed in practice, as is evident from the protocol analyses
given in the G N Y logic paper; see, for example, the analysis of the Needham-Schroeder
protocol there (p. 241).
The G N Y logic has over forty inference rules, many of them quite complex in
terms of the number of premises involved. For the sake of convenience we list them in
appendix B. Some of these are rules which are absent from the B A N logic but which
seem intuitively justifiable. For example, one part of the freshness rule F2,

P N IIPO, P 9 K
p |= »({*}*), PNiKTO* 1 )'
essentially captures an inference which did not seem to be required for the protocol
analyses carried out by Burrows et al. [1] using their logic. A large number of rules
reason about new notions introduced in the logic, for instance, those of possession and
recognizability.
The rest of this section discusses the intended role of the following notions found

in the logic: not-originated-from and never-originated-from, possession, recognizab
and honesty.

Not-originated-from and Never-originated-from
The idea behind the notions of not-originated-from and never-originated-from is to
capture the side condition to the B A N logic message-meaning rules for shared keys.
Recall that the side condition reflects the assumption that a principal can tell whether
an encrypted message was sent by himself or not. The informal semantics of the notion
of not-originated-from is that, if P receives X at some point and X is not-originatedfrom P (written P < *X), then P has not sent X since the start of the current protocol
run up to that point. The G N Y logic is accompanied by a parser algorithm which
mechanically translates a protocol description into one with the not-originated-marker
*. There are two distinct ways the G N Y logic attempts to capture the original B A N
logic side condition. Firstly, it reformulates the B A N logic message-meaning rule for
shared keys by including premises of the form P < *{X}K
of P < {X}K

and P ^ §(X) in place

and the extra side condition; see the message interpretation rule II in

appendix B.6. A n alternative reformulation simply distinguishes the side condition
by means of a premise of the form P ^ (8>(P); see the never-originated-rule II' in
appendix B.8. Despite their intuitive appeal, the usefulness of the above two notational
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devices is rather limited. Since the parser algorithm only controls the current run of
the protocol, the G N Y logic reformulation involving the not-originated-from notion is
of use only in the case of a protocol which requires a message X to be conveyed by
some principal P and such that the same message X is to be later told to P. T h e rule
II then produces the desirable effect of blocking the derivation of beliefs for P from X.
T h e reformulation which makes use of the never-originated-from notion simply seems
to be another way of writing the side condition. Since the G N Y logic does not include
any rules with statement of the form P ^ <S>(-P) as conclusions, it is debatable whether
this notion represents an improvement over the B A N logic side condition.

Possession
T h e notion of possession is a noteworthy addition introduced in the G N Y logic. This
notion underlies m a n y rules of the B A N logic; for example, in the B A N logic message
seeing rule for shared keys:

P ^ P & Q , P<{X}K
P<X
it is implicitly assumed that P possesses K. However, this assumption has the effect
of conflating the two distinct notions of possession of a key K and that of belief about
K. T h e G N Y logic m a k e this distinction explicit; the above rule is reworked as:

P<{X}K,
P3K
P«X

Tq
i6

Recognizability
As noted in previous section, the B A N logic makes the implicit assumption that encrypted messages are verifiable. T h e G N Y logic captures this assumption explicitly
by reformulating the B A N logic message-meaning rules; for example, in the message
interpretation rule II of the G N Y logic,

P<*{X}K, PBK, P^P&Q,
P^c^(X), P\=j{X,K)
P\=Q^X, P^Q^ {X}K,
P^QBK
the premise P |= </>(X) essentially reflects the implicit B A N logic assumption that encrypted messages are verifiable. A n example protocol analysis which evidently demonstrates the usefulness of the recognizability feature of the logic can be found in the
G N Y logic paper, where the logic is shown to reveal the lack of message verifiability
in the enhanced Needham-Schroeder protocol. Specifically, an analysis of the protocol
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using the G N Y logic does not yield a certain desired protocol goal, in contrast to a
B A N logic analysis. The difference is attributed to the fact that one of the message
exchanges used by the protocol is: Q sends to P an encrypted message {N9}K,

where

Nq is a nonce generated by Q and K is a session key between P and Q. The lack of
recognizability of this message relative to P produces the desirable effect of blocking
the derivation of the following statement using the logic: P ^ Q ^ P <-> Q.
The G N Y logic has several rules which allow derivation of statements of the form
P ^ (f*(X); see the 'recognizability rules' in appendix B.5. While the notion of recognizability appears to be a useful addition to the logic, certain recognizability rules of
the G N Y logic are problematic; we will discuss some of the problems involved in the
next chapter.

Honesty
Recall that the B A N logic makes the implicit assumption that principals are honest.
However, not all principals m a y be equally honest; in other words, the notion of honesty
can be specified relative to a trusting principal. The G N Y logic makes such a viewpoint
explicit. Essentially, the B A N logic nonce-verification rule is reformulated in the logic
as the jurisdiction rule J2,

P )= Q h» Q N *, PWQ^(X<^C), FN KX)
P^QWC
where the premise P |s Q (=£> Q ^ * means that Q is trusted by P over his beliefs.
The honesty requirement is enforced during a protocol analysis using the G N Y
logic by means of a belief consistency check: to idealize a protocol message exchange
P —> Q : X

as Q < *X ~> C a precondition is that the statement P ^ C holds.

Similarly, a possession consistency check is also carried out to enforce the intuitive
requirement that a principal can only send possessed messages: another precondition
to the above idealization step is that the statement P 3 X holds.

1.4 G logic

The original GNY logic has been revised by Gong [3] in his doctoral thesis. The r
logic mostly expands the G N Y logic set of rules concerning notions such as freshness
and message interpretation. Essentially, the only new feature to be found in this logic
is a notion called eligibility:
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P is eligible to convey X; P holds the relevant possessions and beliefs
to convey X.

Here the requirement that P holds the 'relevant' possessions and beliefs for a formula
X ~> C is roughly understood to m e a n that the statements P 9 X and P ^ C hold,
among other things. In the revised logic, the consistency requirement given in the
G N Y logic paper is reflected by the rule Tl [3],
P -> Q : AT, P oc X

Q<X
which essentially excludes message exchanges not satisfying the belief or possession
consistency checks. Additionally, the logic includes several rules, called 'eligibility
rules', which allow statements of the form P oc X to be derived. In effect, these rules
define the set of formulas which a principal is eligible to convey. For example, the rule
El [3],

P3 X

ToTx'
says that a principal is eligible to convey any formula he possesses. It is worth noting
that in the revised logic P's eligibility to convey { X } K "^ C is not intended to m e a n
the same thing as (1) P possession of X and K, and (2) P's belief in C. This is
apparent from the eligibility rule E5 [3],

P oc X, P3 K, P |EB P &Q,
P oc {X}K ~> C

P^C

where the premise P ^ P & Q indicates a component of P's 'relevant' beliefs which is
independent of P's belief in C. It is thus clear that the consistency requirement m a d e
in the revised logic is more stringent than that motivated in the G N Y logic paper.
The significance of the belief and possession consistency requirements is further
discussed by Gong [21]. H e argues that their absence can lead to infeasible specifications
in the sense that: (1) protocols which do not meet the possession consistency check
cannot be realized, and (2) protocols which do not meet the belief consistency check
m a y allow non-causal beliefs to be derived. Here non-causality of beliefs means that
some statement of the form P |= Q ^ C holds, but that the statement Q ^ C does
not hold.

1.5 GS logic

The logic of Gaarder and Snekkenes [4], [22] extends the BAN logic in two ways: (1)
reformulates the B A N logic notions and rules for public-key systems. (2) It introduces
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new notions for reasoning about freshness mechanisms which lie outside the scope of
the B A N logic. These two extensions are described below.
Recall that the notions of binding of a public-key and that of the secrecy of the
corresponding private-key are represented by means of a single construct in the B A N
logic: H->. The G S logic distinguishes between these two notions using the following
constructs:
VK(K, P) K is P's authentic public-key.
n(P)

P's private-key is good in the sense that it is a secret known
to P alone.

The above distinction is further reflected in the G S logic by the rule R13 [4],

P^VK(K,Q),

P^I1(Q),
P^Q^X

P<a(X,Q)

which is essentially obtained by reformulating the B A N logic message-meaning rule
for public-keys; here a(X, Q) replaces {X}K-i

used in the latter rule to represent X

signed with Q's private-key. The G S logic also replaces the B A N logic message seeing
rule for public-keys with the following rule [4]:

P<a(X,Q)
R14

-

P<X

Notice that the above rule makes the implicit assumption that a principal possesses
every principal's public-key, including his own.
Essentially, the B A N logic nonce-verification rule tells us that no beliefs can be
derived from a message sent during a protocol run if that message is not fresh (i.e. if that
message has been sent previous to the current protocol run). However, some protocols
make use of mechanisms which do not rely on the notion of freshness in the above sense
and, yet, for which it is intuitively reasonable to establish the level of belief supported
by the nonce-verification rule. The basic idea underlying such mechanisms is the use of
a duration-stamp to indicate a time interval for which a message is claimed to be good.
The above observations essentially motivate the remaining G S logic extensions that
incorporate time into the logical syntax. In particular, the logic includes the following
constructs to reflect the associated notions of duration-stamp and good time interval.

(Q(ti,t2),X) X tagged with duration-stamp @(ti,t2); X holds in the interval tx, t
<\(ti,t2)

h, t2 denotes a good time interval; the current time lies in the interval
between ti and t^.
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The logic includes the following rule to reason about duration-stamps [4]:
R1,

P^QW

R5

-

A(t.,<2), PNQ

h(6(tuh),x)

FWoWx

Here it is assumed that the validity of a time interval is ascertained by a principal
relative to its own local clock. The rule R15 allows beliefs from uttered messages
attested by duration-stamps to be derived; it is framed similar to the nonce-verification
rule of the B A N logic.
The import of the above extensions is demonstrated in the G S logic paper [4] by
means of a concrete protocol which has beenfieldedfor use: the C C I T T X.509 protocol.
A n analysis of this protocol using the extended logic is shown to compare favorably
with a B A N logic analysis of the same protocol. The main improvement concerns the
idealization of the certificates used to distribute public-keys in the protocol. A protocol
analysis using the B A N logic requires the dubious assumption that the certificates are
fresh, despite the fact that the actual working of the protocol does not make this
assumption. Stated another way, the timing mechanism used to guarantee the validity
of the certificates in the protocol can be captured in the G S logic, whereas in the B A N
logic it cannot.

1.6 KG logic

Kailar and Gligor [5] have devised a BAN-like logic to extend the applicability o
original B A N logic. They argue that the B A N logic suffers from the following two
limitations: (1) The B A N notion of key jurisdiction is dependent on key generation;
that is, a principal who is authorized to generate a key only has jurisdiction over that
key. However, there m a y be protocols which do not satisfy key jurisdiction in the above
sense. Gligor et al. [18] sketch an example to motivate the restrictive nature of the
B A N logic notion of key jurisdiction. Suppose that (a) P trusts Q to read and forward
a key K generated by R, and (b) P trusts Q to maintain the privacy of K. Although Q
does not have jurisdiction over K in the above sense, P's trust in Q should allow P to
infer K is a good key for use with Q. Nonetheless the B A N logic does not capture this
line of reasoning. (2) The B A N logic allows derivation of non-causal beliefs in certain
protocols. The K G logic is essentially aimed to address the above two concerns.
The syntax of the K G logic makes the ordering of protocol message exchanges explicit using the notion of a message round (also called, message instance). Specifically,
a message round corresponds to a transfer of a message contents X from a source principal P to a destination principal Q, possibly via other principals, with the property
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that either: (1) X is signed with P's private-key and encrypted with Q's public-key,
or (2) X is encrypted with a key shared by P and Q. The idea of message ordering
can be explained by means of an example. Suppose we have a protocol which transfers
data values X and Y from S to A and B, respectively, as follows:
Message 1. S ^ A :
Message 2. A -• B :

{X,{Y}KJKas
{Y}Kbs

Here Kas and Kbs are keys shared by A and B with S, respectively. The above protocol
consists of two message rounds: one which transfers X from S to A and another one
which transfers Y from S to B.

The Messages 1 and 2 above are then explicitly

represented in terms of message rounds using the following tuples, respectively:

{Mi, S, A, (X, {M2, S, B, Y})} and {M2, S, B, Y},
where in general (1) a tuple of the form {Mi,P,Q,X} denotes that X is transferred
from P to Q in message round i; and (2) the message rounds comprising the protocol
are consecutively denoted as: Mi, M2, ..., Mi for afixedpositive integer I.
The additional notions introduced in the logic along with their informal semantics
can be given as:
P > {Mi, P, Q,X} P sends a message with contents X in round i to Q.
Q < {Mi, P, Q,X}

Q sees a message with contents X in round i;
Q reads X and knows X originated from P.

KS(X, Mi)

the knowledge set of X at round Mi; the set of all principals who
know X when the message identified in Mi is seen.

Trustx(P,Q)

P trusts Q on the context X.

Apart from the B A N logic notation, some additional notation from predicate logic and
set theory is used in formulating the set of inference rules of the logic; for example, the
symbol V is used to denote universal quantification and the symbol £ is used to denote
set membership. Below we list some of the rules of the K G logic [5].

• Belief in the uniqueness of the message recipient:
P>{Mt,P,Q,X],

P^(R<{Mj,P,Q,X})

P^(R = Q)
Notice that this rule is cast from the perspective of a message originator instead
of the intended recipient of the message; it essentially replaces the B A N logic
message-meaning rules.
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• Set inclusion belief (1):

P$KS(X,Mi), P«{Mi+uQ,P,X}
P£KS(X,Mz+i) = {P,Q}
This rule allows belief in the knowledge set of a message content to be derived
based on messages that are seen.
• Set inclusion belief (2):

P^(Q^KS(X,Mj)), P>{Mi+i,P,Q,X}
P |= KS(X, Mi+i) = KS(X, Mi) U {Q}
This rule allows belief in the knowledge set of a message content to be derived
based on messages that are sent; it reflects a notion of so-called 'eager' belief, not
present in the B A N logic.
• Belief in the freshness of message contents:
P£$(X,Mk),

P<{Mk,Q,P,(X,Y)}

PWKY,Mk)
Here the premise P ^ l(X, Mk) is taken to m e a n that P believes X is fresh in
round k; and similarly for the rule's conclusion.1
• Belief about another principal's knowledge set beliefs:
P<{Mk,Q,P,X},
P\^$(X,Mk)
P\=Q\B(KS(X,Mk)
= {P,Q})
This rule essentially replaces the B A N logic nonce-verification rule.
• First-level beliefs:
P |= {P, Q} C KS(K, Mj), TrustK(P, R) V P £ KS(K, Mi)

Here: (1) Mi is taken to mean the last round of the protocol being analyzed, and
(2) the premise TrustK(P,R) V P £ KS(K,Mi)

essentially says that P trusts all

principals w h o know K to maintain its secrecy. In effect, the above rule allows
beliefs about keys to be derived without the need for key jurisdiction in the sense
of the B A N logic.
intuitively, this rule appears to be questionable. From the the B A N logic notion of freshness it is
apparent that we cannot infer that Y is fresh from the fact that (X, Y) is fresh, since this would imply
that if Y was sent previous to the current protocol run then so are all messages of the form (X, Y).
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• Second-level beliefs:
P\EQ^{P,Q}C

KS(K,Mi), P |= TrustK(Q,R) V P £ KS(K,Mi)

P^Q\=P&Q

Kailar and Gligor [5] give several examples of protocol analyses using t
to demonstrate its potential advantages over the B A N logic. Here we sketch one of
the example protocol analyses which they give to show that the B A N logic does not
preserve belief ordering. Specifically, a ticket-forwarding protocol is analyzed using the
B A N logic, based on the following idealization of the protocol [5, Subsection 5.3]:
Message 2. TGS -> X
Message 3.

X ->• Y

Message 4.

Y -» S

...,{xKxa-ss}TGSKx_
...,{XJ*'S}KX.Y
...,{X <—>
S}KX/Y_S

In the protocol analysis given, it is essentially shown that although Y ^ X ^ X
S is derived from Message 3, only S ^ X ^ X
instead of the desired S |= Y ^ X

|EE X

i—>

<—> S is derived from Message 4,

£^->S S. Notice that the latter is still

possible to derive using the B A N logic if we appeal to the weak notion of honesty
discussed in Section 1.2. Accordingly, we cannot include the formula X

<—> S in

Ay/ y g

the idealization of Message 4 above, since in their analysis Y ^ X

i—Y S does not

hold. However, in accordance with the honesty requirement we can include the formula
X

|= X

K

^

S

S instead, since Y |= X |= X

S ^ Y ^ X ^ X

1.7

K

^

S

S holds. The desired formula

¥-^S S is then easily derived.

V O logic

Van Oorschot [6] provides an extension of the BAN and GS logics to cate
ment protocols. The notion of key agreement used in such protocols can be described as
follows. Two principals wishing to establish a common secret key individually generate

a pair of keys consisting of a public key-agreement key and a private key-agreeme
As these names suggest, each principal keeps its private key-agreement key secret, but
reveals its public key-agreement key. The common key is then obtained by each principal as some suitable function / of its own private key-agreement key and the other
principal's public key-agreement key, where / is chosen in advance and made public.
A characteristic feature of the above notion of key agreement is that the common key
established is not obtained from any trusted principal and is exclusively obtained by
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the two principals who derive the key jointly. However, the B A N logic notion of good
keys cannot be used to distinguish this feature: recall that the B A N logic construct
P & Q means that K is good for P and Q in the sense that if is known only to P or Q
or principals trusted by either of them. The above observation essentially motivates the
V O logic refinements of the broader B A N logic notion of good shared keys. Specifically,
the refinements include the following two constructs:
P1^ Q K is P's unconfirmed secret for use with Q; P possesses K and knows
that no other principal except Q can possibly obtain K.
P*&

Q

K is P's confirmed secret for use with Q; P receives evidence to the
effect that its unconfirmed secret meant for use with Q is indeed
possessed by Q.

Here possession is treated as in the sense of the G N Y logic. The V O logic includes
the construct P has K in place of the less verbose G N Y construct P 9 K. As in the
G S logic, the notions of binding of a public-key and the secrecy of the corresponding
private-key are treated distinctly. In the V O logic, further distinction is m a d e between
the asymmetric key pairs used for signature, encryption, and key agreement. However,
since the notation for asymmetric encryption key pairs is not exploited in the logic, we
omit it here.
PKa(P, K)

K is the public signature-verification key associated with P.

PK~1(P)

P's private signature key K~x is good in the sense that it is
known only to P.

PK5(P, K)

K is the public key-agreement key associated with P.

PK71(P)

P's private key-agreement key K'1 is good in the sense that
it is known only to P.

{X}sP

X signed with P's private signature key.

{X}K

X encrypted with shared key K.

confirm(K)

Current knowledge of K has been demonstrated in the sense that K
has been used to perform some cryptographic action such as encrypting
or hashing.

Notice that the constructs PK?{P)

and {X}sP

essentially replace their G S logic coun-

terparts n ( P ) and o-(X,P), respectively.
The logic introduces several rules for reasoning about key-agreement keys. For the
sake of notational convenience, the following adjustments are m a d e in presenting the
rules there [6]:
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• PKS(P) is written in place of PKS(P, K) when K is evident from the context or
is not explicitly referred to, and
• PKs(P) is used to denote the value of the public-key agreement key of P.
The rules for key-agreement keys are given as follows [6].
• Unqualified key-agreement:
PhasPK-6\P),
PhasPKs(U)
P has K

R30

Here K = f(PKj1(P), PKS(U)) is called an unqualified key for P, which is taken
to mean that the identity of principal U is not verified.
• Qualified key-agreement:
R31

P

N PKJ\P), P N PKs(Q\ P N PKJ\Q)
P^P^Q

Here K— denotes that K is a qualified key, which is taken to mean that P knows
that K cannot be possessed by any other principal except Q.
Key confirmation:
R32.

P ^ P f4 Q, P sees *confirm(K)
P\=PK4Q

Here K+ denotes that K is a confirmed key, which is taken to mean that P has
obtained confirmation that Q actually possesses K.

The VO logic paper contains analyses of three well-known key-agreement protocols us
ing the extended logic: the STS protocol, the Goss protocol and the Giinther protocol.
(An informal description of the working of some other notable key-agreement protocols independent of any logical formalism can be found in a paper by Rueppel and van
Oorschot [23].) The analyses are shown to reveal some subtle differences between the
assumptions made and the goals reached by these protocols. The comparison are made
on the basis of six generic goals captured using the logical syntax. For example, the two
goals called secure key establishment (G3) and key confirmation (G4) are respectively
expressed as follows [6]: A ^ A <h» B and A ^ Ait B (and similarly for B), where
A and B denote the two principals wishing to establish a c o m m o n key K via some
suitable protocol. All the above three protocols are shown to attain G3, whereas only
the STS protocol is shown to attain G4.
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1.8 M B logic

Mao and Boyd [7] have devised a BAN-like logic to address some of their objection
to the B A N logic. Their main criticism concerns the lack of well-defined rules for
protocol idealization in using the B A N logic. The point is that this difficulty can lead
to incorrect idealizations. A simplified version of the Otway-Rees protocol is used as an
example of a protocol which can be sanctioned using the B A N logic and yet for which
an attack is possible (cf. Boyd and M a o [24]). Their other criticisms of the B A N logic
include the lack of typing and the absence of a notion of confidentiality. The former
criticism concerns an oddity noted as early as by Burrows et al. [1] themselves, namely
that their logic does not make any distinction between messages and formulas (truthvalued expressions); for example, the logical syntax allows as formulas expressions of
the form P ^ N, where N is a nonce. The latter criticism is motivated by means of
the flaw in Nessett's protocol: the flaw is traced to a failure of the protocol to maintain
the confidentiality of the key distributed.
The syntax of the M B logic makes a distinction between messages and formulas
by means of a typing mechanism. The logical syntax is divided into three syntactic
classes: V (for principals), M

(for messages), and T (for formulas). Typically,

• the letters P, Q, R, ... are used to denote elements of class V;
• the letters K, M, N, ... are used to denote elements of class M; and
• the letters X, Y, Z, ... are used to denote elements of class T.
Additionally, the symbol S is used to denote a set of principals; Sc denotes the
ment of the set of principals denoted by S. A set of formation rules defines the class M
of messages and the class T of formulas of the logic. For example, the belief formulas
are formed as follows: . ^ . ^ x f - ^ f .

The B A N logic constructs ++, H- and \

are similarly reformulated. Further, 'A' replaces ',' used to represent the conjunction
operator in the B A N logic. The additional notions introduced in the M B logic can be
given as follows.
K
P said M using the encryption key K.

P\^M
P<M

P sees M

sup(P)

P is a super-principal.

S° 4M

the principals in the set Sc cannot see M.

using the decryption key K.
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O f these the first t w o are essentially refinements of the B A N logic notions of said and
seen messages. T h e idea here is to m a k e the key used to convey a message or see a
message explicit; the original B A N logic constructs (without superscripts) are taken to
m e a n that the key used is not of particular significance. T h e notion of a super-principal
is used to capture unconditional trust in s o m e principal. Notice that this notion is far
less expressive w h e n compared to the B A N logic notion of jurisdiction. T h e notion
cannot see provides a basis to express confidentiality requirements.2
T h e terms challenge, replied challenge and response are used to capture the contextdependent role played by message elements. Typically, a nonce issued by s o m e principal
is called a challenge in a message where it is originally sent; it is called a replied challenge
in a message where it is received by the originator of the challenge. A response is
taken to be a primitive message which is combined with a replied challenge by the
originator of the message containing the replied challenge. T h e above terminology is
used to formulate rules for protocol idealization using two constructs, called 'message
combinators': | and 3ft. T h efirstof these, '|', is used to associate challenges or responses;
the second, '3£', is used to associate responses with challenges, typically as response 3ft
challenge.
Below w e list the principal rules of the logic [7].
• Authentication rule (Al):

P^P&QAP<M
P^Q\^M
• Confidentiality rule (C):

P\=P&QAP^SC4MAP\^M
P £ (S U {Q}f 4 M
• Nonce-verification rule (N):
P |= j(M) AP^Q^M

P^Q^P^Q
2

W e can formulate this notion more clearly, and without any loss of generality, as:

5 <J| M

the principals in the set S cannot see M.

However, we retain the more cumbersome formulation in deference to the original presentation of the
logic.
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• Super-principal rule (S):
P^Q^XAP^

sup(Q)

P\EEX

• Fresh rule (F):

P |= l(M) A P < NMM

P N IIW
• Good-key rule (Gl):

P^{P,Q}C4KAP^^(K)
P^P&Q
A backward reasoning technique is recommended in analyzing protocols using the logic.
The aim of this technique is to derive the minimal sets of assumptions needed to infer
afixedset of desired protocol goals using the logic. The reasoning technique is applied
to the Nessett protocol and it is shown that an application of the confidentiality rule
is needed to meet a specific protocol goal, which in turn requires an unreasonable
assumption.

1.9 AT logic

The BAN-like logics that we have discussed so far rely heavily on syntax,
apparent effort being made to define the semantics of logical expressions independently
of the syntax. The work of Abadi and Tuttle [8] marks a turning point in this regard:
it is one of the earliest works to make an attempt at providing such a semantics for a
BAN-like logic and to suggest a soundness theorem for the proposed logic.
The A T logic can be thought of as a reformulated B A N logic with a revised semantics. As discussed by Abadi and Tuttle, the motivations for their logic include the
following semantic issues related to the original logic:
• The meaning of good keys: They note that the secrecy property stipulated in the
informal semantics of the B A N logic notion of good keys is not strictly necessary
for the soundness of the message-meaning rules of the logic. This point is reflected
in the formal semantics of the B A N logic, since there a good key K is defined
in terms of who sends messages encrypted with K. However, according to them,
this definition is also quite strong: if K is a good key between P and Q then
anyone can send a message encrypted with K as long as P and Q are the only
principals using K to encrypt messages.
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• Possession v/s Belief: They argue that these two notions should be m a d e distinct
in the logic, for the sake of a proper semantics. This observation is motivated by
the fact that the notion of possession is implicit in the B A N logic seeing rules,
where it is assumed that belief in a key implies possession of that key.
• Stability of beliefs: In the BAN logic, it is assumed that formulas are stable
the sense that a formula remains true once it becomes true. In particular, the
stability of belief formulas is critical to the soundness of the nonce-verification
rule of the logic. However, this requirement can be removed by expressing the
conclusion of the rule slightly differently, viz: if P said X and X is fresh, then P
has recently said X. To carry this idea further, they suggest defining the notion
of jurisdiction in terms of the notion recently said in place of belief. The B A N
logic essentially takes the latter course because of the way the nonce-verification
rule is designed to work.
The syntax of the A T logic is designed to exclude messages from being treated
as formulas, unlike the B A N logic. Another difference concerns the fact that the
A T logic relates more closely to traditional propositional modal logics of belief: it
includes primitive propositions and the standard propositional connectives for negation,

disjunction, conjunction, implication, and equivalence, respectively denoted as ->, V
D, and =. Typically,
• the symbols P, Q, R, S range over principals,
• the symbol K ranges over keys,
• the symbol X ranges over messages, and
• the symbols <p, ib range over formulas.
The logic proper includes a set of axioms which essentially express the statements
captured via inference rules in the B A N logic as formulas in the logic itself. Most of
the logical axioms are formulated without the use of the belief operator. For example,
one of the axioms for message-meaning is stated as:

A5. P &QARsees{Xs}K D QsaidX

with the side condition that P =£ S. The axioms for belief are formulated separa
for example, one of the axioms for belief is given as:
Al. P believes d> A P believes (<b D if>) D P believes tp
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The logic also includes two inference rules typically found in more traditional logics:
modus ponens (Rl) and belief necessitation (R2).
Rl. From h (b and h <b D vj infer h xb.
R2. From h <£ infer h P believes <j>.
Here h </> means that <£ is derivable in the logic.
A model of computation is given to define a semantics for the logic. The main idea
of the model is to assign truth-values to formulas with respect to a run r and a time
t, where a run typically represents an execution of a given protocol. Each principal is
assumed to be capable of performing the following actions:
• send(m,Q): the action of sending of message m to principal Q.
• receive(m): the action of receiving of message m.
• newkey(K): the action of generating key K.
Further, the two notions history and key set are associated with each principal. A
principal's history in r is taken to be the sequence of all actions P performs in r; the
key set is simply the set of keys the principal holds. The notion of a key set is essentially
used to define two operations on messages: seen-submsgs^M) and said-submsgs^M).
If K denotes the key set of some principal P, then roughly speaking: thefirstoperation
determines the messages seen by P as a result of receiving M; the second operation
determines the messages said by P as a result of sending M.

The notions sketched

above suffice to give aflavorof the truth conditions defined in the A T logic paper. For
example, the truth condition for P seesX is stated as,
(r, k) [= P sees X
iff, for some message M, at time k in r:
1. receive(M) appears in P's local history, and
2. X £ seen-submsgs^M), where K is P's key set.
A notable aspect of the semantics of the A T logic is its treatment of the notion of
belief. This notion is defined in terms of possible worlds, where a world is a pair (r, k)

consisting of a run r and a time k: a principal P believes a formula <f> in (r, k) if <f> is
true in all the worlds P considers possible in (r,k). This contrasts with the syntactic
approach used in defining the notion of belief in the B A N logic.
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The A T logic paper includes a theorem (cf. Theorem 1 of Abadi and Tuttle [8])
which states that the logical axiomatization is sound with respect to the semantics
defined. However, no proof of this theorem has been published.

1.10 SVO logic

Syverson and van Oorschot [9] have devised a BAN-like logic to encompass selecti
features from the logics B A N , G N Y , V O and A T . The syntax and semantics of their
logic mostly follows the line of the A T logic with additional extensions. To deal with
the demands that their aimed expansion seemingly brings to the logical syntax, they
employ some notational short cuts. For example, the notation {X}K

is used to denote

encrypted (using a public-key encryption or a shared key encryption function) as well
as signed messages. Additionally, the notation F(XX,... ,Xk) subsumes the previous
notation and also the notation (Xx,... ,Xk) used to denote concatenated messages.
Notice that the authors of previous BAN-like logics have avoided such notational short
cuts. The syntax of formulas of the S V O logic includes constructs to denote binding
of public-keys for signature verification and public-keys for key agreement: PKC(P, K)
and PKg(P,K),

which are essentially from the V O logic. Unlike the latter, however,

no explicit constructs are defined in the syntax to denote the V O logic concepts related
to goodness of corresponding private keys. The construct P receives X essentially
replaces the construct P seesX of the A T logic. The latter is reserved for the notion of
possession: P sees X is used to denote that P possesses X. The notation K~l is used
to denote the complement of key K. Most of the axioms and the inference rules found
in the A T logic are included in a slightly different form in the S V O logic. For example,
the message-meaning axiom (A5) of the A T logic is recast as:
3. P & Q A R received {XQ}K

D Q saidX

The S V O logic includes several other axioms to reflect the intended extensions. For
example, the following axiom is designed to reflect the V O logic notion of key agreement:

5. PKS(P, Kv) A PK8(Q, Kq)
where Kpq = f(Kp,K~x)

DP&Q

— f(Kq, K~x) for some key agreement function /. Similarly,

the axiom given below is designed to capture the possession rules of the G N Y logic
collectively, barring the rules PI and P3. (The latter two are reflected by means of
individual axioms.)
10.

PseesXx A • • • A P seesXn D P seesF(XX,... ,Xn)
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Perhaps the more interesting axioms are those that indirectly relate to the G N Y logic
notion of recognizability. These are the two axioms called comprehending axioms:
11. P believes (P sees F(X)) D P believes (P sees X)
12. Preceived F(X) A P believes (P sees X) D P believes (P received F(X))
Here the expression P believes (P seesX) is taken to replace the G N Y logic statement
P |= <f>(X).
The model of computation of the S V O logic is similar to that of the A T logic.
Essentially, the former is obtained by modifying the latter to include additional notions.
For example, the action of generating a key K, denoted newkey(K) in the model of
Abadi and Tuttle, is replaced by the more general action of generating a primitive
message X, denoted generate(X). This modification is used in defining the notion of
seen messages, with the aim of capturing the G N Y logic notion of possession: a set of
seen messages is associated with a principal, which includes, amongst other things, the
messages that are received or generated by that principal.
The S V O logic paper contains a soundness theorem for the proposed logic. However,
the sketch of the proof given there leaves the soundness of most of the logical axioms
implicit.

1.11 WK logic

The logic of Wedel and Kessler [10] is one of the latest BAN-like logics along th
lines of the logics A T and S V O . One of the motivations underlying their logic is to
allow analysis of protocols relying on various cryptographic mechanisms that cannot
be adequately captured in these two logics. The authors of the W K logic take a middle
ground between the notations of BAN-like logics that predate the A T logic and the
notational short cuts introduced in the S V O logic. For example, the syntax of the W K
logic distinguishes between encrypted and hashed messages, unlike the S V O logic. The
W K logic notations for encryption, hashing and signing functions are respectively given
as enc, h, and a. However, the notation enc is variously used to cover symmetric or
asymmetric encryption functions as well as signature functions with message recovery;
the notation a is reserved for signature functions that do not provide message recovery.
The notation F is used to denote either of enc, h, or a; the notation F(M)

is taken

to mean the structure of the message computed by F on M, not its value. A notion
of message localized towards a principal is defined to capture what parts of a message
structure can be verified by the principal. If M

is a message, the notation Mp is read

1.11. WK logic
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localized towards P; for example, if P possesses M

then (h(M))p

is defined to be

equal to h(M); this definition reflects the property that P can verify the hash of any
messages he possesses. A set of generalized messages M.j> is defined to consist of all
messages that can be constructed from the basic message items and with the additional
property that it is closed under localization.
Unlike the logics A T and S V O , the syntax of formulas of the W K logic precludes
formulas from being treated as messages. Most of the constructs found in the logics
A T and S V O are also carried over to the W K

logic with some adjustments. The

notation — > is used to denote the propositional connectiveforimplication. A primitive
construct P recognizes M is used to denote the notion of recognizability; this contrasts
with the S V O logic where recognizability is not defined as a primitive notion. The
constructs e & P, a & P, and a & P replace their S V O logic counterparts PK^(P, K),
PKa(P,K),

and PKS(P,K),

respectively. The W K

logic includes axioms similar to

those found in the logics on which it is framed. For example, the A T / S V O logic
message-meaning axiom for shared keys is modified to capture the associated side
condition in the logic itself:

Al. R seesF(K,X) A P & Q A -P saidF(K,X) — • Q said(K,X)
Here F(K, X) is taken to variously denote shared-key encryption as well as hashing of
X using K. The jurisdiction axiom found in the A T / S V O logics is modified to bring
it closer to the original B A N logic rule, as follows:
J. P controls <f> A P believes <f> — > (j)
The logic also includes several additional axioms; for example, an axiom for recognizability is given as:
Rl. P recognizes Xi — > P recognizes (Xx,..., Xk)
A noteworthy innovation of the authors of the W K logic concerns protocol idealization. Unlike the logics A T and S V O , protocol analyses using the W K logic are carried
out without having to treat formulas as messages. The semantics of the W K logic is
developed along essentially similar lines to the logics A T and S V O . The authors of
the W K logic use their semantics to suggest instances of unsoundness in some earlier
logics; for example, the G N Y logic recognizability rule R6. (We will have occasion to
return to this rule in the next chapter.) The proof of soundness of the W K logic follows
the line of the S V O logic paper: it leaves the soundness of most of the logical axioms

implicit.

Chapter 2
A n informal proposal for rectifying some
problematic features of the G N Y logic

This chapter highlights some problematic features of the GNY logic. In particula
will point out several classes of problems which arise in the G N Y logic:
1. an unsound rule;
2. the possibility of drawing unsound conclusions by pairing rules;
3. the incompleteness of the set of rules; and
4. rules with redundant premises.
The notions of soundness and completeness of a logic are usually defined with respect
to an independently motivated formal semantics for the logic. However, as we shall
discuss in the following section, the G N Y logic does not appear to have such a semantics. Our use of the terms "unsound" and "incomplete" in this chapter must therefore
be understood informally. W e will give specific instances of the above problems and
suggest some solutions to rectify these informally, at the syntactic level. A formal
justification for the suggested solutions, however, rests ultimately on provision of an
independently motivated semantics for the logic. Our purpose here is not to find a
semantic solution to the problems, but our observations clearly point out the need for
such a solution. In a later chapter, we will build an independently motivated semantic
model for BAN-like logics, which provides a step in the former direction.
(Parts of this chapter appeared in preliminary form elsewhere [25].)
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2.1 Soundness troubles: recognizability and freshness rules

Informally, if a logic is sound then false conclusions cannot be inferred from tr
premises in the logic. A formal semantics for the logic provides a precise structure with
respect to which soundness can be proved. However, in order to obtain any assurance
about the soundness of the logic, the semantics itself must be sufficiently independent
of the logical syntax. As emphasized by Syverson [26], [27], an independently motivated semantics can provide adequate assurance about the validity and power of the
logic, by means of soundness and completeness proofs, respectively.
Gong, Needham and Yahalom [2], like Burrows, Abadi and Needham [1], provide
an "operational" semantics for their logic, but as has been argued by others, most
notably by Syverson [27] and by Tuttle [28], the original semantics of these logics is
not independently motivated, as it takes its structure directly from the logical syntax.
For example, the authors of the B A N logic define the semantics of the jj operator to
correspond directly to the freshness inference rule of their logic. A set of fresh formulas
T is defined for each run under consideration, as follows: T contains all formulas X
such that \(X) holds as an initial assumption, and additionally J7 is taken to enjoy the
closure property that, if X £ T and X is a subformula of Y then Y £ T. Then \(X) is
defined to be true in the corresponding run if X £ T. (The G N Y logic semantics of the
(I operator is also taken to be defined similarly.) The problem with such a semantics
is that it does not provide us with any independent means to check the soundness of
the inference rules themselves. Indeed, we give examples below of unsound conclusions
derivable in the G N Y logic.

2.1.1 Unsound rule
The G N Y logic recognizability rule R 6 states that if P possesses the hash of X, then P
believes X is recognizable. Note that recognizability of X is intended to mean that P
has prior expectations about the contents of X independent of the act of receiving it;
this interpretation of recognizability is part of the informal semantics given by Gong,
Needham and Yahalom [2, p. 236]. Surprisingly, the rule R 6 enables the conclusion
that P believes X is recognizable from the premise that P possesses X: from P B X
it follows by rule P 4 that P 3 H(X), and therefore, by R6, that P |= <j>(X). There is
nothing wrong with P4; it just says that a principal is capable of computing the hash
of a message he possesses. Seemingly, the problem lies with R6. The rule becomes
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problematic when w e take into account the fact that a principal P's possessions include
the following: (1) the messages received by P, and (2) the messages that can possibly
be computed from P's possessed messages. This fact is evident from the possession
rules PI through P8 of the logic. Since, by rule Pi, every message P receives is also
possessed by P, the rule R 6 in effect tells us that every message received by P is also
recognizable by P. However, this conclusion conflicts with a basic intuition underlying
the notion of recognizability. For example, consider a protocol where P generates a
random value Np, and sends it to Q. Here Np is not recognizable by Q, although Q
possesses it.
The problem with R 6 can also be seen from another viewpoint. Recall that the
notion of recognizability is meant to reflect the implicit B A N logic assumption that
encrypted messages are verifiable. For instance, the rule 11, which is the G N Y logic
counterpart of the B A N logic message-meaning rule for shared keys stipulates a recognizability premise, P ^ (f>(X), to express the B A N logic assumption explicitly. This
rule also has the following two premises: (a) P < *{X}K

and (b) P 3 K. Given R6, it is

easy to see that the recognizability premise itself is derivable from these two premises
using the logic: From (a) and rule Tl, P < {X}K,

and therefore, from (b) and T3,

P < X. Hence, by PI, P 3 X, and so, by P4 and R6, P |EE (b(X). It is clear here that
R6 really begs the recognizability feature of the logic.
Ironically enough, the unsoundness of R 6 is perhaps best illustrated by appealing
to the analysis of the enhanced Needham-Schroeder protocol in the G N Y logic paper,
which is used to promote the recognizability feature of the logic. As part of the protocol
handshake, Q sends to P an encrypted message {N<J}K, where Nq is a nonce generated
by Q and K is a session key known to P and Q. In the protocol analysis given in
the paper (p. 242), it is argued that this message is unrecognizable to P, since Nq is
unpredictable by P. Thus P can only gain possession of Nq (so that P 3 Nq), but
not any beliefs from this message. The latter is essentially reflected in the logic by
the recognizability premise in the rule II. To make the above message recognizable to
P, it is suggested that the message be modified to include Q's identifier:

{NQ,Q}K;

the modified version is seen to allow the expected belief for P to be derived under
the additional assumption that P ^ 4>(Q)- However, since we have P 3 Nq, R6
allows us to infer that P ^ <f>(Nq), which does not require the extra assumption that
P

^

d>(Q). It should be emphasized that we are not claiming that the protocol

modification suggested in the G N Y logic paper is superfluous. The point of the above
exercise is only to reinforce our claim that R 6 is at odds with the original purpose of
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adding recognizability to the logic.

2.1.2 Unsound conclusions from pairs of rules
W efirstrecall an observation m a d e by Anderson [29], namely that the freshness rules
F2 and F7 of the G N Y logic, when used together, imply a "strange result". Suppose
that for principal P all of the following conditions hold: (1) P believes that formula
X is recognizable; (2) P possesses a key K; (3) P believes that K is fresh. Then, by
F7, P |= \({X}K), and therefore from F2 and the fact that {{X}^1

= X, it follows

that P ^ |(X).
Curiously, although each of the rules F2 and F7 is plausible in itself, when used
together as above these rules produce a suspect conclusion. For example, we can extend
the analysis of the modified enhanced Needham-Schroeder protocol in the G N Y logic
paper, to derive the nonsensical conclusion that P ^ $(Q), as follows. Observe that in
the protocol analysis given there (p. 241), the following statements hold: (a) P ^ 4>(Q);
and (b) P 3 K.

(K is a session key known to P and Q.) The statement (a) holds

by assumption, and the statement (b) holds from message 4 of the protocol in which
S sends to P the following: {NP,Q, K,.. .}KPS- T O derive the nonsensical conclusion
using F2 and F7, we need the statement P ^ l(K). This is a reasonable statement to
obtain, since the session key K, which is generated by the server S in the protocol, is
normally expected to be a fresh quantity. W e can capture this in the logic as follows.
Firstly, we introduce two additional statements as assumptions: (c) S ^ l(K); and (d)
P ^ S =$> §(K). Secondly, we modify the idealization of the above message to include
the former statement in the extension attached to the message:

P< *{...}Kp.^>(S\=P&Q,S£i{K))

We can now derive the statement P ^ S ^ $(K) in an essentially similar way to whi
the statement P ^ S ^ P & Q

is derived from the original idealization in the G N Y

logic paper. The required statement P ^ t(K) then immediately follows from (d) and
the jurisdiction rule Jl.
W e note that the problem pointed out by Anderson is not only confined to the
freshness rules F2 and F7 used together. There are several other pairs of freshness and
recognizability rules which lead to essentially the same problem:
(i) R2 and F7;
(ii) F8 and F4;
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(iii) F9 and F3;
(iv) R3 and F9;
(v) R4 and F8.
Note that with the pairs (iii) and (v) we assume public-key schemes where {{X}^K}+K

=

X; for example, R S A [30].

2.1.3 Side conditions
To tackle the above problem, we suggest side conditions to several of the freshness and
recognizability rules of the logic. W e begin by replacing each of the rules F2, F7, and
R 2 with two equivalent rules:
P fcs ft(X), P3K
F2'

P N «({*}*)

F2"

P |= l(X), P3K
P NH(TOK)
P j= <b(X), P 1= j(K), P3K

F7'

P N !{{x}K)
P £ cb(X), P \= j{K), P3K

F7"

R2'

R2"

P

N l(W?)

P jss <b(X),

P3K

P N 4>{{X}K)
P |= # X ) , P 3 if
P |
=
= <KWK)

W e proceed to include the following side condition to the rule F2": X is not of the
form {Y}K-

The intuition used to arrive at this side condition is as follows. Let us

assume that the statements P

|EE %({Y}K)

and P 3 K hold. In the absence of the side

;

condition, by F2 we can obtain the conclusion P [EE \(Y). N O W , the only way we could
have established P |= J({Y}K)

is by a prior application of either of the rules F2' or F7'.

Observe that: (1) If F2' were applied, then the statement P |= ${Y) holds a priori; (2)
If F7' were applied, then the statements P |= <j>(Y) and P ^ Jt(A") hold a priori. In
the former case, since the statement P ^ J|(Y) holds already, deriving it through F2"
is of no use essentially. However, in the latter case, deriving the statement P ^ §(Y)
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through F2" is unsound since this statement does not necessarily hold. Intuitiv
then, by the side condition on F2", we have only omitted the possibility of an unsound
conclusion, without losing any useful derivations.
W e can also argue for similar side conditions to each of the rules F3, F4, F7", F8,
F9, R2", R3, and R4. W e list below these rules along with their corresponding side
conditions.
P t= tJ(X), P 3 +K
F3 —
, /r ., 7 — , X is not of the form {Y}-K
P NttlW+A-)
P E= ft(X) P 3 —K
F4
D L - J l y l x > X isnot of the form iY}+K

Ppmxl-K)
F7" u/rv-i-iN ' X 1S not of
P F IKWjr )
F8 m-u/rvi \ '

X 1S not

the form

°f

\YSK

the form

\Ys-K

P F KW+K-)

F9 Di-^rv-i \ '

X 1S not of the form

R2

" Pn^(yrV^ ^^»

VJ+*

X is not of the form

W*

P F <?({A-}*: )

R3 P
R4

^t:x2\S^XK>

xisnotoftheform

W-*

^X^h^T^' X is not of the form {F}+/<
P F-</>({AJ-_K)

Similarly, we include the side condition: X is not of the form {Y}^1, to the rules F2',
F7', and R2', for conventional cryptosystems in which {{A - }^ 1 }^ = X; for example,
D E S [31]. Note that the side conditions to F3 and F8 are only needed for public-key
schemes in which

2.2

{{X}-K}+K

= X.

Completeness troubles: The Yahalom protocol

In this section we give an example of a non-trivial rule which is not captured by the
G N Y logic [2]. W efindthis rule to be essential for verifying the working of the Yahalom
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protocol, which according to the G N Y logic paper, is apparently within the scope of
the logic (p. 243). While it has been suggested that in such logics rules m a y be added
when needed (cf. Gong [3, p. 18]), because of the variety of cryptographic techniques
possible, an independently motivated semantics is essential if we are to be able to
obtain assurance about the soundness of the added rules.
Essentially, the message interpretation rules of the logic enable the derivation of
beliefs from encrypted or hashed messages. As we shall see below, the G N Y logic
lacks a message interpretation rule to reason about the use of a shared secret in the
Yahalom protocol. In analyzing this protocol, we use the protocol parsing scheme given
by Gong [3], instead of the scheme given in the G N Y logic paper. First, we clarify the
reasons for not using the original parsing scheme.

2.2.1 Protocol parsing
Thefirststep in analyzing a protocol described in the conventional notation is to
generate a form suitable for manipulation in the logic. In the G N Y logic, this task is
performed by a protocol parser. For each protocol message X received by a principal
P (written P < X), the parser inserts symbolic information to distinguish those parts
of X which are not included in any message sent by P up to the point of receiving X
in the current protocol run. Specifically, for every statement of the form P < X, the
parser inserts a not-originated-here marker, '*', in front of each complete subpart Y
of X, if Y does not appear as a subpart of any message P has sent previously in the
current run (p. 238).
W e observe that the only message interpretation rules with a formula of the form
P < *X appearing as a premise are the rules II, 12, and 13. In each of these rules,
the not-originated-here marker is either prefixed to an encrypted formula (II and 12,
respectively) or a hashed formula (13). For the purpose of using the logic to derive
beliefs from encrypted or hashed messages, it makes no significant difference whether
the insertion of the not-originated-here marker is carried out for non-encrypted and
non-hashed message parts or not; we choose not to. Not only does this simplify the
parsing process, it also avoids a peculiar problem with original parsing scheme. In
particular, we note that the original scheme precludes some legitimate applications of
the message interpretation rules. For example, in the analysis of a voting protocol in
*S'
the G N Y logic paper, the statement Q ^ Q ^4 Pi is clearly required to apply 13 to
the second message of the protocol (p. 239). Presumably, we can derive this statement
from the protocol assumption Q ^ Q «4 Pi, but there is nothing in the logic which
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would enable us to do so. However, such a difficulty does not arise if we adopt the
modified parsing scheme given by Gong [3].

2.2.2 The Yahalom protocol
The goal of the Yahalom protocol [1] is to distribute an authenticated session key to
two principals A and B via a trusted third party known as the authentication server
S. The following sequence of messages describes a successful run of the protocol (p.
30):

1.
2.

A-+B:A,Na
B^S:B,{A,Na,Nb}Kbs

3. S -+ A : {B, Kab, Na, Nb}Kas, {A,
4.

Kab}Kbs

A^B:{A,Kab}Kbs,{Nb}Kab

As explained by Burrows et al. [1], this protocol makes use of an uncertified key: a key
which is used before its validity is established.
In the sequel, we refer to the protocol initiator A as 'Alice' and the other principal
B as 'Bob', following standard practice. Initially, Alice and Bob share keys Kas and Kbs
with the authentication server S respectively. Alice initiates the protocol by sending
her identity and a nonce Na to Bob. In the second message, Bob sends to the server
his own n a m e and an encrypted part {A, Na, Nb}Kbs, where Nb is Bob's nonce. In the
third message, the server sends to Alice: {B,Kab,Na,Nb}Kas,

{A,Kab}Kbs.

The first

encrypted part tells Alice that Kab is a good session key for communicating with Bob,
and also tells her Bob's nonce. The second encrypted part is intended for Bob. In
the fourth message, Alice forwards this encrypted part to Bob, along with Bob's nonce
encrypted with Kab. Bob decrypts thefirstencrypted part of this message to get Kab,
and uses it to decrypt the second encrypted part. If the latter decryption yields Bob his
nonce A7;,, then he obtains assurance that Kab is a good session key for communicating

with Alice.

2.2.3 Analyzing the Yahalom protocol using GNY logic
W e begin the analysis by using the parsing scheme to produce a protocol description
containing *'s in the appropriate places:
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1. B< A,Na
2. S< B,*{A,Na,Nb}Kbs
A<*{B,Kab,Na,Nb}Kas^S£AIhbB,
*{A, Kab}Kbs
^S^A&B

3.

4. B < *{ A, Kab}Kbs
*{Nb}

^S^A*hbB,

^A\=A*hbB

In the above description, we have also added extensions which describe the beliefs held
when the messages are sent. The following statements describe the initial protocol
assumptions:

A 3 Kas; A |= A *& S; A3Na; A^ j(Na);

A £ <f>{B)
B3Kbs;

B^EBK&

S; B3

Nb; B |= J(iV6);

B f= <j>(Nb); B |EE A ft B
S3Kas;

S3Kab;

S\EEA*hsS; S 3 Kbs; S $= B *&'S;

S^A&B

That is, Alice possesses a secret Kas and believes it is a secret between
Similarly, Bob possesses a secret Kbs and believes it is a secret between himself and S.
Each possesses a nonce and believes that it is fresh. Alice believes that the identifier B
is recognizable to her. Bob believes that Nb is recognizable to him. Also, Bob believes
that his nonce Nb is a suitable secret with Alice. The server S possesses valid keys
Kas and Kbs with Alice and Bob, respectively. It also possesses a session key K and
believes A' is a suitable secret between Alice and Bob.

A\=S\^S^*; A\=S\*A&B
B\=S\^S\=*;
B\=A^A\^*

B^S^A&B;

Both Alice and Bob believe that S is honest and competent. They also trus
a suitable secret key for them. Also, Bob believes that Alice is honest and competent.
For a run of the protocol, we apply the inference rules to the messages, as follows:
Message 1: From PI we obtain B 3 (A,Na).
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Message 2: From T2 and PI we obtain S 3 B. From T2, Tl, T3, and PI we obta
S3(A,Na,Nb).

Message 3: The extension S |EE A *& B attached to the two encrypted parts
because it holds by assumption. From Tl, T3, T2, PI and thefirstencrypted
part, we obtain A 3 Kab and A 3 Nb.
From Fl, Rl, II, J2, and J3 we obtain A |= S [= A K<$ B. Hence, by Jl,
A ^ A «46 B. W e can thus include this statement in the extension attached to
the second encrypted part of message 4.
Message 4: From Tl, T3, T2, PI and the first encrypted part we obtain B 3
However, we cannot derive any beliefs from this part since the statement
B ^ $({A,Kab}Kbs) does not hold. In the actual working of the protocol, Bob
deduces that Kab is shared with Alice if the decryption of the second encrypted
part yields his nonce. By appealing to the G N Y logic rules, wefindthat the only
way we can proceed in the logic to reason in this manner is byfirstestablishing
that Bob believes the extension attached to the second encrypted part. However,
none of the G N Y logic rules enable this to be derived; the only applicable rule is
II which cannot be applied, since it requires the recipient of an encrypted message to believe that the key used to encrypt the message is shared with another
principal a priori.

2.2.4 Adding a new rule
The incompleteness revealed by the above analysis motivates us to propose the addition of the following new message interpretation rule to the logic:

P<*{X,<S>}K, P3K,P^PAQ,P^ cb(X,S), P N t(X,S,K)
P |= Q h (X,<S>), P N Q h {X,<S>}K,P \=Q3K
That is, suppose that for principal P all of the following conditions hold: (1) P receives
a formula consisting of X concatenated with S, encrypted with key K and marked with
a not-originated here mark; (2) P possesses K; (3) P believes S is a suitable secret
for himself and Q; (4) P believes that X concatenated with S is recognizable; (5) P
believes that at least one of S, X, or K is fresh. Then P is entitled to believe that:
(1) Q once conveyed the formula X concatenated with S; (2) Q once conveyed the
formula X concatenated with S and encrypted with K; (3) Q possesses K. (A similar
rule can be added along previous lines to the set of "never-originated-here" rules of the
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G N Y logic.) The new rule 18 enables us to derive Bob's beliefs in the validity of Kab,
as follows:
Message 4 (continued): From

18 and the second encrypted part we obtain
K,
B |= A 3 Kab, and B |= A [~ {Nb}Kab ~*A^A&B.
From F2, J2, and J3 we

obtain B\=A^A*&B.

W e can include the statement A |= S |= A ff B in

the extension attached to the second encrypted part, since this statement holds
from message 3. W e also need an additional assumption which reflects Bob's trust
in Alice to pass on the session key from the server: B ^ A [=>> (S ^ A <¥ B).
This assumption is the logical embodiment of a curious feature of the protocol:
Alice can make Bob believe in a replayed session key. Notice that the statement
of the assumption essentially amounts to Bob believing that this does not take
place. The fact that we are forced to make the odd assumption explicit during
the analysis provides a good example of the virtue of the logic. (The above protocol feature also emerges from the B A N logic analysis of the Yahalom protocol,
cf. [1, p. 33].) From 18, J2, J3, and Jl wefinallyobtain B |= A *& B.
To conclude our analysis of the Yahalom protocol, we list the final position

A 3 Kab; A^A*hb

B

B 3 Kah; P |EE A ff B; B^A3
B^A^A*&

Kab

B

Both Alice and Bob possess the session key and believe in it. In addition, Bob believes
that Alice possesses the session key and believes in it.
The above analysis shows an interesting point: it hints at a possible redundancy in
the last message of the protocol. The analysis tells us that no beliefs about Kab are
derived for Bob from the encrypted part which Alice forwards him from the server in
message 4: {A, Kab}Kbs-

Also notice that Bob binds the identity claimed by Alice to his

nonce, by concatenating them and encrypting with Kbs in message 2. Apparently then,
in the last message of the protocol, Bob's nonce not only assures him of the freshness
of the encrypted half sent by Alice, but also guarantees that Kab is shared with Alice.
Since Bob decrypts the encrypted part forwarded by Alice only to gain possession of
Kab, we can delete Alice's n a m e from this part:
3'. S -+ A : {B, Kab, Na, Nb}Kas,
A'.

A^B:{Kab}Kbs,{Nb}KLab
a

{Kab}Kbs
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2.3. Redundancy in the logic

A n analysis of the modified protocol using the logic confirms our above intuition: the
samefinalposition as the original protocol is achieved by the modified protocol.

2.3 Redundancy in the logic

In this section, we give an example of a rule which contains a redundant premise.
Observe that the message interpretation rule 12 includes the following statements as
premises: (1) P < *{X,< S >}+K;

(2) P 3 -K; and (3) P 3 S. In the original rule,

(2) and (3) are combined into one single premise using the conjunction operator ',':
P 3 (-K, S). W e replace this premise by (2) and (3) only for the sake of convenience.
It is easy to see that (3) follows from (1) and (2): From Tl and (1), P<{X,

<S>}+K,

and therefore, from (2) and T4, P < (X, < S >). Hence, by T2, P < S, and so, by PI,
P 3 S. Thus, we see that the premise (3) of the above rule is redundant. (The message
interpretation rule 12' exhibits a similar redundancy.)

Chapter 3
A modification of the G N Y logic for
automatic analysis of protocols

This chapter proposes a modified GNY logic, and describes the implementation of a
protocol analysis tool based on that logic. The modifications are designed to allow the
logical statements derivable from any protocol represented by afiniteset of statements
to be deduced in afinitenumber of steps, without losing any useful inferences. The
tool can be used to automatically generate proofs of statements representing protocol
goals.
(Parts of this chapter appeared in preliminary form elsewhere [32].)

3.1 Introduction
The BAN and GNY logics can be used to effectively explain the working of protocols. Very often a protocol analysis using the logics reveals missing assumptions or
deficiencies in the protocol begin analyzed. This can lead to the assumptions or the
original protocol being revised and the inference rules being reapplied to determine if
the desired goal is then attainable. The process of applying and reapplying the inference rules, however, is in practice often tedious and error-prone to do by hand. Several
tools which relieve the manual burden of carrying out this task for the B A N logic or
modified versions of it can be found in the literature; see, for example, [16], [33], [34],
[35]. The appeal of tools for mechanical validation is clear, but such tools can also
assist in examining the role played by protocol messages and assumptions in attaining
the desired goal. In addition, such tools can also be used to verify proofs of protocol
goals which are obtained by manually applying the logic. Manual analysis of protocols
using the G N Y logic is particularly unwieldy, as the logic has more than forty inference
rules. Moreover, the G N Y logic operates at afinerlevel than its predecessor, so proofs
of protocol goals in the logic typically work out to be much longer than their B A N
logic counterparts.
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Our main aim in automating the logic is to be able to mechanically determine
whether one or more statements describing the goal of a protocol are derivable using
the logic from some initial assumptions. Furthermore, it is also desirable to obtain all
statements that are derivable from the initial assumptions. This allows us to analyze
the state of the principals after the execution of each protocol step. W e therefore use a
forward-chaining strategy in automating the logic. This involves repeated application
of the inference rules of the logic to the set of statements consisting of the idealized
protocol, initial assumptions, and derived statements, until all statements derivable are
obtained. However, many of the inference rules of the original G N Y logic are unsuitable
for forward-chaining. The problem is clear just from the freshness rule Fl,

N Kx)
p^i(x,Yy
P

which essentially says that if A" is a fresh message and X is concatenated with any
other message Y, then the resulting message is also fresh. (The rule has one more
conclusion; however, the one shown suffices to illustrate the problem.) It is easy to see
that this rule can be used to derive an infinite set of statements starting from a finite
set of statements of the form P ^ U(AT). Although the inference expressed by this rule
is intuitive and desirable, it is necessary to restrict the application of the rule for the
purposes of forward-chaining.
W e will show that the set of inference rules can be modified in such a way that the
statements derivable from any protocol represented by afiniteset of statements are
alsofinitein number. Essentially, the point of our modifications is to convert the set
of rules into a form which is directly amenable to forward-chaining. The modifications
are designed to produce a restricted logic in the sense that the modified logic does not
capture all inferences which are possible in the G N Y logic. However, we will argue that
the inferences lost by the modified logic do not affect our central aim in using the logic:
that is, to reason about a principal's possessions and his beliefs about the statements
conveyed by other principals, based on the messages received by the principal. In other
words, we can still use the modified logic to analyze protocols with the same intended
effect as the original G N Y logic.

3.2 Modifying the GNY rule set

We now describe the modifications to the set of inference rules of the GNY logic,
we make in order to obtainfinitenessof derivations. Additionally, we include several
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new rules which are clearly required during protocol analyses using the logic, but which
are nonetheless absent from the original G N Y logic [2]. The resulting set of rules is
given in appendix C, and a proof offinitenessof derivations for this rule set is given
in the next section.

3.2.1 Adding new rules
W e add three new rules all of which enable dropping of extensions attached to formulae:

T7

18

19

P<X^C
P«X
P^QY^X^

c

P^Q\-X

P^Q^X^
P\=Q

(C,C>)

y^x^c

While the above rules capture rather trivial inferences, these rules are nevertheless
required during protocol analyses. Thefirsttwo rules, T 7 and 18, are also present in
an extended version of the G N Y logic found in Gong's thesis [3]; the role played by
these rules should be intuitively clear. Surprisingly, the rule 19 is absent from both the
original G N Y logic [2] and Gong's extension [3]. Essentially, 19 enables the splitting
of message extensions which are conjunctions of two or more statements. The logical
use of this rule's conclusion is made in the jurisdiction rule J2 where it appears as a
premise (see appendix C.6). A handy example of the need for 19 can be seen from the
analysis of the Yahalom protocol given in the previous chapter: there we tacitly made
K,
use of this rule in proceeding with the derivation of the statement B ^ A 44b B from
the statement B |= A ^ {Nb}Kab

^

(A |= A *& B, A |= S |= A % ? B).

3.2.2 Modifying existing rules
Like Fl, several other freshness and recognizability rules cause problems by repeated
application. W e deal with this problem by modifying these rules into a form suitable for
forward-chaining. Notice that every freshness and recognizability rule has a conclusion
of the form P ^ l(X) and P ^ <t>(X), respectively. Our modification introduces an
additional premise of the form P 3 X in each of these rules; the modified freshness
and recognizability rules are listed in appendices C.3 and C.4, respectively. W e now
discuss the rationale behind the modifications to the freshness rules; the modifications
to the recognizability rules are explained similarly.
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The idea behind the modifications to the freshness rules is to limit the original
rules to allow only those inferences which contribute to our purpose of reasoning about
a principal's possessions and beliefs about the statements conveyed by other principals. Evidently, from the possession rules of the G N Y logic we see that a principal
P's possessions do not depend on P's beliefs. Therefore what we can conclude using
a freshness rule for P is of no use for the above purpose if it does not affect P's beliefs about statements conveyed by others. Essentially, the rule which enables us to
obtain such beliefs for P is the jurisdiction rule J2, which has a premise of the form
P ^ Q |~ (X ~> C). This premise reflects the requirement that P can only obtain beliefs from messages sent by some well-known principal Q, and appears as a conclusion
of the message interpretation rules II, 12, 13, 14, II', 12', and 13'. Hence the statement
P ^ t(X) is of significance in deriving P's beliefs in statements conveyed by others
only if it appears as a premise in one of these rules. Out of these rules, only II, 12,
and 13 have a freshness premise. Further, each of these rules satisfies the following
property: if P ^ §(XX,... ,Xm)

is the freshness premise of the rule, then P 3 Xi

for i — 1,... ,m. For example, take II; this rule has a freshness premise of the form
P |= \(X,K).

Since this premise is meant to denote P |= \(X) or P ^ j(K) ([2], p.

245), w e can replace II by the following two equivalent rules:

T

, P< *{X}K, P3K, P^P&Q, P^ <KX), P N ttffl

P^Q^X, P N Q h {X}K,
n„

P^Q^K

P<*{X}K, P3K, P^EP&Q, PN(4 fNP)
P^Q^X,
PNQh{x} K , P^QBK

It is easy to see that in both II' and II", P possesses the formula appearing in the
corresponding freshness premise:
II': From the premise P < *{X}K and rule Tl, P <J {X}K, and therefore, from the
premise P 3 K and rule T3, P < X. So, by PI, P 3 X, as required.
II": Trivially, P 3 K holds as a premise.

3.2.3 Deleting existing rules
W e delete several possession rules of the logic: P2, P4, P6, P 7 and P8. Each of these
rules can be applied indefinitely to derive new possessions. For example, suppose the
statements P 3 X and P 3 K hold. Then we can use the possession rule P6 for shared
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keys,

P3K,
P3{X}K,

P3X
P3{X}~^

to derive the infinite set of statements: P 3 {X}K,

P 3 {{X}K}K,

.... The above

rules are evidently useful in enforcing the possession consistency check, but their role
during protocol analyses otherwise is not so clear. Furthermore, we do not include
this check in automating the logic, since it is intended to be performed outside of the
logic. For our purposes, we simply find it convenient to delete these rules. Similarly,
we delete the G N Y logic rationality rule, which states that if ~

is a rule, then so is
2

,

, for any principal P.

3.3 Finiteness of derivations
In this section, we prove that for the modified rule set given in appendix C:
The statements derivable from a finite set of idealized protocol steps and
initial assumptions arefinitein number, and are therefore derivable in a
finite number of steps.

Essentially, we will follow a a technique used by Engberg [16] to prove a simila
for a modified version of the B A N logic.
W e begin with a set-theoretic formulation of the statement which we wish to prove.
To this end, it is convenient to introduce the notation (T>/E) to denote a generic
inference rule, where V is the set consisting of the premises of the rule and E is
the conclusion of the rule; here we assume that rules with multiple conclusions are
decomposed in the obvious way into separate rules, each with a single conclusion.
Denote by IZ the modified set of rules. W e define an operator p on sets of statements,
as follows: for any set of statements S,
p(S) =SU{E: there exists (V/E) £ 11 such that V C S}.

Thus p returns <S together with the statements derivable from S by applying the i
ence rules in 1Z exactly once. The main idea of the proof is an argument showing that
there exists an n such that
n
P

(S) =

P~(S),

where we use p°°(S) to denote the infinite union

U™=0pm(S).
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Recall that any statement of the logic is a statement of the form P < X or P 3 X
or P ^ C. The key step in the argument is to construct a well-founded and finitary
relation over the set of statements of the forms P 3 X, P<X, and P ^ C. W e construct
the required relation, denoted by -<, in terms in terms of six subsidiary relations -<<„
-<3, -<3, -<t, -<% and -<£, as follows:
(1) P«X-<P<Y ifX^Y
(2) P3X

<P<Y

if X x | Y

(3) P3X^P3Y
(A) P^C

iiXA^Y

<P3

X

if C -<| A

(5) P ^ C ^ P < A :

ifC^A

(6) P ^ C - ^ P ^ P * ifC^NP>
The definitions of the subsidiary relations are derived from suitably chosen classes of
rules and are given below.
The definition of -<4 is read off the being-told rules Tl, T2, T3, T4, T5, T6 and T7
(see appendix C.l), where T2 and T5 are used in their two symmetrical forms, giving
clauses as follows:
(1)

X -<* *A

(2)(i)

X^(X,Y)

(ii)
(3)

X^(Y,X)
X -«« {X}K

(A) X ^ {X}+K
(5)(i) X<<F(X,Y)
(ii) X^F(Y,X)
(6)

X -<« {X}-K

(7)

X^X^C

The definition of -<| consists of a single clause which is read off the possession rule PI
(see appendix C.2):

(1)

X^%X

The definition of -<9 is read off the possession rules P3 and P5 (see appendix C.2),
where both the rules are used in their two symmetrical forms, giving clauses as follows:

(l)(i) X<3(X,Y)
(ii)
(2)(i)
(ii)

X^(Y,X)
X^F(X,Y)
X^BF(Y,X)
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The definition of -<L consists of two clauses. T h efirstclause is read off each of the
freshness rules Fl', Fl", F2', F2", F3', F4', F5', F6', F7', F7", F8', F9', F10', and Fll'
(see appendix C.3). T h e second clause is read off each of the recognizability rules Rl',
Rl", R2', R2", R3', R4', and R5' (see appendix C.4).

(1) t{X)*%X
(2) <b(X)^%X
The definition of -<t is read off: (A) the message interpretation rules 11, 12, 13, 14 and
15 (see appendix C.5), and (B) the rules for never-originated-here messages II', 12' and
13' (see appendix C.7). Each rule contributes as m a n y clauses to the definition as the
number of conclusions in the rule, giving clauses as follows:

Q\~X -<i
(l)(i)
(ii) Q h {X}K ~> C %
Q3K
(iii)
-4
Q\-X •<i
(2)0)
(ii) Q [~ {X}+K ^ C *i
Q3+K
(iii)
%

*{X}K^C
*{X}K ~> c
*{X}K ~> c
*{X}+K o+ c

*{X}+K -> c
*{X}+K ~* c
Q^x % *H(X) ~> C
(3)(0
Q ^ H(X) ~> C •<i *H(X) -> C
(")
{X}-K ^ C
Q^x
(4)0)
{X}-K -> C
(") Q ^ {X}-K -> C - *
Q3-K
{X}-K
(5)(i)
-*>*
Q3X
{X}-K
(ii)
^N
Q\-X -*>* {X}K -* C
(6)(i)
^N
{X}K -> C
Q
h
WK
C
(ii)
Q\-X •<i {X}+K -> C
(7)0)
(ii) Q h {X}+K -> C -<% {X}+K ^ C
H(X)^C
QY^x
(8)(i)
H(X) ~> C
Q ^ H(X) ~* C ^
(ii)

"t

•

<

%

The definition of X ^ is read off: (A) the message interpretation rules 16, 17, 18 and 19
(see appendix C.5), where 17 and 19 are used in their two symmetrical forms, and (B)
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the jurisdiction rules Jl, J2 and J3 (see appendix C.6), giving clauses as follows:

(1) Q3X -<£ Q\^X
(2)(i)

(ii)
(3)

Q^X

-<w Q\*{X,Y)

Q K

^N QM*',*)

Q h ^

^N

(4)(i) QY-X^C

-<w

(ii) QY^X^C

Qh^-^C
QY-X^(C,C)

^N ghx^(C",c)

(5)

a

-<w

(6)

Q ^ C ^N

(7)

QN^ ^

Q^C

QY^(X^C)

QNQNc

This completes the definitions of the six subsidiary relations. O f the six relations, the
most critical in the analysis are: -<<,, -< 9 , and -<^. It is easy to see that each of these
three relations is well-founded. Consider the definition of thefirstof the three, -<<,: the
formula on the left in each clause is syntactically shorter than the formula on the right,
so there cannot be infinite descending chains with respect to -<«. Well-foundedness of
-<9 and -<^ is equally easily proved. (Well-foundedness of the other three subsidiary
relations -<|, -<^ and -<t is not required.)
W e proceed to show that -< is also well-founded; that is, there are no infinite
descending chains with respect to -<. If w e show that: (*) any infinite descending
chain with respect to -< must contain an infinite chain of statements of one of the three
forms P3X,P<X,ovP

^ C , then the well-foundedness of -< follows from the

well-foundedness of -<<,, -<3, and -<^. It remains to show that (*) holds. So assume
there is an infinite descending chain • • • -< Cz -< C2 •< Cx, where each C% is a statement
of one of the three forms P < X, P 3 X, or P ^ C. W e say that -<^ occurs at Ci if
Ci+i is obtained from an application of clause (6) in the definition of -<; and similarly
in the case of the relations -<jL, -<fL, -<9, -<|, and -<<.
Case (A): Suppose that -<^ occurs at Cn for some n. It follows that -<^ also occurs at Cm
for all m>n;

that is, there is an infinite descending chain with respect to -<(|=.

Case (B): Suppose that -<|= does not occur at d for all i. It follows that -<jL and -<^ do
not occur at Ci for all i.
Case (i): Suppose that -<9 occurs at Cn for some n. It follows that -<9 occurs at Cm
for all m > n; that is, there is an infinite descending chain with respect to
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Figure 3.1: Protocol analysis

Case (ii): Suppose that -<9 does not occur at Ci for all i. It follows that -<* does not
occur at Ci for all i. Therefore the only remaining case is that -<< occurs at
Cn for some n. It follows that -<<, occurs at Cm for all m > n; that is, there
is an infinite descending chain with respect to -<!<.

A further property of all six subsidiary relations is that they are finitary; th
given any statement C of the form P 3 X or P < X or P ^ C, the set of statements
{D : D -< C} isfinite.This is easy to see in the case of the relation -<<<, and is equally
easily proved for the otherfiverelations. It follows straightforwardly that -< is also
finitary. Since -< is well-founded as well asfinitary,it follows by Konig's lemma that
for any C the set of statements {D : D -<* C}, where -<* denotes the transitive and
reflexive closure of -<, isfiniteas well.
N o w the definitions of the subsidiary relations and of -< are constructed so as to
give a straightforward guarantee that for each rule (TJ/E) £ 1Z, there exists C £ V
such that E -< C; that is, in each rule the conclusion is smaller, with respect to -<,
than at least one of the premises. Therefore, if <S is the set of idealized steps and initial
assumptions of any protocol, then for every C £ p°°(S), there exists S £ S such that
C ^* S. Hence

p°°(S)C \J{C:C ^* S}.
S£S
N o w the right-hand side above is afiniteunion, since by assumption the set <S is finite.
By thefinitaryproperty we established earlier, the set {C : C -<* S}, for any S £ S,
isfiniteas well. Therefore, we conclude that p°°(S) is finite, as required.

3.4 Implementing the tool

We now outline an implementation of a tool based on the modified set of rules giv
in appendix C. The tool is implemented along similar lines as in our previous work on
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Formula
X

( ,Y)

WK

l

m-K

{X}+K

W-K
H(X)
F(Xi,...
*X

X^C
X
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Structure

[X,Y]
encrypt(X, shared(K))
decrypt(X, shared(K))
encrypt(X, public(K))
decrypt(X, private(K))
h(X)
,Xn)f(Xl, ..., Xn)
star(X)
ext(X, C)
ext(X, nil)

Table 3.1: Representing formulas

automating the B A N logic [35]. It consists of (1) an inference engine which produces
the complete set of logical statements derivable from an input specification consisting
of the idealized protocol and the initial assumptions, and (2) a routine to extract
proofs from the database of derived statements. Since the modification we make to the
original tool only concerns the representation of the logical syntax, we will mostly skip
the details of the remaining parts of the implementation. Figure 3.1 gives an overall
block diagram of how the tool is used in analyzing protocols [35]. As in the original
tool, we use Prolog as an implementation language and represent the logical syntax in
terms of Prolog structures.

3.4.1 Formulas and statements
In the logic, protocol messages are represented as formulas. The building blocks of
messages are constants like principal names, keys, nonces, etc. W e typically represent
these constants by one or more lowercase letters. For example, a session key Kab
for principals A and B is denoted by the Prolog atom kab. The remaining formulas
like concatenation, encryption, functions, etc. are represented by Prolog structures
chosen to represent their typographical counterparts wherever possible. W e also use
the structure ext(X, nil) to represent a formula X without any extension. Table 3.1
shows how we represent the logical formulas by means of Prolog structures.
The statements of the logic are similarly represented by appropriately named Prolog
structures as shown in Table 3.2. It is straightforward to translate any formula or
statement in the logical syntax to its Prolog counterpart by looking up Tables 3.1 and
3.2.

3.5. Using the tool: an example

Statement
P<X
P3X

p |= 4>{X)

Structure
told(P, X)
possesses(P, X)
conveyed(P, X)
believes(P, fresh(X))
believes(P, recognizes(X))

P\EQ&R

believes(P, secret(Q,S,R))

PW&Q

believes(P,
believes(P,
believes(P,
believes(P,
[CI, C2]

PY-x
P NIIPO

P\EEC

P^QY^C

PNQKQN*
Cx, C2

public(K,Q))
C)
controls(Q,C))
honest(Q))

Table 3.2: Representing statements

3.4.2

Derived statements

Apart from representing the logical constructs in Prolog syntax, we also need to maintain derivation information about statements obtained by applying the inference rules.
The predicate fact/3 which represents an inference step is used for this purpose. It
takes the form:
fact(Index, Stat, reason(PremIs, Rule))
Here the integer argument Index is used to index instances of fact/3. The
argument Stat is bound to a derived statement. In the last argument, Premls is a list
containing the indices of premises used in deriving Stat by an application of rule Rule.

3.4.3 Logical rules
The representation of the inference rules is best explained by means of an example; the
being-told rule Tl is defined by the following clause for told/2:
told(told(P, X), reason([I], 'Tl')) :fact(I, told(P, star(X)), _ ) .

3.5 Using the tool: an example

We now demonstrate the use of the tool by means of one of the protocol an
the G N Y logic paper [2]: the voting protocol. Our aim here is to illustrate how the

3.5. Using the tool: an example

51

tool confirms a problem with the parsing scheme, which we discussed in the previous
chapter.
The idealized protocol is given as follows (p. 239):
1. Pi < *Nq
2. Q<

*Ph *N{, Wi, *H(Nq, * <Si>, V])

3. P,<

*R,*H(Ni,<Si>,R)

Here Si is a secret between P; and Q, and Ni and Nq are nonces generated by Pt and
Q, respectively.
The following statements describe the protocol assumptions:
Pi 3 Si; Pi3Ni;

Pt £ Q & P* />• |= Jj(^)

Q3Si;

Q £ Q & />•; Q £ l{Nq)

Q3Nq;

It is straightforward to convert the above statements into the syntax of the tool using
Tables 1 and 2. For example, the second idealized message is represented by the Prolog
fact:
fact(2, told(q, [star(pi), star(ni), star(vi), ext(star(h([nq, star(si), vi])),
nil)]), reason([], 'Step')).
The set of Prolog facts representing the idealized protocol and the initial assumptions
is then loaded into the analyzer to obtain all the logical statements derivable:
?- analyze(voting).
Analyzed in 4 cycles
The database of facts can now simply be queried to determine whether a particular goal
statement is attained or not. For example, according to the G N Y paper, the statements
Q ^ Pi Y-1 Vi and Pi ^ Q (~ R hold for the protocol (p. 239). The following queries
can be used to verify this:
?- fact(I, believes(q,conveyed(pi,vi)), Rule).
no
?- fact(I, believes(pi,conveyed(q,r)), Rule).
I = 37
Rule = reason([33],17);
yes
The output of the above queries show that Q ^ Pi |~ V does not hold, whereas
Pi ^ Q (~ R holds. It is not difficult to explain the discrepancy behind this mismatch. Looking at the analysis sketched in the G N Y paper, we see that the conclusion
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Q ^ Pi |~ V is obtained from the message interpretation rule 13 and the second message. It is easy to see that in the premises of the intended application of the rule,
the secret Si appears prefixed with a *; for example, one of the premises works out
*S'

^-

to be: Q ^ Q <4 Pi. Although we have the statement Q ^ Q <4 Pt as an initial
assumption, we see that the statement Q ^ Q *4 Pi does not follow from the logic. As
we discussed in the previous chapter, this difficulty is best dealt with by modifying the
parsing scheme so that non-encrypted and non-hashed message parts are not marked
with *'s. The desired statement Q ^ Pi |~ Vi is immediately derived once we alter the
idealization of the second message to reflect this change:
fact(2, told(q, [pi, ni, vi, ext(star(h([nq, si, vi])), nil)]), reason([],
'Step')).
| ?- fact(I, believes(q, conveyed(pi, vi)), Rule).
I = 37
Rule = reason([31],17);
no

The proof explanation routine can be further used to obtain explicit representati
proofs of derived statements. For example, we obtain the following machine-generated
proof of Q ^=Pi\~Vi:
?- explain_proof(believes(q, conveyed(pi,vi))).
1. told(q,[pi,ni,vi,ext(star(h([nq,si,vi])),
nil)]) {Step}
2. told(q.vi) {1, T2}
3. possesses(q,vi) {2, PI}
4. possesses(q,si) {Assumption}
5. possesses(q,nq) {Assumption}
6. believes(q,fresh(nq)) {Assumption}
7. believes(q,secret(q,si,pi)) {Assumption}
8. told(q,ext(star(h([nq,si,vi])),nil)) {1, T2}
9. believes(q,conveyed(pi,[nq.si.vi])) {8, 7,
6, 5, 4, 3, 13}
10. believes(q,conveyed(pi,vi)) {9, 17}

Chapter 4
Semantic foundations for authentication
logics

The motivation for this chapter is perhaps best described by the title of a note

by Tuttle [28]: "Flaming in Franconia: Build models, not logics.'''' Broadly speaking
the problem statement is as follows: To develop a model capable of providing a semantic
basis for BAN-like logics, but which is essentially independent of any such logic itself.
In constructing a model in this chapter, we will attempt to isolate and formalize
the semantics of some of the notions found in existing logics, without appealing too
closely to the logical formalisms themselves. In the next chapter, we will devise a logic
based on the model constructed here.

4.1 Informal groundwork

We begin by reviewing some of the notions which form the mainstay of existing mo
for BAN-like logics, namely the models due to Abadi and Tuttle [8], Syverson and
van Oorschot [9], and Wedel and Kessler [10]. Our intention is to highlight some of
the problems that arise in defining such notions semantically and to lay down some
groundwork for the model which we will construct in the next section.
As in existing works, we are interested in modeling a system of communicating,
message-passing principals. W e assume that principals can perform some actions;
for convenience we divide the class of actions into two: communication actions, and

message-construction actions. For example: (1) The actions of sending and receiving
a message belong to the former class; (2) The action of constructing a constant term
such as the n a m e of a principal belongs to the latter class.
The notions which are central to our model are those that associate various sets of
messages with principals: possessed messages, seen messages, and said messages.
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Possessed messages

The notion of possessed messages essentially reflects the following intuition: (1
principal P receives or constructs a message X, then X is possessed by P; (2) any
message that can be possibly computed by P from P's possessed messages is also
possessed by P.

Motivated by the above intuition, we can proceed to construct a

definition for the set of P's possessed messages as follows: we form the set of all the
messages which P receives or constructs and close this set off under the operations
that are available to P within the system. W e make the assumption that the available
operations include: keyed encryption function E_(-), keyed hashing function H_(-), and
concatenation function _ | • • • | _. To continue the previous definition we can require, for
example, that if a message X and a key K are in the set of P's possessions, then so is
the message EK(X);
EK(FK(EK(X))),

of course, this also implies that so are the messages

EK(EK(X)),

.... However, the unbounded nature of this definition makes the set

of P's possessed messages infinite; this means potentially all messages are possessed
by P. Furthermore, it introduces arbitrary messages, which does not seem necessary
for reasoning about messages that are actually constructed within the system. As in
existing approaches, we fix the set of P's possessed messages for each time t, but we
do not allow this set to be infinite in our model. W e will employ a limited notion of
possession, which works as follows. In defining the set of possessed messages for a given
time t, we restrict the closure operation to admit only those messages which occur in
the system at that time. Intuitively, a message occurs at time t, if it was constructed
by any principal at a time earlier than t. A characteristic property of the resulting
definition is that the set of possessed messages isfinite.As we shall see in the next
section, our definition also has many other interesting properties which appear quite
natural.
The notion of a message being constructed in the system also enables us to formulate
the assumption that 'accidents' do not happen. That is, we treat what is highly
improbable as impossible: we shall assume that a message can be constructed in the
system in only one way. For example, if a message is constructed as an encryption
then our assumption guarantees that the same message cannot be constructed as a
concatenation. As another example, if a message is constructed as an encryption of X
using K, then the same message cannot be constructed as an encryption of X' using
K', unless X

= X' and K = K'. The assumption which rules out chance equality

between messages is crucial for our definitions to make sense. For example, one part
of the closure operation that we will use in defining P's set of possessed messages at
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time t roughly captures the following statement:
(*) if a message Y is in this set and Y = EK(X)

for some K, X such that AT"1 is

also in this set, then so is X, provided that some principal has encrypted X using
K, and thus constructed EK(X),

at a time earlier than t.

Essentially, it is by virtue of the assumption which says that messages can be constructed in only one way that we can fix X as intended in the above statement. Of
course, this assumption cannot hold with certainty in the real world. However, it
simply reflects an idealization and is not unrealistic to make for our purposes.
The statement (*) above reflects an example of how we capture decryptions in the
model. The role of deconcatenations is captured similarly; we will give an example of
this below.

4.1.2 Seen messages
The notion of seen messages is somewhat more restrictive than that of possessed messages. It essentially reflects what messages can be extracted by a principal from the
messages it receives: (1) if a principal P receives a message X, then X is seen by
P; (2) any message that can be possibly extracted from P's seen messages, perhaps
using keys possessed by P, is also seen by P. The idea behind (2) is expanded as
follows: (2') if a message Y is seen by P and Y — EK(X)

for some X, K such that

K~l is possessed by P, then X is seen by P; and (2") if a message Y is seen by P and

Y = Xi | • • • | Xk for some Xx,..., Xk, then P's seen messages include X{ for all i. A
with the set of P's possessed messages, we fix the set of P's seen messages for each
time t. The closure operation that we will use in defining the set of P's seen messages
at time t has essentially the following two properties:
(**) if a message Y is in this set and Y = EK(X)

for some X, K such that K~x is

in the set of P's possessed messages at time t, then X is in the set of P's seen
messages at time t, provided that some principal has encrypted X using K, and
thus constructed EK(X),

at a time earlier than t, and

(***) if a message Y is in this set and Y = Xi \ • • • \ Xk for some Xx,..., Xk, then so
are Xx,..., Xk, provided that some principal has concatenated Xx,..., Xk, and
thus constructed Xx \ • • • | Xk, at a time earlier than t.
Again our assumption which says that messages can be constructed in only one way is
crucial to the intended meaning of the statements (**) and (***) above. Notice that
(**) shows an example of how we capture deconcatenations in the model.
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Said messages

The notion of said messages essentially reflects the following intuition: (1) if
P sends a message X, then X is said by P; (2) if X is said by P, then so are the
messages from which X was immediately constructed, if those messages are possessed
by P. Intuitively, if X is a message then the messages from which X was immediately
constructed are those messages that allow X to be obtained as the output of a single
message-construction action. For example, to construct an encrypted message

EK(X)

the immediate messages that are needed are X and K. W e emphasize that the notion
of 'immediate messages' is not inductive in nature: in the previous example X could
itself have been constructed as an encrypted message EK'(X');
are not amongst the immediate messages from which EK(X)

however, X' and K'

was constructed. In our

model, we willfixthe set of P's said messages for each time t. To define the set of said
messages along the above lines, we need to capture the notion of immediate messages.
This is done simply in terms of the notion of a message being constructed in the system.
For example, one part of the closure operation that we will use in defining P's set of
said messages at time t roughly captures the following statement:
(f) if a message Y is in this set and Y = EK(X) for some X, K such that X and
K are in the set of P's possessed messages at time t, then X and K are in the
set of P's said messages at time t, provided that some principal has encrypted X
using K, and thus constructed EK(X),

at a time earlier than t.

4.2 A computational model of communicating prin
cipals

Let E be a finite alphabet, and let M — E* be the set of all messages. For simpli
we take E = {0,1}; the set M. then consists of all binary strings offinitelength. Let a
finite set of principal names V C M
names simply as principals.
all possible keys K C M
function EK

'• M

a set /C _1 C M

—> M

be fixed; henceforth we always refer to principal

Let a set of nonces J\f C Ai be fixed. Let the set of

be fixed. For each key K

£ K,, we assume a one-to-one

isfixed,which we call a keyed encryption function. Assume

isfixedalong with a one-to-one onto function - 1 : /C —> /C-1. For

each K £ K, we assume a non-invertible function EK

- M

->• M

isfixed,which we

call a keyed hash function. For each natural number m > 1, we use the symbol | to
represent m-fold concatenation function over E*. If Xx,..., Xm £ M, we usually write
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\m(Xx,.. .,Xm) as Xx | • • • | Xm.
Informally, for each K £ K we use the value K~x to stand for the property that the
inverse function of EK is accessible. The difficulty of decrypting a message encrypted
under K without the knowledge of K'1 will be captured by the way we define certain
sets of messages in the model later. The collision-free property of keyed hash functions
will be captured as part of a restriction we will make on our model later.
W e assume that there is a global notion of time which is linear and discrete; for
convenience we think of time as ranging over the set of all integers Z. W e call our finite
collection V of principals a system (of principals). The actions a principal can perform
are defined by the following:
1. generate(m): This corresponds to generating a primitive term m .
2. send(m): This corresponds to sending a message m .
3. receive(m): This corresponds to receiving a message rn.
A. encrypt(m,k), and hash(m,k): These correspond to encrypting, and keyed hashing, respectively, of a message m using key k.

5. concatenate(mx,..., mk): This corresponds to concatenating messages mx,..., m
W e assume that at a given time a principal can perform at most one of the above
actions. W e also include a null action, denoted null, assumed to be performed precisely
when none of the above actions is performed.
Fix a system: V = {Pi,P2,..., P n } for some positive integer n. Intuitively, the
notion of a run of the system describes an execution of the system over time. W e shall
characterize a run r of the system by means of the following components: (1) a time
^first(r)> calle(i the start time for r, at which execution is assumed to begin; (2) for
each i, a sequence h(Pi,r), called the total history of Pi in r, which describes all the
actions Pi performs in r.
Definition 4.1 A runr of the system is a tuple (t^TS^(r),h(Px,r),... ,h(Pn,r)), where:
L

hTst(r) € Z >

and

2. for each i, h(Pi, r) is the union of the sequences h(Pi,r, ^first(r))) h(P{, r, £first(r)
1), ..., which are determined as follows:
0
h(Pi,r,t) =
\

if * = *flrst(r)

h(Pi, r, t — 1) • a if t > tfirst(r)

an

d a is the action

performed by Pi at time t — 1.
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It is convenient to call the sequence h(Pi,r,t), for each i, the partial history o
t in r. W e emphasize that h(Pi,r,t) includes all actions Pi has performed in r up to,
but not including, time t.
Let a principal P and a run r of the system befixed.The key component of the
model consists of the definition of several message sets. For convenience we define some
auxiliary sets first.
Definition 4.2 Let a denote the action P performs at time t in r.
{X}

if a = generate(X)

0

otherwise

(a) Sgenr(P,r,t) =

ifX\ if a = receive(X)
0

otherwise

{X}

if a = generate(X) or a = receive(X)

{EK(X)}

if a = encrypt(X, K)

(c) Sposs(P,r,t) = < {HK(X)}

\{a =

{(Ai | • • • | Xk)}
0
\X\

(d) Ssaid(P,r,t) = { \
1

0

hash(X,K)

if a = concatenate(Xx,... ,Xk)

otherwise
if a — send(X)
i

.

otherwise

The following l e m m a is easily proved from Definition 4.2.

Lemma 4.1
(a) Sgenr(P,r,t) C Sposs(P>r,t);
(b) Srecv(P,r,t) C Sposs(P,r,t).
In preparation for the lengthy definition that will follow, we begin by discussing
informally some of the sets to be defined there. For each time t, we will define the following message sets: Mgenr(P,r,t), Mrecv(P,r,t), Mposs(P,r,t), Mseen(P,r,t),
Msaid(P,r,t).

and

Informally, the set Mgenr(P,r,t) (respectively, Mrecv(P,r,t)) consists

of all the messages P produces by means of the generate^) (respectively, receive^))
action at any time in r up to, but not including, time t. In other words, for all X:
(1) X £ Mgenr(P,r,t) iff generate(X) appears in h(P,r,t); (2) X £ Mrecv(P,r,t) iff
receive(X) appears in h(P,r,t). The sets Mposs(P,r,t), Mseen(P,r,t), and

Msaid(P,r,t)

are meant to model the intuitive notions of possessed messages, seen messages, and said

4.2. A computational model of communicating principals

59

messages, respectively. As discussed in the previous section, in defining these sets we
shall use the idea of a message 'occurring in the system'. Certain sets of tuples are
useful for capturing this idea: €(P,r,t), U(P,r,t), and C(P,r,t). The set £(P,r,t)
(respectively, li(P,r,t)) consists of 2-tuples corresponding to message-key pairs; the
set C(P,r,t) consists of m-tuples of messages for various natural numbers ra > 1.
Informally, we use the set €(P,r,t) to record all the pairs (X, K) such that P has
performed the action encrypt(X, K) at any time in r up to, but not including, time t;
and similarly for the sets %(P,r,t) and C(P,r,t), respectively. Notice that the union
of the sets £(Pj, r, t) for all i identifies all encryptions that are constructed by any principal in r at any time earlier than t; and similarly for hashes and concatenations. For
convenience we introduce the following additional sets to denote the respective unions:
£ M ) = U ? = i W , r , t ) , H(r,t) = [£=xH(Pi,r,t), and C(r,t) = {fl=xC(Pi,r,t).
To formulate the assumption that messages can be constructed in only one way, we
distinguish sets of messages occurring in the system according to the type of action
which gave rise to them. For example, we will define the set M.genr(r,t) as the set
containing all the messages constructed by means of the generateQ action by any
principal at any time in r up to, but not including, time t; and similarly the sets
Mencr(r,t), -A^hashkri^)->

and

-M concO", t) for encrypted, hashed and concatenated

messages, respectively. The desired assumption is then stated in two parts: one part
which says that the above sets are pairwise disjoint; another part which says that
P_(_) and H_(J) (respectively, _ | • • • | _) are one-to-one functions when restricted to
those message-key pairs (respectively, message-tuples) which occur in the system.
W e will make use of the sets S(r,t), %(r,t), and C(r,t) in defining the closure
operation that determines the set Mposs(P, r, t). For example, suppose that a message
X and a key K are in this set. Then our definition implies that so is the encrypted
message EK(X),

but only if (X, K) £ S(r,t), i.e. if the encrypted message already

occurs in the system at time t in r. The sets MSeen(P,r,t), and Msaid(P,r,t) will
also be defined along similar lines.
The following definition brings together the above discussion and is central to our
model. It proceeds in two parts: Each of the above sets is defined to be empty at
t = ifirst(r)- Then assuming all sets are defined at all times up to and including t-1,
we define them at t. In parallel with these definitions, we restrict the actions that can
be performed at a given time.
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Definition 4.3
1. Let t = tfast(r).
(i) Mgenr(P,r,t) = A4recu(P,r,i) = 0
(ii) S(P, r, t) = U(P, r, t) = C(P, r, t) = 0
(iii) S(r,t) = U(r,t) = C(r,t) = ®
(iv) Mgenr(r,t) = Mencr(r,t) = -M/,05/,(r,t) = A4COnc(r,t) = 0
(v) M p o 4 P , r , t ) = M se en(P,r,t) = A 4 s a i d ( ^ W ) = 0
REO. The only action permitted is the generate() action.
2. Let t > tfirst(r).
(i) Mgenr(P,r,t) = A45enr(P,r,t - 1) U Sgenr(P,r,t - 1)

(ii) A4rect;(P,r,t) = Mrecv(P,r,t - 1) U Srecv(P,r,t - 1)

(iii) £(P,r,t) = £(P,r,t-l)U5, where
{(X, A")} if P performs encrypt(X, K) at time t - 1
S= <

(iv)ft(P,r,i)=

0

otherwise

ft(P,r,*-l)U5,where

{(X, K)} if P performs hash(X, K) at time t - 1
otherwise

(v) C(P, r, t) = C(P, r, t - 1) U S, where
{(Xx,..., Xk)}
5 =

if P performs concatenate(Xx,..., Xk) at
time i — 1
otherwise
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(vi) S(r,t) = \JS(Pi,r,t)
i-i

(vii) rl(r,t) = \JU(Pi,r,t)
i=i

n

(viii) C(r,t)= \JC(Pi,r,t)
»=i

RE1. (a) If (X,K),(X',K') £ S(r,t) and EK(X) = EK,(X'), then X = X' and

K = K'.
(b) If (X, K), (X', K') £ ri(r, t) and HK(X) = HK,(X'), then X = X' and
K = K'.
(c) If(Xx,...,Xk),(X'x,...,X'k,)£C(r,t)andXx\---\Xk = X'x\---\X'k,,
then k = k' and Ai = X'i, ..., Xk = X'k>.

(ix) Mgenr(r,t) = |J A4^enr(Pi,r,t)
i=l

(x) AWr(M) = {£*(X) | (X, #) € £(r,i)}

(xi) Mhash(r,t) = {HK(X) | (X, tf) e tt(r,i)}

(xii) A4«mc(r,t) = {(Xx \ • • • \ Xk) \ (Xx, ...,Xk)£ C(r,t)}

RE2. The sets Mgenr(r,t), Mencr(r,t), Mhash(r,t), and Mconc(r,t) are pairwise disjoint.

(xiii) Mposs(P, r, t) is the smallest set of messages such that:
I. (Basis)
Mposs(P, r, t - 1) U SpoSs(P, r, t - 1) C A4poSS(P, r, t)
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II. (Induction)

(a) EK(X) £ Mposs(P,r ,0

if X,K £MPoss(P,r,t) and
(X,K)£S(r,t)

(b) HK(X) £ Mp0SS(P,r

• . * )

if X, K £ MpOSS(P, r, t) and
(X,K)£U(r,t)

(c) Xi

\---\Xk£Mposs(P,r,t) if Xx,...,Xk£MPoss(P,r,t)
and(Xi,...,Xfc)GC(r,t)

(d) X £ Mp0ss(P,r,t)

if^(X),A'- 1 €^ o s s (P,r,t)
and (X, AT) e £(r, <)

(e) Xi £ Mposs(P,r,t)

ifXi |---|Xfc€Mpo5S(P,r,*)
and(Xi,...,Xfc)GC(r,t)

(xiv) M. seen(P\*\t) is the smallest set of messages such that:
I. (Basis)
Mseen(P, r, t - 1) U <SreCt;(P, r, t - 1) C A4seen(P, r, t)
II. (Induction)
(a) X € A4seen(P,r,t) if EK(X) £ Mseen(P,r,t) and
(X,K) £ E(r,t) and A^"1 £ MPoss(P,r,t)
(b) Xi € Mseen(P, r,t)

if Xx \ • • • \ Xk £ Mseen(P, r, t) and
(Xi,...,Xfc)GC(r,i)

(xv) Msaid(P,r,t) is the smallest set of messages such that:
I. (Basis)
Msaid(P, r, t - 1) U <SsmW(P, r, t - 1) C A W P , r, t)
II. (Induction)
(a) X, A- £ Msaid(P, r, t) if EK(X) £ Msaid(P, r, t) and
(X, K) £ £(r, t) and X,K £ MpoSs(P, r, t)
(b) X , /if € Msaid(P, r, t) if P^(X) £ Msaid(P, r, t) and
(X, K) £ U(r, t) and X,K £ MpoSs(P, r, t)
(c) Xi £ Msaid(P,r,t)

if Xi | • • • | Xk £ Msaid(P,r, t) and
(Xi,...,X,)GC(r,t)
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RE3. If P performs receive(X) at t, then there exists a principal Q which performs
send(X) at some t' < t.
RE4. If P performs send(X) at t, then X G A4p0ss(-P,r,t).

RE5. If P performs encrypt(X, K) or hash(X, K) at t, then X, AT G Mposs(P, r, t).

RE6. If P performs concatenate^,..., Xfc) at t, then Xi,..., X*, € A4p0ss(P, r, t)
(This completes Definition 4.3.)
The following lemmas are easily proved from Definition 4.3.
Lemma 4.2 For all t,t' such that t <t' the following holds:
(a) Mgenr(P,r,t) C Mgenr(P,r,t');
(b) Mrecv(P,r,t) C Mrecu(P,r,t');
fcj £(P,r,t)C£(P,r,t');
(d) H(P,r,t)CH(P,r,t');
(e) C(P,r,t)CC(P,r,t');
if) MpoSS(P,r,t) C XpossCP.r,*');
faj -Mseen(P,r,t) C A4seen(/W);

Lemma 4.3 For all t, t' such that t < t' the following holds:
(a) £(r,t)C£(r,t');
(b) H(r,t)CH(r,t');
(c) C(r,t)QC(r,t').
Lemma 4.4 For each time t, the following sets are finite:
(a) Mgenr(P,r,t), and Mrecv(P,r,t);
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(b) £(P,r,t), H(P,r,t), andC(P,r,t).

We will later prove the finiteness property for the sets Mposs(P,r,t), M.seen(P-,r-

andA4 sa j d (P,r,t).
Lemma 4.5 For each time t, the following sets are finite:
£(r,t),U(r,t), andC(r,t).
Lemma 4.6 For all t, t' such that t < t' the following holds:
(a) Mgenr(r,t) C Mgenr(r,t');
(b) Mencr(r,t) C Mencr(r, t');
(c) Mhash(r,t)QMhash(r,t');
(d) Meanest) Q MConc(r,t').
Lemma 4.7 For each time t, the following sets are finite:
Mgenr(r, t),Mencr(r,t),Mhash(r,t), and Mconc(r, t).

Lemma 4.8
(a) If (X, K) £ £(P, r, t) then X, K £ MPoss(P, r, t - 1).
(b) If(X,K) £ n(P,r,t) then X , K £ Mposs(P,r,t - 1).
(c) If(Xx,... ,Xfc) G C(P,r,t) then Xx,...,Xk£ MPoss(P,r,t- 1).
Proof. (By induction on t.) We only prove part (a); the remaining parts are proved
similarly.
1. (Basis) Let t = tfirst(r). By definition 4.3, £(P,r,t^Tst(r)) = 0. Therefore, the
required statement holds vacuously.
2. (Induction) Let t > tfirst(r) be arbitrary. W e assume the inductive hypothesis:
if (X,K)

£ £(P,r,t) then X,K

£ Mposs(P,r,t - 1); and we show this implies

that, if (X,K) £ £(P,r,t + 1) then X , K £ Mposs(P,r,t).
Suppose (X, K) £ £(P, r, t + 1 ) . By definition 4.3 we need to consider the following two cases:
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Case (A): (X, K) £ £(P, r, t). The inductive hypothesis yields X, K £ MpOSS(P, r, t
1). B y L e m m a 4.2(f) it follows that X , K £ Mp0ss(P,r,t).
Case (B): P performs encrypt(X,K) at t. R E 5 yields X,K

£

MpoSs(P,r,t).

(This completes the proof of Lemma 4.8.) D

In the sequel, we shall make use of a proof technique which is vital to proving
properties of the following inductively defined sets: Mp0ss(P, r, t), MSeen(P, r, t), and
Msaid(P, r, t). It suffices to explain this technique in context of the set Mp0ss(P, r, t),
since it works similarly in other contexts. Essentially, the technique works as follows.
W e construct a sequence of sets Mp0SS(P,r,t) for i = 0,1,2,..., with the following
property: (1) thefirstset in the sequence is the basis set for A4poss(P, r, t), and (2) each
of the remaining sets in the sequence is the union of the set which immediately precedes
it and the set obtained from the preceding set by applying the closure operation exactly
once. The point of the above construction is now obvious: for proving that a particular
statement holds for J^iposs(P-,f^)i w e
sets

use

induction on i to show that it holds for all

Mposs(P,r,t).

Definition 4.4 Let i > 0.
1. Let t = *first(r). Then AAiposs(P,r,t) = 0 for all i.
2. Let t > tfirst(r). Then

Mposs(P,r,t)

Mposs(P, r, t - 1) U Sposs{P, r,t-l)

=<

{ M#ss(P,r,t)US

if i = 0
if»>0

where
S

=

{EK(X)
U{HK(X)

\X,K£

Mp-Jss(P, r, t) and (X, K) £ £(r, t)}

\X,K£

Mlp-Jss(P,r,t) and (X,K) £ U(r,t)}

U{(Xi|---|X,)|Xi,...,X,G^-yP,r,t)and(Xi,...,X f c )GC(r,t)}
U { X | EK(X),K~l

£ A4J70yP,r,t) and (X,K) £ £(f,t)}

U {X{ | (Xi | • • • | X,) G A4J7oyP,r,t) and (Xx,...,Xk)£ C(r,t)}.

The following l e m m a is easily proved from Definition 4.3 and Definition 4.4.
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Lemma 4.9
00

Mposs(P,r,t) C Mposs(P,r,t) C • • • C |J A f ^ ^ r , * ) = A^P,,-,*)
i=0

L e m m a 4.10
Mgenr(P,r,t) C A4p0ss(P, r, t)
Proof. By induction on t:
1. (Basis) Let t = t^rst(r). By definition 4.3,
A4&enr(P,r,tfirst(r)) = Mp0SS(P,r,tfast(r)) = 0.
Therefore, the required statement holds.
2. (Induction) Let t > tj[vst(r) be arbitrary. W e assume the inductive hypothesis:
Mgenr(P,r,t) C A4p0ss(-P,^,t); and we show this implies Mgenr(P,r,t + 1) C
Mpo SS (P,r,t + l).
From L e m m a 4.1(a) and the inductive hypothesis it follows that M.genr(P, r, t) U
Sgenr(P,r, t) C A4poss(P, r, t) U Sposs(P,r,t). B y definition 4.3, Afo e n r (P, r, t +
1) = Mgenr(P,r,t) U Sgenr(P,r,t), and, by definition 4.4, A4°OS5(P,r,t + 1) =
A4 p o s s (P, r, t) U 5 p o s s (P, r, t). Hence Mgenr(P, r, t + 1) C A4£ 0SS (P, r, t + 1). By
L e m m a 4.9 it follows that Mgenr(P, r,t -\-1) C Mposs(P, r,t + 1).
(This completes the proof of L e m m a 4.10.)

•

L e m m a 4.11
A4poss(P,r,t) C Mgenr(r,t) U A4encr(r,t) U Mhash(r,t)

U A4COnc(r,t)

Proof. By induction on t:
1. (Basis) Let t =

tj[TSt(r). By definition 4.3, Mposs(P,r,tfiTSt(r)) =

0 and

Mgenr(r,tfost(r))UMencr(r,tfast(r))UMhash(r,t^
0. Therefore, the required statement holds.
2. (Induction) Let t > t^rst(r) be arbitrary. W e assume the inductive hypothesis:
(HP1) for all t' < t, Mposs(P, r, t') C Mgenr(r, t') UMencr(r, t') U Mhash(r,
A4Conc(^,t'); and we show this implies Mp0ss(P,r,t) C A4oenr(^,t)UA4 en cr(^0 u
^/>as/>M) U ^conc(r,t).
By L e m m a 4.9 it suffices to show that, for all Y and for all m , if Y £ Mp0SS(P, r, t)
then Y £ Mgenr(r,t) U Mencr(r,t) U A i / ^ ^ t ) U AfConc(r,t). This assertion
is shown using induction on m:

t
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I. (Basis) Let m = 0. Suppose Y £ Mp0SS(P,r,t). By definition 4.4, Y £
MpOSS(P, r, t - 1) U Sposs(P, r,t-l).
Case (i): Y £ Mposs(P,r,t-l). HP1 yields Y £ Mgenr(r,t - 1) U Mencr(r,t 1) U Mhos^t

- 1) U MConc(r,t - 1). By Lemma 4.6 it follows that

Y £ Mgenr(r,t) U AWr(r,t) U Af j,fl5j,(r,t) U AtConc(r,t).
Case(ii): Y G <5poss(P,r,t - 1).
Case (A): P performs generate(Y) at t — 1.
By definition 4.3, Y G Mgenr(r,t).
Case (B): P performs receiue(Y) at t — 1.
RE3 yields: there exists a Q which performs send(Y) at some
time t' < t - 1. RE4 yields Y G A*poss(Q,r,*'). HP1 yields
Y G A4oenr(r,t') U A W r ( M ' ) U Mhash(r,t') U A U n c M ' ) - By
L e m m a 4.6 it follows that Y G A4oenr(^i)!UAlencr(r,t)UA</ia5/l(r,t)U
A4Conc(r,t).
Case (C): P performs encrypt(X, K) at t - 1 for some X and some K, where

Y = EK(X).
By definition 4.3, P#(X) £ Mencr(r,t). Hence Y G Mencr(r,t).
Case (D): P performs hash(X,K) at t - 1forsome X and some K, where

Y = HK(X).
Similar to Case (C).
Case (E): P performs concatenate(Xx,... ,Xfc) at t - 1 for some Xi,... ,Xfc,
where Y = Xi | • • • | Xk.
Similar to Case (C).
II. (Induction) Let m > 0 be arbitrary. W e assume the inductive hypothesis:
(HP2) for all Y, if Y G A4™0SS(P,r,t) then Y G Mgenr(r,t) U A4encr(r,t) U
Mhash(r,t) U A4Conc(r,t); and we show this implies that, for all Y, if
Y G M^8(P,r,t)

then Y G Mgenr(r,t) U A W r ( M ) U Mhash(r,t) U

A4Conc(r,t).
Suppose Y G A*35&(P,r,t). By definition 4.4,
YGA^0SS(P,r,t)
U

{EK(X)

| X , K £ M^0SS(P,r,t) and (X,K) G £(r,t)}

U

{#K(X)

1 X, A" G A4^0SS(P,r,t) and (X,K) £ H(r,t)}

U{(Xi | ••• | Xk) | Xi,...,Xfc G A4>*(P,r,t) and (Xi,... ,Xfc) G C(r,
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U { X | EK(X), K-1 £ M™0SS(P,r,t) and (X,K) £ £(r,t)}
U{X{ | (Xi | ... | Xk) £ M™0SS(P,r,t) and (Xu... ,Xk) £ C(r,t)}.
Case (A): Y G M™oss(P,r,t). HP2 yields Y G Mgenr(r,t) U Mencr(r,t) U
Mhash(r,t)UMconc(r,t).
Case (B): Y G {£x(X) \X,K£

M™0SS(P,r,t) and (X, A ) G £(r,t)}.

W e have Y = EK(X) for some X and some K such that (X, A") G
£(r,t). By definition 4.3, Ejr(X) G Mencr(r,t). HenceY G Mencr(r,t).
Case (C): Y G {#A-(X) | X, A G A4^oss(P,r,t) and (X,K) £ U(r,t)}.
Similar to Case (B).
Case (D): Y G {(Xx \ • • • | Xk) \ Xx,...,Xk £ M™0SS(P,r,t) and (Xi,...,Xfc) G

C(r,t)}.
Similar to Case (B).
Case (E): Y G { X | EK(X),K~1 £ M^oss(P,r,t) and (X,K) £ £(r,t)}.
W e have (Y,AT) G £(r,t) for some K.

By definition 4.3, (Y,K) £

£(Q,r,t) for some Q. By L e m m a 4.8(a), Y,K £ Mp0ss(Q,r,t - 1).
HP1 yields Y G Mgenr(r,t - 1) U A4encr(r,t - 1) U Mhash(r,t - 1) U
A4Conc(r,t - 1). By Lemma 4.6 it follows that Y G Mgenr(r,t) U
A4encr(r, t) U A4 /^(r, t) U AfCOnc(r, t).

Case (F): Y G {X; | (Xx | • • • | X,) G A4^0SS(P, r, t) and (Xl5..., X,) G C(r, t
Similar to Case (E).
(This completes the proof of Lemma 4.11.)
•

Lemma 4.12

(a) Let (X,K) £ £(r,t). If EK(X) £ MPoss(P,r,t') for some P and for some t' <
then(X,K) ££(r,t').
(b) Let (X,K) £ U(r,t). If HK(X)

£ MpoSs(P,r,t') for some P and for some

t' <t, then(X,K)£H(r,t').
(c) Let (Xu...,Xk)£

C(r, t). If Xx \ • • • \ Xk £ MPoss(P, r, t') for some P

some t' < t, then (Xt,...,Xk)£ C(r,t').

Proof. We only prove part (a); the remaining parts are proved similarly. W

(X, K) £ £(r, t). Suppose EK(X) £ Mposs(P, r, t') for some P and for some t' < t.
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definition 4.3, EK(X) £ Mencr(r,t). RE2 yields EK(X) $ Mgenr(r,t)UMhash(r,t)U
Mconc(r,t). By L e m m a 4.6 it follows that EK(X) <£ Mgenr(r,t') U Mhash(r,t') U
Mconc(r,t'). Since EK(X) £ Mp0Ss(P,r,t'), it follows by L e m m a 4.11 that EK(X) £
Mgenr(r,t')UMencr(r,t')UMhash(r,t')UMConc(r,t'). Hence EK(X) £ Mencr(r,t').
By definition 4.3, EK(X)

= EK,(X') for some (X',K') £ £(r,t'). W e have t > t'.

By L e m m a 4.6 it follows that (X',K') £ £(r,t). RE1 yields X = X' and K = K'.
Therefore, (X,K) £ £(r,t').

•

Lemma 4.13
(a) IfX,K £ MPoss(P,r,t) and (X,K) £ £(r,t), then EK(X) £ Mposs(P,r,t).
(b) IfX,K £ Mposs(P,r,t) and (X,K) £ H(r,t), then HK(X) £ Mposs(P,r,t).

(c) If Xi,...,Xk £ Mp0SS(P,r,t) and (Xx,...,Xk) £ C(r,t), then Xx \ • • • | X
Mposs(P,r,t).

(d) IfEK(X),K~1 £ Mp0Ss(P,r,t) for some (X,K) £ £(r,t), then X £ Mp0Ss(P,r,t).

(e) IfXi | ••• \ Xk £ MpoSs(P,r,t) for some (Xx,... ,Xk) £ C(r,t), then Xx,.
MpoSs(P,r,t).
Proof. W e only prove part (a); the remaining parts are proved similarly. Suppose X, K £ MPoss(P,r,t) and (X, A') £ £(r,t). By Lemma 4.9 it suffices to show
that EK(X)

£ Mposs(P,r,t) for some /. Since X,K

£ Mp0Ss(P,r,t), it follows by

Lemma 4.9 that X, K £ M^0SS(P, r, t) for some m. By definition 4.4, A4^"/S(P, r, t) D
{EK(X) \X,K£

M™0SS(P,r,t) and (X,K) £ £(r,t)}. Hence EK(X) £ M™£s(P,r,t).

•
Definition 4.5 Let i > 0.
1. Let t = tfiTst(r). Then Mseen(P,r,t) = 0 for all *.
2. Let t > tfixst(r)- Then

Mseen(P,r,t)

Mseen(P,r,t - 1) U Srecv(P,r, t - 1) if i = 0
Mi&n(P,r,t)\JS

if:>0

where
S =
{ X | EK(X) £ M.{£en(P,r,t) and K~x £ MPoss(P,r,t) and (X,K) £ £(r,t)}
U {Xi | (Xx | • • • | X,) G M^en(P,r,t) and (Xx,... ,Xk) £ C(r,t)}.
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T h e following l e m m a is easily proved from Definition 4.3 and Definition 4.5.

Lemma 4.14
oo

M°seen(P,r,t) C M\een(P,r,i)

C • • • C (J A4Jseen(P,r,t) =

MSeen(P,r,t)

i=0

Lemma 4.15
MreCv(P,r,t) C MSeen(P,r,t)
Proof. By induction on t:
1. (Basis) Let t = t^rst(r). B y definition 4.3,
Mrecv(P,r,tfast(r)) = Mseen(P,r, tfirst(r)) = 0.
Therefore, the required statement holds.
2. (Induction) Let t > tfirst(r) be arbitrary. W e assume the inductive hypothesis:
Mrecv(P,r,t) C A4Seen(^,r,t); and w e show this implies Mrecv(P,r,t + 1) C
Af s e en(P,r,t+l).
B y the inductive hypothesis it follows that
A4reci;(P, r, t) U ^^^(P, r, t) C A4seen(i3, r, i) U Srect;(P, r> *)•
By definition 4.3, AWt>(jP, r, t+1) = A4rect;(^, r, t)USrecv(P, r, t), and, by definition 4.5, A4°een(P,r,t + l) = A4 se en(^,r,t)U<WCP,r,*)- Hence Mrecv(P,r,t +
1) Q A < 5 e e n ( ^ r ^ + 1)'

B

y

L e m m a 4

- 14 ii;

follows t n a t

Mrecv(P,r,t + 1) C

M S ecn(P,r,<+l).
D

(This completes the proof of L e m m a 4.15.)

Lemma 4.16
Mseen(P,r,t)C

Mposs(P,r,t)

Proof. By induction on t:
1. (Basis) Let t = tfirst(r). B y definition 4.3,
A4seen(P,r,tfirst(r)) = A4p0SS(P,r,tfirst(r)) = 0.
Therefore, the required statement holds.
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2. (Induction) Let t > tfirs+(r) be arbitrary. W e assume the inductive hypothesis:
(HP1) MSeen(P,r,t) C Mp0ss(P,r,t); and we show this implies MSeen(P,r,t-rl)QMp0ss(P,r,t + l).

By L e m m a 4.14 it suffices to show that, for all m, M™een(P, r, t+1) C Mp0ss(P, r,1+
1). This assertion is shown using induction on m:

I. (Basis) Let m = 0. From Lemma4.1(b) and HP1 it follows that MSeen(P, r
Srecv(P,r,t) C A4poss(P,r,t)U<Sposs(P,r,t). By definition 4.5, A4°een(P,r,t+
1) = A45een(P,r,t) U SreCt;(P,r,*), and, by definition 4.4, Mp0SS(P,r,t +
1) = A^possCP.r^USpo^r,*). Hence A4°een(P,r, t+1) C A4°0SS(P,r,t+
1). By L e m m a 4.9 it follows that M°seen(P,r,t + 1) C AV 5S (P,r,t + 1).
II. (Induction) Let m > 0 be arbitrary. W e assume the inductive hypothesis:
(HP2) M^een(P,r,t + 1) C A4p0ss(iV,t + 1); and we show this implies
M%+ln(P,r,t + 1) C Mposs(P,r,t + 1).
It suffices to show that, for all Y, if Y G A ^ + ^ P ^ t + 1) then Y G
A4p0SS(P,r,t + 1). Suppose Y G A ^

n

( ^ M + l)- BY definition 4.5,

Y£M™een(P,r,t + l)
U { X | EK(X) £ M™een(P,r,t-r-1) and (X,K) £ £(r,t + 1) and
J T 1 eMposs(P,r,t + l)}

U {Xi | (Xi | • • • | Xk) £ M7een(P,r,t + 1) and (Xi,... ,Xk) £ C(r,t
Case (i): Y G A4™een(P,r,t -f 1). HP2 yields Y G MpoSs(P,r,t + 1).
Case (ii): Y G { X | £*(X) G M%een(P,r,t + 1) and (X,tf) G £(r,t + 1) and
AT"1 £ Mp0ss(P,r,t + l)}.
W e have, for some K, EK(Y) £ M^een(P: r, t + 1), (Y, # ) G £(r, t + 1),
and AT"1 G A4poS5(P,r,t + 1). HP2 yields EK(Y) £ MpoSs(P,r,t + 1).
By L e m m a 4.13(d) it follows that Y G Mposs(P,r,t + 1).
Case (iii): Y G {X; | (Xi | • • • | Xk) £ M%een(P,r,t + 1) and (Xx,...,Xk) £

C(r,t + 1)}W e have Y = Xi for some i and for some Xx \ • • • \ Xk £ M™een(P, r, t +

1) such that (Xi, ...,Xk) £ C(r,t + 1). H P 2 yields Xx \ • • • | Xk £
Mposs(P,r,t + 1). By Lemma 4.13(e) it follows that Xi,...,Xfc G
Mpo88(P,r,t + 1). But Y = X{ for some i, so Y G A4p0s5(P,r,t + 1).
(This completes the proof of L e m m a 4.16.)

•
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Lemma 4.17 Let Y £ A4seen(P,r,t). Then
(a) ifY = EK(X) for some (X,K) £ £(r,t) and K~l £ Mp0ss(P,r,t), then X £
MSeen(P,r,t), and
(b) ifY = Xx\---\Xk for some (Xx,...,Xk)£ C(r,t), then
Xx,...,Xk £ MSeen(P,r,t).

Proof. We only prove part (a); part (b) is proved similarly. Since Y G M.seen(
it follows by L e m m a 4.14 that Y G M.™een(P,r,t) for some m. Suppose Y = EK(X)
for some (X, K) £ £(r, t), and further suppose K~l £ MPoss(P, r, t). By definition 4.5,
M&en(P,r,t) D {X | EK(X) £ M^een(P,r,t)and(X,K)
£ £(r,t) and K~x £
Mposs(P,r,t)}. Hence X G M^n(P,r,t).
By L e m m a 4.14 it follows that X G
MSeen(P,r,t).

a
Definition 4.6 Let i > 0.
1. Let t = tfirst(r). Then A4^(P,r,t) = 0 for all i.
2. Let t > tfirst(r). Then
Ui (p

.,

=

f Msaid(P, r, t - 1) U Ssaid(P, r,t-l) if i = 0
A ' W * ^
\^yp,r,t)U5
if^>o

where
5 =
{X, A^ | £tf(X) G M ^ P , r, t) and X, A G A4 poss (P, r, t) and
(X,K)££(r,t)}
U {X, A^ | HK(X) £ M^id(P,r,t) and X,AT G A4poS*(P,r,t) and
(X,K)£U(r,t)}
U {Xi | (Xi | • • • | X,) G M^id(P,r,t) and (Xi,... ,Xk) £ C(r,t)}.
The following lemma is easily proved from Definition 4.3 and Definition 4.6.
Lemma 4.18 oo
M°said(P,r,t) C A4^(P,r,t) C • • • C U Mlsaid(P,r,t) = A*Mirf(P,r,t)
i=0
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Lemma 4.19
Msaid(P,r,t)CMposs(P,r,t)
Proof. By induction on t:
1. (Basis) Let t = t^rst(r). By definition 4.3,
^Sa*d(Ar,tfirst(r)) = MPoss(P,r,t^Tst(r)) = 0.
Therefore, the required statement holds.

2. (Induction) Let t > t-^rst(r) be arbitrary. We assume the inductive hypothesis:
(HP1) Msaid(P,r,t) C Mposs(P,f,t); and we show this implies Msaid(P,r,t +
l)QMp0ss(P,r,t + l).
By L e m m a 4.18, it suffices to show that, for all Y and for all rn, if Y G
Mm -JP,r,t + 1) then Y G Mposs(P,r,t + 1). This assertion is shown using
induction on m:
I. (Basis) Let m = 0. Suppose Y G M°said(P,r,t + 1). By definition 4.6,
Case (A): Y G Msaid(P,r,t). HP1 yields Y G A4p0ss(/>,t). By Lemma 4.2(f)
it follows that Y G Mp0ss(P,r,t + 1).
Case (B): Y G Ssaid(P,r,t). By definition 4.2, P performs send(Y) at t. R E 4
yields Y G Mp0ss(P,r,t). By L e m m a 4.2(f), Y G MpoSs(P,r,t + 1).
II. (Induction) Let m > 0 be arbitrary. W e assume the inductive hypothesis:
(HP2) for all Y, if Y G M™aid(P,r,t + 1) then Y £ Mp0ss(P^,t + 1);
and we show this implies that, for all Y, if Y G A4™+.^(P,r,t + 1) then
Y£MPoss(P,r,t

+ l).

Suppose Y G M™£d(P,r,t + 1). By definition 4.6,

y^BrfM+i)

U {X, AT | £*(X) G Mmsaid(P, r, t + 1) and X , # G A4p 05S (P, r, t + 1) an
(X,AT)G£(r,t + l)}
U { X , K | # * ( X ) £ M7aid(P^^

+ X )a n d X ' ^ G Mposs(P,r,t + 1) and

(X,A^)G^(r,t + l)}

U {Xi | (Xi | • • • | Xfc) G M™aid(P,r,t + 1) and (X1;... ,Xfc) G C(r,t
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Case (i): Y G M™aid(P, r, t + 1). HP2 yields Y G Mp0Ss(P, r, t + 1).
Case (ii): Y G {X, AT | P K ( X ) G A4™^(P,r,t + l) and X , X G A4p05S(P,r,t + l)
and(X,X)G£(r,t + l)}.
W e have Y = X or Y = A for some X , A such that X, K £ Mp0ss(P, r, t+
1). Therefore, Y G Mposs(P,r,t + 1).
Case (iii): Y G {X, X | HK(X) £ M™aid(P,r,t-rl) and X , K £ Mposs(P,r,t + l)
and(X,X)G"H(r,t + l)}.
Similar to Case (ii).
Case(iv): Y G {X4- | (Xx | • • • | X,) G Af™ w(P,r,t + 1) and (Xx,... ,Xk) £
C(r,t + 1)}.
W e have Y = Xi for some i and for some Xx \ • • • \ Xk £ M™aid(P, r, t +
1) such that (Xi,...,Xfc) G C(r,t + 1). HP2 yields (Xi,...,X^) G
Mposs(P,r,t + 1). By Lemma 4.13(e) it follows that Xx,...,Xk £
Mp0ss(P,r,t + 1). But Y = Xt- for some t, so Y G Mp0ss(P,r,t + 1).
(This completes the proof of Lemma 4.19.)

n

Lemma 4.20

(a) IfEK(X) £ Msaid(P,r,t) for some (X,K) £ £(r,t) such that X, K £ Mp0ss(P,r,t)
then X,K £ Msaid(P,r,t).

(b) IfHK(X) £ Msaid(P, r, t) for some (X, K) £ ri(r, i) such that X, K £ Mp0Ss{
t/ienX,XGA<said(P,r,t).

(c) IfXx | • • • | Xjfe G Msaid(P,r,t) for some (Xx, ...,Xk)£ C(r,t), then Xx,
Msaid(P,r,t).
Proof. W e only prove part (a); the remaining parts are proved similarly. Suppose
EK(X) £ Msaid(P,r,t) for some (X, A ) G £(r,t) such that X, K £ Mp0Ss(P,r,t).
By L e m m a 4.18 it suffices to show that X,K
EK(X)

£ Mlsaid(P,r,t) for some /. Since

£ Msaid(P,r,t) it follows by Lemma 4.18 that EK(X)

some m. By definition 4.6, M^d(P,r,t)

D {X,K

| EK(X)

£ M™aid(P,r,t) for
£ Mmsaid(P,r,t) and

(X,K) £ £(r,t) and X, K £ Mposs(P,r,t)}. Hence X, X G A4J+^(P,r,t).

(This completes the proof of L e m m a 4.20.)

Proposition 4.1 For each time t, the following sets are finite:

•
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(a) MPoss(P,r,t);
(b) MSeen(P,r,t);

(c) Msaid(P,r,t).
Proof.
(a) Follows from Lemma 4.11 and Lemma 4.7.
(b) Follows from Lemma 4.16 and part (a).
(c) Follows from Lemma 4.19 and part (a).
D
The following corollary to Proposition 4.1 is easily proved.
Corollary 4.1 For each time t, the following holds:
(a) MPoss(P,r,t) = Mkposs(P,r,t) for some k;
(b) MSeen(P,r,t) = Mkseen(P,r,t) for some k;
(c) M8aid(P,r,t) = Mksaid(P,r,t) for some k;
Proposition 4.2
Let Y £ Afp05S(P, r, t) for some m, and suppose that Y G' A4.Seen(P,r,t).
(a) IfY = EK(X) for some (X,K) £ £(r,t), then X,K £ M^0SS(P,r,t).
(b) IfY = HK(X) for some (X,K) £ U(r,t), then X,K £ M™0SS(P,r,t).
(c) If Y = Xx | • • • | Xk for some (Xx, ...,Xk)£ C(r,t), then
Xx,...,Xk£M™0SS(P,r,t).
Proof. We prove parts (a), (b) and (c) simultaneously by induction on t:

1. (Basis) Let t = tfirst(r). By definition 4.4, Mposs(P,r,t) = 0 for all i. T
the required statement holds vacuously.

2. (Induction) Let t > tftrs+(r) be arbitrary. We assume the inductive hypo
(HP1) for all m , if Y £ M^0SS(P,r,t) and Y £ Mseen(P,r,t) then
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(a) if Y = EK(X) for some (X, K) £ £(r, t) then X, K £ M™0SS(P, r, t), and
(b) if Y = HK(X) for some (X, K) £ U(r, t) then X, K £ Mp\>ss(P, r, t), and
(c) if Y = Xi | • • • | Xk for some (Xx, ...,Xk) £ C(r,t) then Xx,...,Xk £
M^oss(P,r,t).

We show the above hypothesis implies that, for all m, if Y £ Mposs(P,r,t + 1)
and Y g" MSeen(P, r, t + 1) then
(a) if Y = PK(X) for some (X, K) £ £(r, t +1) then X, X G M™0SS(P, r, t +1),
and
(b) if Y = #A'(X) for some (X, K) £ "H(r,t + 1) then X, X G Af™oss(P,r,t + l),
and

(c) if Y = Xi | • • • | Xk for some (Xl5... ,Xk) £ C(r,t + 1) then X1?... ,Xk £
M™0SS(P,r,t+l).
The above assertion is shown using induction on m:
I. (Basis) Let m = 0. Suppose Y G Mposs(P,r,t + l) and Y g" Afseen(P,r,t +
1). By definition 4.4, Y G A4poss(P,r,t) U Sposs(P,r,t).
Case (i): Y G MpoSs(P,r,t). By Lemma 4.9 it follows that Y G M™'oss(P,r,t)
for some m'.
Case (a): Y = £ K ( X )forsome (X,X) G £(r,t + 1).
By L e m m a 4.12(a) it follows that (X,X) G £(r,t). Since Y g
A4Seen(-P, r, t+1), it follows by Lemma4.2(g) that Y g" A4seen(P,r, t).
HP1 yields X , X G M%oss(P,r,t). By L e m m a 4.9 it follows that

X, X G MPoss(P, r, t). Hence, by definition 4.4, X, X £ Mposs(P, r, t
1).
Case (b): Y = # K ( X ) for some (X, X ) G U(r, t + 1).
Similar to Case (a).
Case (c): Y = Xx \ • • • \ Xk for some (Xl5..., X*) G C(r, t + 1).
Similar to Case (a).
Case(ii): Y G Sp0SS(P,r,t).
Case (a): Y = E*(X) for some (X, X ) G £(r,f + 1).
By definition 4.3, EK(X) £ Mencr(r,t-\-l)- Hence Y G A W r ( r , t +
!)•
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Case (A): P performs generate(Y) at t.
By definition 4.3, Y G Mgenr(r,t + 1), which is impossible by
RE2.
Case (B): P performs receive(Y) at t.
By definition 4.3, Y G Mseen(L\f',t + 1), which is impossible by
assumption.
Case (C): P performs encrypt(X', K') at tforsome X' and some X', where

Y = £*,(*')•
RE5 yields X',X' G AVss(P,r,t). By definition 4.3, (X',X') G
£(r,t + 1). RE1 yields X = X' and K = K'. Hence X, X G

Mp0ss(P, r, t). Therefore, by definition 4.4, X, X G Mposs(P, r, t+
1).
Case (D): P performs hash(X',K') at t for some X' and some K', where
Y=#K'(X').
By definition 4.3, Y G M^^r^

+ 1), which is impossible by

RE2.
Case (E): P performs concatenate(X[,... ,X'k) at t for some X'1,...,X'k,
where Y = X { | • • • | X'k.
Similar to Case (D).
Case (b): Y = HK(X)

for some ( X , X ) G %(r,t + 1).

Similar to Case (a).
Case(c): Y = Xx \ • • • \ Xk for some (Xu... ,Xk) £ C(r,t + 1).
Similar to Case (a).
II. (Induction) Let m > 0 be arbitrary. W e assume the inductive hypothesis:
(HP2) for all m , if Y G M^0SS(P,r,t + 1) and Y g A4seen(P,r,t + 1) then
(a) if Y = EK(X)

for some (X, X ) G £(r,t + l) then X , X G A4^0SS(P,r,t +

1), and
(b) ifY = HK(X)

for some (X, X ) G U(r, t+1) then X , X G A4^0S5(P,r,t+

1), and
(c) if Y = Xi | • • • | Xk for some (Xi,..., X*) G C(r, t+1) then

Xu...,Xk£

M%0SS(P,r,t + l).
W e show the above hypothesis implies that, if Y G M^ssiP^^
Y£A4Seen(^,r-,t + l) then

+ !) a n d

4.2. A computational model of communicating principals

78

(a) if Y = EK(X) for some (X, X) G £(r, t + 1) then X, X G M^S\(P, r, t +
1), and
(b) if Y = HK(X) for some (X, X ) G U(r, t+1) then X, X G M$£8(P, r, t+
1), and
(c) ifY = Xi !••• |Xfcforsome(Xi,...,Xfc)GC(r,t+l)thenX1,...,XfcG

A4^+V(P,r,t + l).
Suppose Y G Mffis(P,r,t+l) and Y g" A4seen(P,r,t+l). By definition 4.4,
Y£M™oss(P,r,t + l)
U

{^K(X)

| X , X G A4™OS5(P,r,t + 1) and (X, X ) G £(r,t + 1)}

U {HK(X) I X , X G

M^OSS(P,

r, t + 1) and (X, X ) Gft(r,t + 1)}

U {(Xx 1 • • • | Xk) I Xi,... ,Xk £ M™oss(P,r,t + 1) and
(X!,...,Xfc)GC(r,t + l)}
U { X | EK(X), X- 1 G A4™oss(P,r,t + 1) and (X, X ) G £(r,t + 1)}

U {Xi | (Xi 1 • • • | Xfc) G Af£0SS(P,r,t + 1) and (Xi,...,Xfc) G C(r,t +
Case (A): Y G MpOSS(P,r,t + 1). The required statement follows from HP2 and
L e m m a 4.9.
Case (B): Y £ {EK(X) | X , X G M%0SS(P,r,t + 1) and (X,X) G £(r,< + 1)}.
W e have Y = EK<(X') for some X', X' G M^oss(P,r,t + 1) such that
(X',X') G £(r,* + 1). By definition 4.3, EK>(X') £ Mencr(r,t + 1),
and therefore, Y G Mencr(r,t + 1).
Case (a): Y = EK(X) for some (X,X) G £(r,t + 1).
RE1 yields X = X' and X = X'. Hence X, X G Af™0SS(P,r,t + 1).
By L e m m a 4.9 it follows that X, X G A ^ + ^ P , ? ^ + 1).
Case (b): Y = # * (X)forsome (X, X ) G U(r,t + 1).
By definition 4.3, Y G At/^(r,* + 1), which is impossible by RE2.
Case (c): Y = Xi | • • • | Xk for some (X1}... ,Xk) £ C(r,t + 1).
By definition 4.3, Y G A4Conc(r,t + 1), which is impossible by RE2.
Case (C): Y G {HK(X) \ X,K £ M™0SS(P,r,t + 1) and (X,X) G H(r,t + 1)}.
Similar to Case (B).
Case (D): Y G {(Xi | ••• | Xk) | Xi,...,Xfc G A4™0SS(P,r,t+l) and (Xi,... ,Xk) £

C(r,t + 1)}.
Similar to Case (B).

4.2. A computational model of communicating principals

79

Case (E): Y G {X | EK(X),K~X £ M™0SS(P,r,t + 1) and (X,X) £ £(r,t + 1)}.
W e have EK(Y), X" 1 £ M™0SS(P, r, t+1) for some X such that (Y, X ) G
£(r,t+ 1). By Lemma4.9 it follows that EK(Y), X" 1 G Mposs(P,r,t +
1). Since Y £ Mseen(P,r,t + 1) it follows by the contrapositive of
L e m m a 4.17(a) that EK(Y) $ MSeen(P,r,t + 1). HP2 yields Y, X G
Mposs(P,r,t + 1). The required statement then follows from HP2 and
L e m m a 4.9.
Case(F): Y £ {X{ \ (Xx \ • • • \ Xk) £ M%0SS(P,r,t + 1) and (Xx,... ,Xk) £

C(r,t + 1)}.

W e have Y = X{ for some i and for some Xx | • • • | Xk £ Mposs(P, r, t +
1) such that (X!,...,Xfc) GC(r,t + l). Since X,- g" Mseen(P,r,t + 1)
for some i, it follows by the contrapositive of Lemma 4.17(b) that
Xi | • • • | Xk$

Mseen(P, r, t+1). HP2 yields Xx,...,Xk£ M™0SS(P, r,

1). But Y = Xi for some i, so Y £ Mposs(P, r, t + 1). The required
statement then follows from HP2 and Lemma 4.9.
(This completes the proof of Proposition 4.2.)

O

Looking back at the proof of Proposition 4.2, it is apparent that we could
a stronger statement. W e can refine the hypothesis further to prove the following
result, for example: Suppose Y G J^/i^0ss(Pir^) f°r s o m e

rn

i and suppose that Y ^

MSeen(P,r,t). If Y = EK(X) for some (X, X ) G £(r,t), then
^

( MPoss(P,r,t- 1) if m = 0 and t > tfirst(r)

1 ^Fo^(P>r>*)

ifm>0.

However, the statement of Proposition 4.2 is less cumbersome and proves to be more
direct for our purposes.
Thefollowingtheorem is easily proved from Proposition 4.2 and L e m m a 4.9.
Theorem 4.1 Let Y £ MPoss(P-,r,t), and suppose that Y g" MSeen(P,r,t).
(a) IfY = EK(X) for some (X, X ) G £(r,t), then X, X G Mp0ss(P,r,t).
(b) IfY = HK(X) for some (X,K) £ U(r,t), then X, X G Mp0Ss(P,r,t).
It is apparent that we have omitted the following case from the statement of Theorem 4.1: (c) If Y = Xi | • • • | Xfc for some (Xx,...,Xk) £ C(r,t), then Xx,...,Xk
Mposs(P,'r,t).

W e do this simply because the omitted case is exactly part (e) of

L e m m a 4.13, which, however, does not require the extra hypothesis that Y g" MSeen(P, r, t)
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Theorem 4.2 If X £ MSeen(P,r,t), then X £ Msaid(Q,r,t') for some Q and for
some t' <t.
Proof. By induction on t:
1. (Basis) Let t = ^first(r). By definition 4.3, Mseen(P,r>^first(r)) — 0. Therefore,
the required statement holds vacuously.
2. (Induction) Let t > t^g^r) be arbitrary. W e assume the inductive hypothesis:
(HP1) for all t' < t, if X G Aiseen(P,r,t'), then X G Msaid(Q,r,t") for some
Q and for some t" < t'; and show this implies that, if X G MSeen(P,r,t) then
X G Msaid(Q, r, t') for some Q and for some t' < t.
By L e m m a 4.14 it suffices to show that, for all m, if X £ M™een(P,r,t), then
X G Msaid(Q,r,t') for some Q and for some t' < t. W e show this by induction
on m:
I. (Basis) Let m = 0. Suppose X G A4°een(P,r,t). By definition 4.5, X G
A4see„(P,r,t - 1) U <Sre«;(P,r,t - 1).
Case (i): X G Mseen(P,r,t - 1).
HP1 yields X G Msaid(Q,r,t') for some Q and for some t' < t - 1.
Case(ii): X £ Srecv(P->r,t-1).
RE3 yields: there exists a Q which performs send(X) at some t' <
t - 1. By definition 4.2, X G Ssaid(Q,r,t'), and therefore, by definition 4.6, X G M°said(Q,r,t' + 1). By L e m m a 4.18 it follows that
X G Msaid(Q,r,t' + 1), which is as required, since t' + 1 < t.
II. (Induction) Let m > 0 be arbitrary. W e assume the inductive hypothesis:
(HP2) if X G Af™en(P,r,t), then X G Msaid(Q,r,t') for some Q and for
some t' < t; and we show this implies that, if X G M^erl(P, r, t), then X G

Msaid(Q, r, t') for some Q and for some t' < t. Suppose X G A ^ ^ P , r, t).
By definition 4.5,
XGA^ e e n (P,r,t)
U {Y | EK(Y) £ M™een(P,r,t) and (Y, X ) G £(r,t) and
K-1 £ Mposs(P,r,t)}
U { Y | (Yi | ••• I Yk) £ Mmseen(P,r,t) and (Yi,..., Yk) £ C(r,t)}
Case (A): X £ M^een(P,r,t).
H P 2 yields X G Msaid(Q,r,t') for some Q and for some t' < t.
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£ {Y \ EK(Y)

£ M™een(P,r,t)

and (Y,K) £ £(r,t) and X " 1 £

Mposs(P,r,t)}.
W e have, for some K, EK(X)
and X " 1 G MpoSS(P,r,t).

£ M™een(P,r,t),

H P 2 yields EK(X)

(X, X ) G £(r,t),

£ Msaid(Q,r,t') for

some Q and for some t' < t. Consider the smallest t' < t for which
there exists Q such that EK(X)
Q.

£ Msaid(Q,r,f),

Thus, for all R and for all t" < t', EK(X)

and fix one such
g"

Msaid(R,r,t").

By the contrapositive of the inductive hypothesis H P 1 it follows that
EK(X)

g" Mseen(Q,r,t'). Since EK(X)

£ Msaid(Q,r,t'),

L e m m a 4.19 that P ^ ( X ) £ MpOSs(Q,r,t').

it follows by

Also, we have (X, X ) G

£(r,t) and t' < t. By L e m m a 4.12 it follows that (X, X ) G £(r,t').
Since EK(X)

£ MpoSs(Q,r,t') and EK(X)

(jL Mseen(Q,r,t'), it follows

by Theorem 4.1 that X , X G Mp0ss(Q, r, t').
follows that X , K £

B y L e m m a 4.20(a) it

Msaid(Q,r,t').

Case (C): X £ {Yt \ (Yx \ - - - \Yk) £ Mjeen(P,r,t) and (Yx,..., Yk) £ C(r, t)}.
W e have X = Y, for some i such that Yx \ ••• \Yk £ M™een(P,r,t)

and

(Yx,. ..,Yk)£ C(r,t). H P 2 yields Yx \ • • • \ Yk £ Msaid(Q,r,t') for som
Q and for some t' < t. By L e m m a 4.19 it follows that Yx \ • • • \Yk £
Mposs(Q,r,t'). Also, we have (Yx,...,Yk) £ C(r,t) and t' < t. By
L e m m a 4.12(c) it follows that (Yi,...,Yfc) £C(r,t'). By L e m m a 4.20(c)
it follows that Yx,...,Yk £ Msa^d(Q,r,t').

But X — Yi for some i, so

x

^Msaid(Q,r,t').

(This completes the proof of Theorem 4.2.)

•

4.3 Related work
The semantic model developed in this chapter alleviates some major deficiencies
isting models for authentication logics proposed by Abadi and Tuttle [8], and Syverson
and van Oorschot [9]. In particular, the problems it addresses include the following:
• A fundamental problem with existing models is that they reflect the syntax of
the corresponding logics. As emphasized by Syverson [27], this makes the proof
of soundness of such logics largely trivial and uninformative.
• A more compelling problem with existing models is that the definitions made as
part of the models are generally not made sufficiently accurate. As a result, there
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is often confusion about exactly what properties can be proved as a consequence
of such definitions. For example, the A T logic paper claims that the logic proposed by its authors is sound with respect to the model defined in that paper.
However, it has been subsequently reported that one of the axioms of the A T
logic is unsound (cf. Syverson and van Oorschot [9]). Indeed, no detailed proofs
of soundness of the logics A T and S V O have been published yet.

• Existing models leave implicit some critical assumptions that underlie authenti
cation logics; for example, the assumption that messages can only be constructed
in a unique way within the system, which is formally captured in our model as
restrictions R E l and RE2. It is difficult to see how proofs of properties which
depend on such assumptions can be carried out formally in existing models.
Overall, existing models do not appear to enable proofs of desired properties to
carried out rigorously.
Although our model is motivated by notions found in previous works, it is essentially independent of any logical syntax. It formalizes various critical assumptions that
underlie authentication logics, but which are nonetheless absent from existing models
for such logics. In contrast to previous works, we have provided detailed and accurate
proofs of the properties of our model. Our model is therefore a major advance as
compared to the models of Abadi and Tuttle [8], and Syverson and van Oorschot [9].

Chapter 5

The soundness of a logic of authenticatio

This chapter presents a logic for analyzing authentication protocols. The logic p
sented here is motivated by the model developed in the previous chapter. The semantics w e give for the logic is based on this model; thus our logic has an essentially
independently motivated semantics. W e demonstrate the virtue of this approach by
giving a mathematically rigorous and intuitively convincing proof of soundness of the
logic. While the syntax of the logic presented in this chapter is somewhat similar in
appearance to that of the logics A T and S V O , there is a significant underlying difference nonetheless; namely, that the soundness of our logic is proved rigorously. As
emphasized elsewhere in this thesis, claims regarding the soundness of the logics A T
and S V O appear unsupported by published evidence.

5.1 Logic
5.1.1 Syntax
W e begin by defining a formal language L

Although l is defined without essential

regard to the intended interpretation, its structure is motivated by that interpretation.
The symbols of £ are defined as follows.
1. Logical symbols
{HE-1
-, A

V

=4> <S>

occurs-encr occursJiash

occurs.conc

fresh
generates received sees said says has
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believes

controls

2. Parameters
Pi, P2, ..., Pn (for some fixed natural number n)

KX,K%, ...
NUN2, ...
?1, 92, ...
The classification of the symbols into the above two classes is motivated by their
intended interpretation: the logical symbols are the symbols whose interpretation will
befixed,whereas the interpretation of the parameters will be allowed to vary. However,
this distinction plays no essential role in characterizing the language itself. The symbols
Pi,..., Pn are called principal symbols. The symbols Xi are called key symbols. The
symbols Ni are called nonce symbols. The symbols qi are called propositional symbols.
The symbols Pi, Ki, and Ni are called primitive symbols.

Formation rules
W e distinguish two classes of expressions in L

the terms and the formulas. The

terms are the expressions which under their intended interpretation represent messages.
The formulas are the expressions which under their intended interpretation represent
assertions about messages.
The terms are defined as follows.
Tl. Any primitive symbol is a term.

T2. For each fixed positive integer k if Xx,... ,Xk are terms, then Xi | • • • |
ter m .
T3. If X is a term and X is a key symbol, then EK(X)

and HK(X)

are terms.

T4. If X is a key symbol, then X-1 is a term.
T5. No expression is a term unless it can be shown to be so from (T1)-(T4).
The formulas are defined as follows.
Fl. Any propositional symbol is a formula.
F2. If (b is a formula, then so is ->(/>.
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F3. If <p and tb are formulas, then so are <b A ip, cb V ib, <b => if), and <b <$• ^.

F4. If X is a term and X is a key symbol, then occurs-encr(X, K) and occurs Jiash
are formulas.

F5. For each fixed positive integer k if Xi,..., Xk are terms, then occurs-Conc(Xi
is a formula.
F6. If X is a term, then fresh(X) is a formula.
F7. If P is a principal symbol and X is a term, then P generates X, P received X,
P sees X, P said X, P says X, and P has X are formulas.
F8. If X is a key symbol and P and Q are principal symbols, then P &

Q is a

formula.

F9. If P is a principal symbol and <b is a formula, then P believes (b and P controls <b
are formulas.
F10. N o expression is a formula unless it can be shown to be so from (F1)-(F9).

Formal system
W e now define a formal system, called L, which consists of the language £ together
with a deductive apparatus for £. The deductive apparatus is specified by defining the
following: (1) a set of axioms; (2) afiniteset of inference rules.
The axioms of L are divided into two classes: the logical axioms and the proper
axioms (also called, nonlogical axioms). W e shall fix a set of formulas as the logical
axioms. T h e set of proper axioms consists of formulas which are protocol-specific, and
is thus left unspecified. B y an inference rule p we mean a relation among formulas:
if a set of formulas T is in relation p to a formula <j>, then w e say that ^ is a direct
consequence of the formulas in V by virtue of p.
The set of logical axioms and the set of inference rules isfixedas follows.
1. Logical axioms
W e define the set of logical axioms in terms of axiom-schemas, all instances of
which are logical axioms. To give the axiom-schemas, we need several classes of
metavariables. Let
• (^,X)^ be metavariables ranging over formulas,
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• P, Q, R be metavariables ranging over principal symbols, and
• X , Xi, X2, ... be metavariables ranging over terms.
Let k range over the set of all positive integers, and let i range over the set
{1,..., k} for eachfixedk.
The following are the axiom-schemas of L:

Al. <p =* (x =» <t>)
A 2 . (<f> =» (X => </0) => ((<f> => X) =* {<t> => *!>))
A3, (-x => -•<£) => (hx =>• <f>) =* x)
A4. P generates X => P /ias X
A5. P sees X =^ P has X
A6. P said X ^ P hasX
A7. P hasX A P has X A occurs.encr(X,K) => P has EK(X)
A8. P hasX r\P has X A occurs Jiash(X, X ) =^ P /ms # # (X)
A9. P hasXiA--- A P /ms Xfc A occwrs_conc(Xi,..., X*) =>- P has X a | • • • | Xfc
A10. P has EK(X) A occurs_encr(X, X ) A P /ms X - 1 ^ P has X

All. PftasXi | • • • | Xk A occurs-conc(Xx,... ,Xk) ^ P has Xi A • • • A P ha
A12. P received X =>• P sees X
A13. P sees # K ( X ) A occurs.encr(X, K) A P has K~x => P sees X
A14. P sees Xi | • • • | Xk A occurs-conc(Xi,..., Xk) =>
P sees Xi A • • • A P sees Xk
A15. P said £ # ( X ) A occurs.encr(X, K) A P has X A P has K =»
P said X A P said K
A16. P said HK(X) A occursJiash(X, K) A P has X A P has K =>
P said X A P said K
All. P said Xi | • • • | Xk A occurs.conc(Xx,..., Xk) =>•
P said Xx A • • • A P said Xk
A18. P says X => P saidX
A19. P said X A fresh(X) =>- P soys X
A20. fresh(Xi) A occurs.conc(Xx,... ,Xk) =» fresh(Xx \ • • • \ Xk)
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A21. fresh(X) A occurs„encr(X, K) =* fresh(EK(X))
A22. fresh(K) A occurs.encr(X, X ) =* fresh(EK(X))
A23. fresh(X) A occursJiash(X, K) => fresh(HK(X))
A24. fresh(K) A occursJiash(X, X ) =*> fresh(HK(X))

A25. P

&Q&Q&P

A26. P &Q

AR

sees EK(X)

(P saidXAP
A27. P hQ

AR

A occurs_encr(X, K) =»

said EK(X)AP
sees HK(X)

has K)V(Q

saidXAQ

said EK(X)AQ

has K)

A occurs Jiash(X, K) =>

(P said X A P said ff#(X) A P feas X ) V
(Q said X AQ

said HK(X)

A Q has X )

A28. P believes (b A P believes (<b => x^>) =$- P believes if>
A29. P believes <f> =$• P believes (P believes fa)
A30. ->P believes <p => P believes (->P believes fa)
A31. P controls <f> A P believes <b =>• </>
2. Inference rules
Rl. (Modus Ponens) If d> and ^ are any formulas, then V> is a direct consequence
of <^> and </> => ij>.
R 2 . (Necessitation) If </> is any formula and P any principal symbol, then
P believes <f> is a direct consequence of 0.
(This completes the definition of L.)
For the purpose of studying properties of L, w e define some standard proof-theoretic
notions: proof in L, theorem ofL, and deduction in L from a set of formulas.

Definition 5.1 A proof in L is a finite sequence of formulas fa, ..., fa such that, fo
each i, either fa is an axiom, or fa is a direct consequence of some preceding formulas
by a rule of inference.
Definition 5.2 A formula <^ is a theorem ofL (written hL fa) if <b is the last formula
of a proof in L.
Notice that all axioms (logical or proper) of L are theorems of L.
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Definition 5.3 A deduction in L from a set of formulas T is a finite sequence of
formulas fa, ...,fasuch that, for each i, either fa is an axiom, or fa is an element of
T, or fa is a direct consequence of some preceding formulas by a rule of inference.
Definition 5.4 A formula <j> is deducible in L from a set of formulas Y (written
if </> is the last formula of a deduction in L from Y.
The following lemma is easily proven from the above definitions.
Lemma 5.1 Let <b, XJJ be any formulas and Y, A any sets of formulas. Let P be any
principal symbol.
(a) IfY is the empty set, then Y \~L (b iff\~L <j>(b) IfY\-L(f> then YUA\-Lfa
(c) Y \~ <b iff there is a finite subset £ ofY such that £ hjr, <p.
(d) IfY\-L<p and Y \~L <j> =£• ip, then Y \~L ip.
(e) IfY\-L,4> then Y \~L P believes <j>.

5.1.2 Semantics
W e introduce a possible worlds framework. Fix a system, say, Pi,..., Pn, where n is
the number of principal symbols in £. Intuitively, a world is an ordered pair (r,t),
which consists of a run r of the system and a time t. Let TZ be the set of all runs of
the system. If R C H, call {(r,t) \ r £ R and t > t^TSt(r)} the set of worlds of R,
denoted w(R). The semantics we define is of a model-theoretic nature; it rests on the
usual notions: interpretation, truth for an interpretation, and validity.

Roughly,

interpretation is a structure relative to which truth is defined. The class of structures
we take as interpretations is essentially due to Kripke. (Since their invention Kripke
structures have become a pervasive tool in giving semantics for modal logics.) For our
purposes an interpretation consists of the following components: a set of runs

RCfc,

a truth assignment to the primitive propositions with respect to the set of worlds of P,
n binary relations (one for each principal) on the set of worlds of P, called possibility
relations, and a function / which maps terms of £ to messages in M.
Definition 5.5 Let $0 be the set of propositional symbols of £. An interpretation
£ is a tuple / = (P, it, ~ 1} ..., ~ n , / ) , where:
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1. RCK,
2. TT : $0 -> 2™(R),
3. for each i, ~i is a binary relation on w(R) (so that ~t- C u>(P) x w(P)) which is
transitive and euclidean, and
4.

(a) / maps each principal symbol to a distinct element of V (the set of principal
names);
(b) / maps each key symbol to an element of /C (the set of keys);
(c) / maps each nonce symbol to an element of M

(the set of nonces);

(d) if Xi,...,Xfc are terms, then f(Xx | ••• | X*) = f(Xx) | ••• | f(Xk) (the
concatenation of the strings f(Xx),..., f(Xk));
(e) if X is a key symbol and X is a term, then f(EK(X))

- Ef(K)(f(X)) (the

symbol E on the right-hand side is the semantic keyed encryption function
defined in the model);
(f) f{Hx(X))

= Hf(K)(f(X)) (the symbol H on the right-hand side is the

semantic keyed hash function defined in the model);
(g) if X is a key symbol, then f(K~x) = (/(X))_1 (the symbol - 1 on the righthand side is the function from K to /C _1 specified earlier).

Although the above definition fixes the possibility relations to be transitive a
clidean, there is considerable flexibility in choosing alternative properties. W e follow
the usual idea that a principal's possibility relation determines its beliefs, and that the
properties of the possibility relation govern the properties of the notion of belief.

Convention. We normally suppress /; for example, instead of f(K) we write X.
Any resulting ambiguity is resolved from the context.
Fix an interpretation / = (il,7r,~i,...,~„,/). If ( M ) G w(R), we say that (r,t)
is in I. W e now define what it means for a formula d> to be true for (r, t) in I (written
Hrt) *£)• T h e

defmition

P r o c e e d s b y induction on the structure of fa

Definition 5.6 For all i, j £ {1,..., n} and for all positive integers /:

1. H=fr,t) <?m iff (r> *) € ^m). for m = 1,2,.. ..
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3. h{r,t) ^ A ^ i f f h(,,t) 0 and hfr,t) V>4- h(r,t) </> V V> ^ h(,,t) </> or (=(,,*) 0 or both.
5. |=fr)t) <£ =4> if) iff either not ^ [ r t ) fa or |=Jrt) t/>, or both.

6- Y=(r,t) <f> & V> iff either j=[r>t) </> and (=(,.)t) V, or not f=(r)f) </> and not f=£.(t) V>
7. (=(Tft) Pi generates X iff X G Mgenr(Pi,r, t).
8. l=[rit) Pi received X iff X G AWu(P,,r,t).
9. f=(rit) Pt- sees X iff X G A4seen(Pi,r,t).
10- h(r,*) pi

saidX { Xe

®

Msaid(Pi,r,t).

H - H(r,«) p i says X iff X G Msaid(Pi,r,t)

\

Msaid(Pi,r,0).

12. |=fr>t) Pi fcas X iff X G A4poss(Pi, r, t).
13. H(r,t) occws_encr(X,X) iff (X, X) G £(r,t).
14. f=frit) occurs_/iasfc(X, X) iff (X, X) G U(r,t).
15. |=fr>t) occitrs-concCXi,..., X,) iff (Xx,..., X,) G C(r, t).
16. \={r>t) /res/>(X) iff X £ A<said(ft, r, 0) for all k = 1,..., n.
17. [=(rt) Pi & Pj iff for all t' < t, for all X , for all k = 1,..., n:
(a) if £K(X) G A4smW(Pfc,r,t') and (X, X) G £(r,t'), then
£JC(X)

(b) if HK(X)
HK(X)

G A4seen(Pfc,r,t') or Pfc G {Pi,Pj} or both, and
£ Msaid(Pk,r,t')

and (X, X ) G U(r,t'), then

£ Mseen(Pk,r,t') or Pk £ {Pi,Pj} or both.

18. Y^\r,t) pi believes (j) iff for all worlds (r',f) in /, if (r,t) ~i (r',f) then j=(r
19. (=[r>t) Pi contro/s d> iff h(r,t) ^ &e/ieue$ <£ implies f={rt) <£.
The truth conditions defined above need some explanation. Clause (1) reflects what
has already been noted before: w e fix the truth of propositional symbols by means
of TT. Clauses (2)-(6) reflect standard propositional truth assignments for'--, A, V,
=*, and &. Each of the clauses (7)-(15), with the seeming exception of clause (11),
reflects notions that w e have independently developed in the model of the previous
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chapter. However, says is simply a derived notion: the truth condition for says is
essentially that for said with an added restriction. A similar c o m m e n t applies to the
notion reflected by clause (16); the only novelty here is that w e quantify over all sets
of said messages for a fixed time of 0. Essentially, the truth condition for <-> captures
the following intuition: a key K

is shared between principal P and Q iff P and Q are

the only principals encrypting and hashing messages using X . Clause (18) reflects the
standard possible worlds view of belief. Roughly, it says that a principal P believes
exactly those facts that are true in the worlds P considers possible.
T o this point, the notion of truth is defined relative to a given interpretation and a
world in that interpretation. A s usual, w e extend this notion to truth with respect to
a given interpretation and define validity in terms of truth for all interpretations.
Definition 5.7 A formula <f> is true for an interpretation I (written |=7fa)iff </> is true
for every world in A

Definition 5.8 A formula <f> is valid (written \= fa) iff <f> is true for every interpretat
The following proposition shows that the inference rules preserve truth with respect to
interpretations.
Proposition 5.1 Let (b, ib be any formulas and P any principal symbol. For any
interpretation I:
(a) If f=7 <f> and ^ 7 (b^^,

then \=* </>•

(b) If |= 7 fa then Y=* P believes fa

Proof.
(a) Suppose there is an interpretation / such that j=7 <j> and l^7 <b=^rb. T h e n \=l <f>
and \=l <b =» V> for every w in A

Therefore, by condition 5 of definition 5.6,

\=l ib for every w in /; that is, [=7 fa as required.
(b) Suppose there is an interpretation I such that |=7 fa T h e n \=l (b for every UJ in
I. Therefore, by condition 18 of definition 5.6, \=l P believes <f> for every w in /;
that is, j=7 P believesfaas required.
(This completes the proof of Proposition 5.1.)
Corollary 5.1 Let <j> and I/J be any formulas and P any principal symbol.
(a) If\=4> and \= 4>=> ij), then \= i>.

°
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(b) If (= <p, then (= P believes <f>.

Hereafter we write ^7 <p to mean not (=7 fa and similarly for the cases with or wi
subscripts and superscripts. If P denotes a principal symbol, write ~ p to stand for the
possibility relation of the principal denoted by P.
W e now proceed to show that all the logical axioms of L are valid.
Lemma 5.2 The following formulas are valid:

(a) <f>^(X^<b)

(b) (<t>^(x^ VO) =* ((<£ =» x) =* (</> =* </>))
fcj (-X =* -^) =* ((-X =* 0) =* X)
Proof. We only prove part (a); the remaining parts are proved similarly. Take an
arbitrary interpretation I and an arbitrary world w in I such that j=7 fa From condition 5 of definition 5.6 and the fact that j=J,fait follows that \=*w x => fa as required.

(This completes the proof of Lemma 5.2.)

n

Lemma 5.3 The following formulas are valid:
(a) P generates X => P has X
(b) P received X =£- P sees X
(c) P sees X => P has X
(d) P saidX => P hasX
Proof.
(a) Take an arbitrary interpretation / and an arbitrary world (r, t) in / such that
\=(rt) P generates X. Then, by condition 7 of definition 5.6, X G Mgenr(P,r,t),
and therefore, by L e m m a 4.10, X

G MPoss(P,r,t).

\=Lt\ P has X, as required.
(b) Follows similarly using Lemma 4.15.
(c) Follows similarly using Lemma 4.16.
(d) Follows similarly using Lemma 4.19.

Hence, by condition 12,
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(This completes the proof of L e m m a 5.3.)

Q

Lemma 5.4 The following formulas are valid:
(a) P has X A P has K A occurs_encr(X, X) =^> P has EK(X)
(b) P hasX A P has K A occursJiash(X,X) =4> P has HK(X)
(c) P has Xx A • • • A P has Xk A occurs.conc(Xx,...,Xk) => P has Xx \ • • •
(d) P has EK(X) A occurs„encr(X, K) A P has X"1 ^ P has X
(e) P has Xx \ • • • \ Xk A occurs-conc(Xx,..., Xk) =*> P has Xx A • • • A P

Proof. We only prove part (a); the remaining parts are proved similarly. Ta
arbitrary interpretation / and an arbitrary world (r,t) in / such that (=(r)t) P has
X A P has K A occurs.encr(X,K).

Then, by conditions 3, 12, and 14 of defini-

tion 5.6, X , X G Mposs(P,r,i) and (X, X ) G £(r,t), and therefore, by Lemma4.13(a),
EK(X) £ MPoss(P,r,t). Hence, by condition 12, |=(r)t) P has EK(X), as required.

(This completes the proof of Lemma 5.4.)

D

Lemma 5.5 The following formulas are valid:
(a) P sees EK(X) A occurs-encr(X, K) A P has X'1 =3- P sees X
(b) P sees Xi | • • • | Xk A occurs-Conc(Xx,..., X*) => P sees Xx A • • • A

Proof. We only prove part (a); the remaining part is proved similarly. Take
trary interpretation J and an arbitrary world (r,t) in / such that |={yit) P sees EK(X)A

occurs.encr(X, K) A P has K'1. Then, by conditions 3, 9, 12, and 14 of definition 5.
EK(X)

£ Mseen(P,r,t), (X,K) £ £(r,t), and X" 1 G Mposs(P,r,t), and therefore,

by L e m m a 4.17(a), X G Mseen(P,r,t). Hence, by condition 9, !=fr>f) P sees X, as
required.

(This completes the proof of Lemma 5.5.)

D

Lemma 5.6 The following formulas are valid:

(a) P said EK(X) A occurs.encr(X, X ) A P has X A P has K ^ P said X A P said

(b) P said HK(X) A occursJiash(X, X) A P has X A P has X => P said X A P sai
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(c) P said Xi | • • • | Xfc A occurs_conc(Xi,..., Xk) =>• P said Xx A • • • A P said Xk
Proof. We only prove part (a); the remaining parts are proved similarly. Take an
arbitrary interpretation / and an arbitrary world (r,t) in / such that \=Lt\ P said
EK(X)

A occurs^encr(X, X ) A P has X A P has X =» P said X A P said K. Then, by

conditions 3, 10, 12 and 13 of definition 5.6, EK(X)

£ Msaid(P,r,t),

(X, X ) G £(r,t),

and X , X G MPoss(P,r,t), and therefore, by L e m m a 4.20(a), X , X G

Msaid(P,r,t).

Hence, by conditions 3 and 10, \=[Tit) P said X A P said X , as required.

(This completes the proof of Lemma 5.6.)

n

Lemma 5.7 The following formulas are valid:
(a) P says X => P said X
(b) P said X A fresh(X) =>• P says X

Proof.
(a) Take an arbitrary interpretation / and an arbitrary world (r, t) in / such that
\=lrt)

P

sa

Vs X-

Msaid(P,r,0),

Then

' b^

condition n

of

definition 5.6, X

and therefore, X G Msaid(P,r,t).

G Msaid(P,r,t) \

Hence, by condition 11, (=fr,t)

P said X, as required.
(b) Take an arbitrary interpretation J and an arbitrary world (r, t) in 1" such that
f=frt) P said X Afresh(X). Then, by conditions 3, 10 and 16 of definition 5.6,
X

e Msaid(P,r,t)

and X

G" A4 5 m W (Q,r,0) for all Q; in particular, X

A4sairf(P,r,0), and therefore, X
condition 11, ^ ^

g

G A4safj(P,r,t) \ At sflW (P,r,0). Hence, by

P saysX, as required.

(This completes the proof of Lemma 5.6.) '
Lemma 5.8 The following formula is valid:
fresh(Xi) A occurs_conc(Xx,. ..,Xk)=> fresh(Xx | • • • | Xfc)

Proof. (By contradiction.) Suppose there is an interpretation / for which the for

fresh(Xi) A occurs_conc(Xx,... ,Xfc) =* fresh(Xx | • • • | X*) is not true. Then there e
ists a world (r, t) in / such that ^fr>i) fresh(Xi) A occurs.conc(Xx,.. •, Xk) =» fresh(Xx
... | Xk).

B y condition 5 of definition 5.6, j=fr(i) fresh(Xi) A occurs-Conc(Xx, ...,Xk)
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V=(r,t) fresh(Xx | ••• | Xk).

By conditions 3, 15 and 16, Xt- g A4said(P,r,0) for

all P, (Xi,...,Xfc) G C(r,i), and X x

| • • • | Xk £ Msaid(Q,r,0)

(Xi,... ,Xk) £ C(r, 0), then, by L e m m a 4.20(c), Xx,...,Xk£

for some Q. If

Msaid(Q,r,

0), and the

required statement follows by contradiction. It remains to show that (Xx,...,Xk) £
C(r,0).

Case (i): Let t < 0. From (Xi,...,X*) £ C(r,t), it follows that (Xi,...,Xfc) G C(r,0)
trivially when t = 0, and by L e m m a 4.3 when t < 0.

Case (ii): Let t > 0. Since Xx \ - • • \ Xk £ Msaid(Q,r,0), it follows by Lemma 4.19 t
Xi | ••• | Xk £ MpOss(Q,r,0).

Also, (Xi,...,Xfc) G C(r,t). By L e m m a 4.12(c)

it follows that (Xi,..., X*) G C(r, 0).
(This completes the proof of Lemma 5.8.) •
Lemma 5.9 The following formulas are valid:
(a) fresh(X) A occurs.encr(X, K) =>- /resa(P^(X))
(b) fresh(K) A occurs_encr(X, K) =>• fresh(Ex(X))
(c) fresh(X) A occursJiash(X, K) =$• /res/i(iJ^(X))
(d) fresh(K) A occursJiash(X, K) => fresh(HK(X))
Proof. (By contradiction.) We only prove part (a); the remaining parts are proved
similarly.

Suppose there is an interpretation / for which the formula fresh(X) A

occurS-encr(X,K) => /res/i(P^(X)) is not true. Then there exists a world (r,t) in
/ such that y=\ri\ fresh(X) A occur\s_encr(X, X ) =>- fresh(EK(X)). By condition 5 of
definition 5.6, \=Lt\ fresh(X) A occurs.encr(X,K) and ^7r>i) fresh(EK(X)). By conditions 3, 13, and 16, X
Msaid(Q,r,0)

for some Q.

such that EK(X)

£

Consider the smallest t' < 0 for which there exists R

£ Msaid(R',r,t").

0 MSeen(R,r,t'). Since EK(X)

that EK(X)

for all P, ( X , X ) G £(r,t), and EK(X)

£ Msaid(R,r,t'), and fix one such P. Thus, for all R' and for

all t" < t', EK(X)
EK(X)

g Msaid(P,r,0)

£ Mp0ss(R,r,t').

The contrapositive of Theorem 4.2 yields

£ Msaid(R,r,t'),

it follows by L e m m a 4.19

W e now show that (X, X ) G £(r,t'). Recall that

(X,K)££(r,t).

Case (i): Let t < t'. It follows that (X, X) G £(r,t'), trivially when t = t', and b
L e m m a 4.3 when t <t'.
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Case (ii): Let t > t'. By L e m m a 4.12(a) it follows that (X,X) G £(r,t').

Thus, (X,X) G £(r,t'). By Theorem 4.1 it follows that X, X G Mposs(R,r,t'). Since
EK(X) £ Msaid(R,r,t') it follows by Lemma 4.18 that EK(X) £ Mm

-JR,r,t') for

some m , and therefore, by definition 4.6, X , X £ M™£d(R,r,t'). By L e m m a 4.18,
X , X G Msaid(R,r,t'), and therefore, by Lemma 4.2, X, X £ Msaid(R,r,0) since
t' < 0, which contradicts the fact that X G" Msaid(P,r,0) for all P.

(This completes the proof of Lemma 5.6.) •

L e m m a 5.10 The following formula is valid:

1. P&Q&Q&P
Proof. Obvious. •
Lemma 5.11 The following formulas are valid:
IS

(a) P <-» Q A R sees EK(X)

A occurs.encr(X, X ) =>

(P said X A P said EK(X) A P has X ) V (Q said X AQ said EK(X) A Q has X )
(b) P & Q A R sees HK(X) A occursJiash(X, K) =>
(P said X A P said HK(X) A P has X ) V (Q said X AQ said HK(X) A Q has X )

Proof. We only prove part (a); the remaining part is proved similarly. Tak
arbitrary interpretation / and an arbitrary world (r,t) in / such that \=Lt\ P <->
Q A R sees EK(X)

A occurS-encr(X, K).

Hfrt) P ^ Qi hfr.t) P
ER(X)

sees

EK(X),

Then, by condition 3 of definition 5.6,

and \=Lt\ occurs_encr(X,K). By condition 9,

£ MSeen(R,r,t), and therefore, by Theorem 4.2, EK(X) £ Msaid(R',r,t') for

some R! and for some t' < t. Consider the smallest t' < t for which there exists R'
such that EK(X) £ Msa{d(R',r,t'), andfixone such R'. Thus, for all R" and for all
t" < t', EK(X) G* Msaid(R", r, t"). By the contrapositive of Theorem 4.2 it follows
EK(X) <£ Mseen(R',r,t'). Since EK(X) £ Msaid(R',r,t'), it follows by L e m m a 4.19
that EK(X) £ Mp0ss(R',r,t'). By condition 14, (X,X) G £(r,t), and therefore, by

L e m m a 4.12(a), (X, X ) G £(r,t') since t' < t. Hence, by condition 18(a), R' £ {P,Q}.
Also, by Theorem 4.1, X, X £ Mp0ss(R',r,t'). Since EK(X)
follows by L e m m a 4.18 that EK(X)

£ Msaid(R',r,t'), it

£ A4^fl^(P',r,t') for some m , and therefore,

by definition 4.6, X , X G M™+>d(R',r,t'). By L e m m a 4.18, X, X G Msaid(R',r,t').
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Hence, by L e m m a 4.2, EK(X),X

£ Msaid(R',r,t)

and X

G Mposs(R',r,t) since

t' < t. Hence, by conditions 3, 4, 10 and 12, (=frt) (P said X A P said EK(X)
K) V (Q saidX A Q said EK(X)

A P has

A Q has K), as required.

(This completes the proof of Lemma 5.11.) •
L e m m a 5.12 The following formulas are valid:
(a) P believes d> A P believes (d> => ip) =4> P believes if)
(b) P believes d> =^ P believes (P believes fa)
(c) ->P believes d> =>• P believes ->(P believes fa)
Proof.
(a) Take an arbitrary interpretation / and an arbitrary world w in I such that |=7
P believes cbAP believes (<j> =>fa).Then, by conditions 3 and 18 of definition 5.6,
|=7# d> and [=7# d> =>• if) for every to' in I such that UJ ~ P UJ'. Therefore, by
condition 5, \=w> d> for every UJ' in / such that UJ ~ P UJ'. Hence, by condition 18,
[=7 P believes ip, as required.
(b) Take an arbitrary interpretation / and an arbitrary world UJ in / such that |=7
P believesfaThen, by condition 18 of definition 5.6, (*) for every w' in / such
that UJ ~ P UJ', \=TW, d>. W e wish to show that [=7 P believes (P believesfa).By
condition 18 it suffices to show that for every w' in / such that w ~p w', and for
every w" in I such that w' ~ P UJ", [=^// 0. This statement clearly holds by the
transitivity of ~ p and (*).
(c) Take an arbitrary interpretation / and an arbitrary world UJ in / such that ^ 7
-iP believesfaB y conditions 2 and 18 of definition 5.6, (**) there exists a world
UJ0 in I such that w ~

P

w0 and |=70 ->fa W e wish to show that \=*w P believes

->(P believesfa).By conditions 2 and 18 it suffices to show that for every w' in /
such that UJ ~ P W' there is a UJ" in / such that UJ' ~ P UJ" and |=7U» ->fa But if w'
is a world in / such that UJ ~ P UJ', then from the euclideanness of ~ p and (**) it
follows that UJ0 is a world in / such that w' ~ P W0 and 1=^ -yfa as required.
(This completes the proof of L e m m a 5.12.)
L e m m a 5.13 The following formula is valid:
P believes d> A P controls d> => d>

D
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Proof. Take an arbitrary interpretation / and an arbitrary world (r,t) in / such
that (=7rt) P believes d> A P controlsfaThen, by condition 3 of definition 5.6,

N(r,t) P beeves <p and \=[r^ P controlsfaHence, by condition 19, \=Lt\faas required.

(This completes the proof of Lemma 5.13.) •
Theorem 5.1 Every logical axiom ofL is valid.
Proof.
1. Axioms (A1)-(A3) are valid, by Lemma 5.2.
2. Axioms (A4)-(A6), and axiom (A12) are valid, by Lemma 5.3.
3. Axioms (A7)-(A11) are valid, by Lemma 5.4.
4. Axioms (A13)-(A14) are valid, by Lemma 5.5.
5. Axioms (A15)-(A17) are valid, by Lemma 5.6.
6. Axioms (A18)-(A19) are valid, by Lemma 5.7.
7. Axiom (A20) is valid, by Lemma 5.8.
8. Axioms (A21)-(A24) are valid, by Lemma 5.9.
9. Axiom (A25) is valid, by Lemma 5.10.
10. Axioms (A26)-(A27) are valid, by Lemma 5.11.
11. Axioms (A28)-(A30) are valid, by Lemma 5.12.
12. Axiom (A31) is valid, by Lemma 5.13.
(This completes the proof of Theorem 5.1.)

D

Soundness theorems
Let L 0 be the system L with an empty set of proper axioms. Thus, the only axioms of
L 0 are the logical axioms (Al) through (A32).
W e are now ready to establish the main soundness theorem.
Theorem 5.2 Every theorem of LQ is valid.
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Proof. Let d> be a theorem of L 0 . The required statement is proved by induction on
the length of a proof in L 0 of d>.
Let d>i, ..., d>„ = d> be the sequence of formulas of a proof in L 0 of d>. W e show, by
induction on i, that |= fa for 1 < i < n.
1. (Basis) Let i = 1. Then fa must be a logical axiom, and therefore, by Theorem 5.1, (= fa.
2. (Induction) Let i > 1 be arbitrary. Assume the inductive hypothesis that, for all
j < i, \=fa.
Case (1): fa is a logical axiom. As in the basis step, f= fa.
Case (2): fa follows by modus ponens from formulas fa and d>m, where j < % and
m < i, and <pm is of the form fa =» fa. By the inductive hypothesis, |= fa
and f= d>j =>fa,and therefore, by Corollary 5.1(a), \= fa.
Case (3): fa follows by necessitation from a formula d>j} where j < i, and <& is of
the form P

6e/ieues fa for some principal symbol P.

B y the inductive

hypothesis,!^=fa,and therefore, by Corollary 5.1(b), [= P 6e/ieuesfa,which
is as required.
(This completes the proof of Theorem 5.2.)

•

Note that the statement of Theorem 5.2 does not hold for L, since in general we allow
L to contain proper axioms which can be arbitrary formulas. However, a modified form
of the soundness theorem can still be obtained for L. Technically, when carrying out
deductions in L we are only interested in those interpretations for which all the proper
axioms are true. W e can then prove soundness of L relative to such interpretations.
(This idea is routinely used in the study of formal systems with proper axioms.)

Definition 5.9 An interpretation / is a model ofL iff every axiom of L is true fo
Theorem 5.3 Every theorem ofL is true for any model ofL.

Proof. Suppose that / is an interpretation for which all the axioms of L are true
d> be a theorem of L. The required statement is proved by induction on the length of a
proof in L of d>.
Let fa,fa,---An = 4>^ the sequence offormulasof a proof in L of fa W e show,
by induction on i, that |=7 fa for 1 < i < n.
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1. (Basis) Let i — 1. Then fa must be an axiom, and therefore, by supposition,
r-'fa2. (Induction) Let i > 1 be arbitrary. Assume the inductive hypothesis that, for all
j < i, \=* fa.
Case (1): fa is an axiom. As in the basis step, [=7 fa.
Case (2): fa follows by modus ponens from formulas (bj and d>m, where j < i and
m < i, and d>m is of the form (bj => fa- By the inductive hypothesis, (=7 4>j
and j=7 d>j =^ fa, and therefore, by Proposition 5.1(a), !(=7 <&.
Case (3): fa follows by necessitation from a formula fa, where j < i, and fa is of the
form P believesfafor some principal symbol P. By the inductive hypothesis,
^=7 fa, and therefore, by Proposition 5.1(b), [=7 P believesfa,which is as
required since d>» is of the form P believes fa.
(This completes the proof of Theorem 5.3.) °

Chapter 6
A model for reasoning about lower bounds
on rounds
In this chapter we introduce a new model, which allows reasoning about lower bounds
on rounds for a class of authentication protocols. This continues the theme of formal
reasoning developed in the preceding chapters. The motivation for the model introduced here is a largely informal body of bounds arising from the work of Gong [36], [37],
[38]. Our aim in developing the model is to provide a systematic means for deriving
such bounds. In particular, we will show how some of the bounds intuitively obtained
by Gong are formally derived in our model.
(Parts of this chapter appeared in preliminary form elsewhere [39].)

6.1 Introduction

An authentication protocol, in its barest form, consists of a sequence of message
changes. The appeal of defining metrics for comparing authentication protocols is
obvious. Of course, the most important aspect of a protocol is its correctness and
there is a sizable amount of literature on this subject. However, the literature on metrics for authentication protocols is rather sparse. A n essentially similar observation to
the one m a d e above motivates Gong [36], [37], [38] to study some efficiency metrics
for authentication protocols. Specifically, he defines two efficiency metrics: the number
of messages and the number of rounds. The former metric simply means the total
number of message exchanges comprising a protocol. To define the latter metric, Gong
uses the notion of round: a round consists of protocol messages that can be exchanged
simultaneously—the number of rounds is then taken to mean the minimum number
of rounds needed to complete the protocol. Notice that the notion of round reflects
the concurrency inherent in a distributed protocol: multiple participants m a y simultaneously send or receive messages in one round. In his works, Gong [36], [37], [38]
gives lower bounds on the above two metrics for some c o m m o n protocol classes, in an
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informal manner. Independently, Yahalom [40], [41] has devised a model for analyzing bounds on the number of messages for a class of secure asynchronous protocols.
The model provides constructs for expressing security requirements using the notion

of verifiable causality, which is related to Lamport's [42] happened before relation. Yahalom [40] employs the model to define a class of secure data exchange protocols, and
derives a lower bound on the number of messages for this class. However, the metric
of rounds is not addressed in his work.
Set against the above background, we introduce a model to formally derive bounds
on rounds from security requirements. The idea behind our model can be sketched as
follows. W e adopt Yahalom's notion of verifiable causality between events as a means
of specifying security requirements for asynchronous protocols. This allows us to define
the notion of an abstract protocol class in terms of verifiable causality. A characteristic
property of this notion is that it induces a partial order on an associated set of events;
this partial order is a causal order in the sense of Lamport [42]. A round then precisely
consists of a set of causally unordered events. The key upshot of the definitions we
make to exploit this fact is that they lead us to a theorem for proving lower bounds on
the number of rounds. The theorem gives rise to a simple graph-theoretic technique
forfindingbounds.

6.2 Basic model
We begin by recalling some of the notions described by Yahalom [40].
A system consists of a collection of nodes, also called principals, which communicate
solely by asynchronous message passing. That is, we assume that: (1) the principals do
not maintain synchronized clocks, and (2) the only means of communication between
principals is via message exchanges. Each principal can generate a new pseudorand o m value, called an up-nonce, which is unpredictable by others. If is assumed that
principals m a y act maliciously, that is, they can see, modify, or replay any message
exchanged within the system. Further, any principal can inject fake messages into the
system.
A n event is an action taken by a principal. The actions a principal can perform
include the following: (i) sending a message M, denoted send(M); (ii) receiving a
message M, denoted receive(M). Each node maintains its own local abstract clock. It
is assumed that the local clock value at a principal is incremented at least once between
two successive events at that principal. Each event E is associated with the local clock
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reading, c(E), at the principal where that event occurs.
Following Lamport [42], we define a happened before relation, denoted —>, as the
smallest binary relation on the set of events of a system satisfying the following conditions:

1. E -• E' holds:
(i) if E and E' are events occurring at the same principal such that c(E) <
c(E'), or
(ii) if E = send(M) and E' = receive(M) for any message M exchanged between
two principals, or
(iii) if E -> E" and E" -+ E' for some E".
2. E-frE for all E.
The above definition essentially generalizes the following two basic observations about
the order of events in a distributed system (cf. [43]): (a) A principal is a sequential
process; that is, the events occurring at the same principal are totally ordered; (b)
Whenever a message exchange takes place, the event of sending the message occurs
before the event of receiving the message. It is easy to see that -> is an irreflexive,
transitive, anti-symmetric relation; that is, a partial order on the events of a system.
A basic property of ->• is concerned with a notion of informationflowbetween
events. If E{ -> Ej for events E{ and Ej at two different principals P{ and Pj, respectively, then the above definition implies that there exists a send event, send(M), at
Pi, and a receive event, receive(M'), at Pj, for some messages M

and M', such that

send(M) -)• receive(M'). W e then say that there is an information flow from Ei to Ej.
Note that the happened before relation effectively captures the notion of potential
causality: E -> E' means E may (but does not necessarily) causally affect E'. The
basic idea underlying Yahalom's notion of verifiable causality is to capture strict causal
dependence between events, in that the occurrence of one event is precluded without
the occurrence of another event. This notion is relativised to principals, and causal
dependence is further distinguished as precedence or succession between events, as
follows.
Definition 6.1 ([40]) A n event Ei of one principal Pi verifiably-precedes an event
Ej of another principal Pj if Pi can establish that Ej could not be generated without
Pj receiving some information derived from the occurrence of Ei or from some event
at Pi that occurred after E{.
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Definition 6.2 ([40]) A n event Ei of one principal P{ verifiably-succeeds an event
Ej of another principal Pj if, at the time it generates Ei, P{ can establish that Ej has
occurred.

As noted by Yahalom [40], the notions of verifiable precedence and verifiable su
defined above are strictly independent: Ei verifiably-precedes Ej does not necessarily
imply that Ej verifiably-succeeds Ei (and vice-versa).
The following propositions relate verifiable causality with potential causality.

Proposition 6.1 ([40]) For any two events Ej and Ei that have occurred at differ
principals, if E{ verifiably-precedes Ej then Ei -> Ej.

Proposition 6.2 ([40]) For any two events Ej and Ei that have occurred at differ
principals, if Ei verifiably-succeeds Ej then Ej —»• Ei.
As noted by Yahalom [40], the two notions represented by Ei verifiably-precedes
and Ej verifiably-succeeds Ei are strictly stronger than Ei —>• Ej. The converses of
Propositions 6.1 and 6.2 do not hold.
The following definition is intended to capture the notion of an event at one principal
occurring relatively recently with respect to an event at another principal.
Definition 6.3 ([40]) An event Ej of one principal Pj A-precedes an event Ei of
another principal Pi if Pi can establish that Ej was generated at most A ticks (as
measured by Pi on its local site clock) before the generation of Ei.

In Yahalom's model, the notion of A-precedence is central to capturing the secur
requirement that principals be able to determine that certain messages are fresh and
not replays of earlier ones.
The following theorem (Theorem 1 of Yahalom [40]) gives necessary and sufficient
conditions for A-precedence.
Theorem 6.1 An event Ej of a principal Pj at one site A-precedes an event Ei of
principal Pi at another site if and only if the following conditions hold:
1. There exists another event E\, generated by principal Pi, such that E\ verifiablyprecedes Ej.
2. Ei verifiably-succeeds Ej.
3. c(Ei) - c(E\) < A.
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Note that the first condition above asserts that for a principal Pi to establish t
event Ej at a different principal Pj A-precedes an event Ei at Pi, there must exist
another event E\ at Pi, from which there is an information flow to Ej. This information
flow implicitly includes a receive event (respectively, send event) of some message at
Pj (respectively, Pi). The received message at Pj is referred to as a A-precedence
establishing (A-pe) message by Yahalom [40].
Informally, a protocol defines a sequence of events at various principals. A n execution of a protocol consists of a realization in which various protocol events take place
at the principals involved. Each event is associated with the protocol execution where
it occurs. Events that occur in different executions at the same principal are assumed
to be unrelated, in that the clock values associated with such events are incomparable.
For the purpose of deriving bounds, the significance of the above model is that
it allows us to deduce the information flows that are needed to satisfy some security
requirements. Essentially, Yahalom [40] exploits this fact to obtain a lower bound on
the number of messages for a particular class of protocols.

6.3 Extending the model: Rounds

For our purposes, we abstract a class of secure asynchronous protocols as a collec
protocols that achieve some goal defined using Yahalom's notions of verifiable causality.
W e represent such a goal in general by means of the following: (1) afiniteset £b of
base events at various principals, and (2) a set C of verifiable causal relationships over
£b defined using verifiably-precedes, verifiably-succeeds, or A-precedes. Clearly, C
induces a partial order, defined by ->, on the set £ = £b U £d, where £d is a possibly
empty set of additional events induced by Theorem 6.1. W e thus represent a protocol
class formally as a partially ordered set n = (£, -<), where -< denotes the partial order
associated with £.
As an aside, we note that in light of the poset formulation for a protocol class, it
appears natural to view an individual protocol of class n as a totally ordered set (£, <),
where < is a total order on £ consistent with -<; that is, such that E -< E' implies
E < E', for all E, E' £ £. In other words, a protocol of class n m a y be thought of as
a topological sort (cf. [44]) of the poset (£, -<)- However, we do not explore the notion
of an individual protocol further, since the protocol class abstraction suffices here.
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Rounds and causality

Gong [36] defines the metric number of rounds as follows:
The number of rounds in a protocol is the total number of time units from
the instant that the [protocol] originator sends thefirstmessage till the
instant that the last message is received, under the best execution scenario.
(p. 28)

Further, "A round consists of all messages that can be sent and received in paral
within one time unit" ([36], p. 27). For the sake of the above definition, Gong makes the
following two idealized timing assumptions: (i) exactly one time unit elapses between
sending and receiving of a message; and (ii) the processing time for any event is exactly
zero time units. As Gong observes, the number of rounds gives a rough estimate on
the execution time of a protocol.
For our purposes more precision is required than the definitions used by Gong.
In our model, the notion of 'time' is captured by the happened before relation. W e
effectively use this relation to formulate below our counterparts to Gong's notions on
rounds. First, we need tofixa message set associated with a protocol class.
Definition 6.4 A message M is a triple (P,Q,m), P ^ Q, denoting that principals
P and Q are the sender and recipient, respectively, of the message contents, rn.

Thus, messages with the same contents but which are sent or received at different
principals are distinct messages for our purposes. The case where a principal is meant
to send the message contents to itself does not appear to be meaningful in our context.
(Such messages do not serve to establish verifiable causality.) The side condition in the
definition rules out this uninteresting case by excluding messages of the form (P, P, m ) .
W e fix a message set M

on any protocol of class n = (£,-<) as the set of messages

corresponding to the prescribed send (or alternatively, receive) events in £:

M = {M\ send(M) £ £}

Following Lamport [42], we say that events E and E' are concurrent if E -ft E' an
E' ft E, and write this as E || E'. W e then define a round to consist of a subset of M
for which the corresponding send events are concurrent.
Definition 6.5 Let M' C M be non-empty. Then M' is a round of M, if send(M) ||
send(M') for all M, M' £ M'.
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Intuitively, the rounds comprising a protocol are mutually exclusive and exhaustive:
each element of the message set belongs to exactly one round.

Definition 6.6 A round partition of M. is a partition 7r of M such that eve
of 7r is a single round of M..

We call a round partition linear if its blocks may be totally ordered to be
with -<; this is intended to capture the idea that there is an execution order over that
round partition.
Definition 6.7 A round partition -K of M is linear if there exists a total
7r satisfying the following restriction: for all 7r«, TXJ £ TT, if there exist messages Mi £ i^i
and Mj £ Wj such that send(Mi) X send(Mj), then 7Ti < rtj.

A round partition may not necessarily be linear. For example, consider a hy
protocol class with:
M
X

=
=

{MX,M2,M3,M4}
{(send(Mx),send(M2)),(send(M3),send(M4))}

where Mx, M2, M3, and M4 are all distinct messages. In this example, the set
{{MX,M4}, {M2, M3}} is a round partition of M

but not a linear round partition.

W e can now define the number of rounds.
Definition 6.8 The number of rounds for n is the rank of the smallest (having fewest
blocks) linear round partition of M.
Notice how our definition pins down the intended meaning of the phrase, "best execution scenario," seen in Gong's informal definition earlier.

6.3.2 Rounds and directed acyclic graphs
W e now proceed to relate lower bounds on rounds with the structure of the poset
defining a protocol class.
Definition 6.9 Let II = (£,•<) be a protocol class. Define £s C £ and -<a C x such
that:
1. £s — {E | E £ £ and E is a send event}, and

2. ^s=^f)(£sx£s).
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Then the poset (£s, -<s) is called the send-poset of n.
Implicit in the above definition is the fact that X s is a partial order on £s. This fact
follows directly from clauses 1 and 2. Technically, the send-poset of a protocol class
n = (£, -<) is simply a restriction of the poset (£, -<) to the send events in £.
As before, let M

denote the message set on n.

Lemma 6.1 Let nx and n2 be the ranks, respectively, of the smallest round partition
and the smallest linear round partition of M.

Then nx < n2.

The proof of this lemma is immediate from the fact that the set of linear round pa
tions of M. is a subset of the set of round partitions of M.
W e can now state our main theorem.
T h e o r e m 6.2 Let Q(H) be the number of rounds for a protocol class H whose send-

poset is (£s,~<s)- If there exist send events send(Mx), send(M2), ..., send(Mn) £ £s
such that:
send(Mx) -<s send(M2) -<s • • • -<s send(Mn),
thentt(Yl)> n.
Proof. Assume that send(Mi) -<s send(MJ+i) for i — 1, ..., n - 1. Since -<s is irreflexive, we have Mi ^ Mj, when i ^ j. Therefore, the set M' = {Mi,..., Mn} has exactly
n elements. Clearly, M' Q M.
elements of M'

Now, any subset of M

cannot be a round of M.

assumption: for all M,M'
round partition of M

£ M', M

containing two or more distinct

This follows from Definition 6.5, by the

^ M', we have send(M) [f send(M'). Then any

must contain at least n blocks. Hence by L e m m a 6.1 it follows

that the smallest linear round partition of M

must also contain at least n blocks.

•

To obtain the best lower bound implied by Theorem 6.2, we obviously need to find
the longest chain of send events in £s. This is conveniently viewed in graph-theoretic
terms: w e can view the poset (£s,<s) as an acyclic digraph G, with £s as the set
of vertices and <s as the set of edges. The longest chain of send events in £s then
corresponds to the longest path between any pair of vertices in G.

6.4 Case study
We shall now demonstrate our model by deriving lower bounds on rounds for several
classes of authenticated key exchange protocols informally analyzed by Gong [36].

6.4. Case study

109

The overall setting is as follows (cf. [36]): T w o clients A and B share secret keys
with a trusted server S. The protocol aim is to distribute a fresh temporary session
key for use between the clients, followed by an optional handshake using the session
key to verify the presence of clients. In particular, each client must be convinced that
the message from where it gets the session key, as well as the message from which it
confirms the presence of the other client, have not been replayed. (Hereafter, we refer
to such messages as session key message and handshake message, respectively.) This
is achieved using either nonces or timestamps as freshness identifiers, distinguished as
nonce based - N B or timestamp based - T B . The session key goal is distinguished as
A O - authentication only, or A H - authentication with handshake. The candidates for
choosing the temporary key are distinguished as S O - server only, C O - one client only,
or C C - both clients. In the C C case, the temporary session key is suitably derived
from two individual partial key values respectively chosen by the clients.
The choice of the above setting parameters gives twelve protocol classes in all.
W e distinguish them using Gong's [36] shorthand notation: T B / N B + A O / A H

+

S O / C O / C C . (Examples of concrete protocols for each class can be found in Gong's
paper [36].)
Since our model precludes synchronized clocks, it does not apply to the T B cases.
The remaining six asynchronous (NB) cases, labeled Case 7-12 in Gong's paper [36],
fit in with our model; we will consider each of these cases in turn below. First, we
recall some general assumptions made by Gong [36, p. 28]:
HI A client cannot send out a handshake message before it has received
the temporary key. Thus, the last handshake message cannot be sent
before all clients have received the temporary key.
H 2 A client without a synchronized clock cannot accept a temporary key
before it sends out a nonce.
H 3 The protocol responder (client) or the server cannot send out any
message (e.g., a nonce) before the protocol originator sends out a notification message.
(For convenience we have labeled Gong's assumptions above.) Further, client A is
designated as the protocol originator and client B is called the protocol responder.
Some remarks on Gong's above assumptions are in order: (HI) implicitly reflects
that knowledge of the temporary key is necessary to form the handshake message.
(H2) is essentially captured in our model using Yahalom's Theorem 6.1. To see the
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connection between the two, note that (H2) is informally based on the requirement
that a client be able to verify the freshness of session key messages [36, p. 27]; the
notion of A-precedence allows us to express such requirements precisely. Observe that
(H2) is simply a derived fact about the system, as implied by condition 1 of Yahalom's
Theorem 1. W e will directly capture (HI) and (H3) using the happened before relation.
(HI) applies to the three A H cases, whereas (H3) is c o m m o n to all six cases.
Without loss of generality, w e assume in the following that the generation event
of a message coincides with the send event of that message. For all protocol classes
considered below, w e m a k e the following event definition:
eA,o send of protocol start message at A
In the remainder of this section, w e prove lower bounds on rounds for the six
protocol classes:

• NB+AO+SO
• NB+AH+SO
• NB+AO+CO
• NB+AH+CC
• NB+AO+CC
• NB+AH+CC
In our proofs, w e m a k e use of a Prolog procedure for maximal path finding in D A G s ,
which is shown in appendix D.

6.4.1 Protocol class NB+AO+SO
To specify this class, w e define the following events:
e

s,i
es,2
eA,i
es.i

send of session key message for A at £
send of session key message for B at S
receive of session key message at A
receive of session key message at B

and capture the session key goal as follows:
CR1

es,x A-precedes eA,x

CR2

es,2 A-precedes eB,i
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C R 1 and C R 2 imply by Theorem 6.1, Proposition 6.1, and Proposition 6.2 that there
exist send events eAi2 and eBf2, respectively, at A and B such that:
CR3 eA>2 -> es,x
CR4

es,i ->• eA,i

CR5

eB,2 -> e5)2

CR6

e5)2 -> eB,i

To satisfy (H3), we stipulate the following constraints:
CR7

eAi0-^es,i

CR8

eA,o ->• e£,2

W e collect the above events and happened before relationships to form the required
posets.

(£7,-<7):
£7

=

{eAfi,eAti,eAt2,eB,i,eB,2,es,i,es,2}

-^

=

{(eA,2, es,i), (eS>i, e^.i), (eB,2, e5,2), (e<?,2, eB,i), (eA,o, e5,i), (eA,o, es,2)}

The partial order shown above does not explicitly include every pair of events which is
ordered by -*, since the omitted pairs are deduced by the path-finding algorithm used
later. W e will tacitly follow this convention hereafter.

£] = {eAfi,eAt2,eB,2,es,i,es,2}
^l

=

{(eAt2,es,x),(eB,2,es<2),(eA,o,es,i),(eA,o,eBt2)}

We now use the path finding program given in appendix D to obtain the best lower
bound implied by Theorem 6.2. To save space, we only show the resulting output here:
MaxPath = [e(a,0),e(b,2),e(s,2)]
Bound = 3;
It is instructive to compare the maximal path found above with Gong's [36] informal
proof:
The responder [B] has to be notified before it can send out its nonce and
later receive a fresh message; thus three rounds is a lower bound, (p. 30)
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6.4.2 Protocol class N B + A H + S O
We define the following additional events:
eAi3 send of handshake message for B at A
ejgt3 send of handshake message for A at B
eAA
receive of handshake message at A
eBA
receive of handshake message at B

and capture the handshake goal as follows:
CR9 eAi3 A-precedes ej3)4
CR10

eB,3 A-precedes eAA

We capture (HI) using the following constraints:
CR11 eA,i -* eA}3
CR12

eB,i -• eB,3

CR9 and CR10 imply by Theorem 6.1, Proposition 6.1, and Proposition 6.2 that ther
exist send events eB,5 and eA,5, respectively, at B and A such that:
CR13 eBi5 -+ eAi3
CR14 eA<3 ->• eBA
CR15

eA>5 -»• eB}3

CR16

e Bi3 -+ eAA

To satisfy (H3), w e stipulate the following additional constraint:
CR17 eAfi -> eB,5
(£8,-<*)••

£8 = £7 U{eAt3,eAt4,eAt5,eB>3,eBA,eBt5}
•<8 = ^7U

{(eA,i, eA,3), (eBti,eBi3), (eB>5, eA,3), (eA>3, e B , 4 ), (eA)5, e B , 3 ), (eBf3, e A 4 ) , (eA,0, eB,

£? = {eA,o,eA,2, eA,3,eA,5,eB,2ieB>3,eBt5,es,i,es,2}
^

=

{(eA)2, es,i), (es,i, eA,3), (eB)2, e 5>2 ), (es,2, es,3), (eA,o, e5,i), (eA,o, e B , 2 ),

(eB,5, eA,3), (eA,5, eB,3), (eA,0, eB,5)}
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MaxPath = [e(a,0),e(b,2),e(s,2),e(b,3)]
Bound = 4;

The above path is simply an extension of the path found in the previous case. It i
again instructive to compare with Gong's [36] informal proof:
... at least one more round is needed than in Case 7 [NB+AO+SO] to
complete the handshake [after both clients have received the temporary
key]; thus four rounds is a lower bound ... (p. 30)

6.4.3 Protocol class NB+AO+CO
Here w e assume that the protocol responder chooses the session key. (The case where
the protocol initiator chooses the session key can be similarly worked out.) To specify
this class, w e define the following events:
e

s,i

eA,i
eB,i

send of session key message for A at S
receive of session key message at A
send of session key message for S at B

and capture the session key goal as follows:
CR1

es,i A-precedes eAji

CR2

e^i A-precedes eA,i

CR3

ejg.i verifiably-precedes es,i

C R 1 and C R 2 respectively imply by Theorem 6.1, Proposition 6.1, and Proposition 6.2
that there exist send events eA>2 and eA<3 at A such that:
CR4 eAa -»• es,i
CR5

es,i -»• eA,i

CR6

eA,s -> eB,i

CR7

eB,i -> eA,x

C R 3 implies by Proposition 6.1 that:
CR8 eB,i -> eSfi
To satisfy (H3), we stipulate the following constraints:
CR9 eA>0 -> es,i
CR10

eAfi -> eB,i
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(£9,<>:
£ = {6,4,0,6,4,1,6^,2,6^,3,65,1,65,1}
-<!9 =
9

{(eA,2, es,i), (es,i,eA,i), (eAt3, eB,i), (eB,i,eAA), (eB,i, es,i), (eA,o, es.i), (eA,o,

,9\.

& < )

£9

{e.4,0, eA,2, eA,3, es,i, es,i}

^9

{(eA,2, es,x), (eA,s, eB,i), (eB,i,es,x), (eAfi, es,i), (eA,o, eB>1)}

» e

MaxPath = [e(a,3) ,e(b,l) ,e(s,l)]
Bound = 3;

MaxPath = [e(a,0),e(b,l),e(s,l)]
Bound = 3;

6.4.4 Protocol class N B + A H + C O
We introduce the following additional events:
eAA
eB,2
eA,5
eB,3

send of handshake message for B
send of handshake message for A
receive of handshake message at
receive of handshake message at

at A
at B
A
B

and capture the handshake goal as follows:
CR11 e^,4 A-precedes ej3,3
CR12

e S)2 A-precedes eA,5

We capture (HI) using the following constraint:
CR13 eA,x -> eAA

CR11 and CR12 imply by Theorem 6.1, Proposition 6.1, and Proposition 6.2 that th
exist send events eB,4 and eAfi, respectively, at B and A such that:
CR14 eB,4 -*• eAA
CR15

e.4,4 -> es,3

CR16

eA,6 -> eB,2

CR17

eB,2 -» eA,5
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T o satisfy (H3), w e stipulate the following additional constraints:
CR18 eAfi -> eB]2
CR19

eAfi -> e B ) 4

(£10,^10):
£10 = £9 U{eyi,4,eA,5,eA,6,eB,2,eB,3,eB,4}
^10 = ^9 U{(e^,i, eAA), (eB,4, eAA), (eAA, eB,3), (eAfi, eB,2), (eB?2, e^.s),
(eA,o,eBt2),(eAfi, eBA)}

(£l°,<°)
£]° =

W , o , eAy2, eAt3, eAA, eA>6, eB,i, e B)2 , eB,4, es.i}

x1.0 =

{(eA,2, es,i), (es,i, e A | 4 ), (eA,3, eB,i), (eB,i, e A ) 4 ), (eB,i, es,i), (eA,o, e<y,i):
(eA)0, eB,i), (eB,4, eA,4), (eA,6, eB,2), (eA,o, eB,2), (eA,o, eB)4)}

MaxPath = [e(a,3),e(b,l),e(s,l),e(a,4)]
Bound = 4;

MaxPath = [e(a,0),e(b,l),e(s,l),e(a,4)]
Bound = 4;

6.4.5 Protocol class NB+AO+CC
To specify this class, we define the following events:
es,i
es,2
eA,i
eA,2
eB,i

eB)2

send of partial session key message for A
send of partial session key message for B
send of partial session key message for S
receive of partial session key message at
send of partial session key message for S
receive of partial session key message at

at
at
at
A
at
B

S
S
A
B

and capture the session key goal as follows:
CR1

es,i A-precedes eA,2

CR2

e c 2 A-precedes e B , 2

CR3

eB,i A-precedes eA,2

CR4

eA,x A-precedes e B , 2

6.4. Case study

116

CR5

eBii verifiably-precedes es,i

CR6

eAA verifiably-precedes 65,2

C R 1 and C R 2 imply by T h e o r e m 6.1, Proposition 6.1, and Proposition 6.2 that there
exist send events eAi3 and e Bi3 , respectively, at A and B such that:
CR7

eA,3 -> e5,i

CR8

e5,i ->• eA,2

CR9

e B i 3 -• es,2

CR10

e S)2 ->• e B ? 2

C R 3 and C R 4 imply by T h e o r e m 6.1, Proposition 6.1, and Proposition 6.2 that there
exist send events eAA and e B)4 , respectively, at A and B such that:
CR11

eAA ->• eB,i

CR12

e B ) 1 -+ eA,2

CR13

e B i 4 -• eA,i

CR14

eA,x -> e B , 2

C R 5 and C R 6 imply by Proposition 6.1 respectively the following:
CR15

eB,i -» es,i

CR16

eA,i -> e S)2

T o satisfy (H3), w e stipulate the following constraints:
CR17

eAfi ->• eB,i

CR18

e A ; 0 -+ e B , 3

CR19

e A ) 0 -»• e B , 4

(^11,-<11):

£11

=

{eA,o,eA,i,eA,2,eA,3,eA,4,eBji,eB)2,eB,3,eB,4,es,i,es,2}

n

=

{(e A(3 , e S ) 1 ), (es,i, e A ) 2 ), (eB,3, es,2), (es,2, e B , 2 ), (eA,4, eB,i), (e B>1 , e A > 2 ),

^

(eB,4, eA,i), (eA,i, e B ) 2 ) , (eB,u es,i), (eA,i, e 5 ) 2 ), (e A)0 , eB,i), (eAfo, e B ) 3 ) ,
(eA,o,eB)4)}

£sn = {eA,o,eA,i,eA,3,eA,4,eBii,eBi3,eB)4,e5,i,es,2}
^i1

=

{(e A)3 , e5,i), (eB,3, e 5 | 2 ), (e A;4 , eB,i), (e B)4 , eA,i), (eB)i, e5,i), (eA,u e 5, 2 ),
(eA,o, eB,i), (eA,o, e B ) 3 ) , (eA,o, eB,4)}
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MaxPath = [e(a,0),e(b,4),e(a,l),e(s,2)]
Bound = 4;

6.4.6 Protocol class NB+AH+CC
We introduce the following additional events:
eA,5 send of handshake message for B at A
eB)5 send of handshake message for A at B
eAje receive of handshake message at A
eB,6 receive of handshake message at B

and capture the handshake goal as follows:
CR20 eA;5 A-precedes eB,6
CR21

e B)5 A-precedes eA)6

We capture (HI) using the following constraints:
CR22 eAi2 -)• eA)5
CR23

e B)2 -> e B>5

CR20 and CR21 imply by Theorem 6.1, Proposition 6.1, and Proposition 6.2 that ther
exist send events e B)7 and eAJ, respectively, at B and A such that:
CR24 eB,7 -)• eAj5
CR25

eA,5 -> es,6

CR26

eA)7^eB,5

CR27

eB,5 -> eA>6

To satisfy (H3), we stipulate the following additional constraints:
CR28 eA,0 -• eB,5
CR29

eA,0 -• eB,7

(£12,^12):
£12 = £UU
{eA,5, eA,6, eA,7, eB,5, eB,6, eB,7}

-^ = ^ n U
{(eA,2, eA,s), (eB,2, e B , 5 ), (eB)7, eA,s), (eA,5, eBfi), (&A,r, eB)s), (eB,s, eA)6)
(eA,o,eB,5),(eA,o,eB,7)}
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{sr,<2y£]2

=

{eA,o, eAA, e A ) 3 , e A , 4 , e A i 5 , e A)7 , e B > 1 , e B ) 3 , e B , 4 , e B , 5 , e B , 7 , es,i, es,2}

~^s

—

{(e^,3, es,x), (es,i, e A , 5 ), (eB,3, e S ) 2 ), (e5)2, e B , 5 ), (eA,4, e B ,i), (e B)4 , eA,i),
(eB,i, es,i), (eA,i, e5,2), (eA,0, e B ,i), (eA,o, e B , 3 ), (e A)0 , e B , 4 ), (e B)7 , e A ) 5 ) ,
(eA,7, e B , 5 ) , (e A>0 , e B , 5 ), (e A)0 , eB,7)}

MaxPath = [e(a,0),e(b,4),e(a,l),e(s,2),e(b,5)]
Bound = 5;

Chapter 7
Conclusions

The subtlety which underlies reasoning about authentication protocols is well-rec
in the literature. It is also recognized that both formal as well as informal methods are
useful to tackle the underlying subtlety [61], [62]. Authentication logics constitute a
significant class of formal methods for reasoning about protocols. This thesis lays some
semantic foundations for such logics. It also contributes to reasoning about efficiency
metrics for protocols. Appendix E illustrates the use of an existing informal method
for protocol analysis and design due to Boyd and M a o [45]. W e show how it can be
heuristically used to explainflawsin several well-known protocols and to design new,
improved protocols. Below we look back on the main developments of this thesis and
suggest some directions for future work.

7.1 Summary

In Chapter 1 we review several existing authentication logics and discuss some of
the motivations underlying their evolution. In Chapter 2 we stress the need for a
semantic basis for authentication logics. W e make our case by means of some convincing
examples based on a well-known authentication logic of Gong, Needham and Yahalom;
our intention is not criticize their logic but only to draw attention to the problematic
nature of semantically unsupported syntactic definitions. In Chapter 3 we modify the
logic of Gong, Needham and Yahalom to obtain a modified logic with the property
that derivations in the logic are finite. This allows a direct automation of the modified
logic using forward-chaining. In Chapter 4 we develop a model to explain some of the
notions that existing logics attempt to capture, not in terms of any logical formalism
but within a framework which we can appeal to on independent grounds. One of the
virtues of our model is that it forces us to make explicit various assumptions that
are needed to formally establish the properties which are usually associated with the
above notions. In Chapter 5 we exploit the model developed earlier to help devise a new
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authentication logic which is sound with respect to that model. The soundness theorem
established there gives us confidence that our logic correctly models in syntactic terms
the properties which we wish to capture. The conventional metalogical machinery we
employ in carrying out the proof of the soundness theorem should enable comparisons
of the logic with more traditional logics. W e emphasize that the proposed logic is rather
modest in regards to the number of features it offers for protocol analysis: it does not
capture m a n y interesting notions found in other logics. However, it stands out from
these logics in a unique way—it is accompanied by a rigorous proof of soundness. It is
our understanding that some notable researchers have lately expressed concern about
the lack of solid foundations for authentication logics [63], [64]. W e believe our work
represents a positive step in this direction. Indeed, in the words of Tuttle [28],
".. .let's go back to basics and concentrate on [emphasis ours] meaningful
models and definitions. Then let's see what new logics these definitions
suggest."
In Chapter 6 we develop a general model for reasoning about the round complexity
of authentication protocols. The model draws upon some existing notions of causality
to build a definition of the metric number of rounds. The upshot of our definition is a
key theorem that yields lower bounds on the number of rounds.

7.2 Future work

There are a number of directions to consider for future work. This includes model
of the notion of recognizability using the computational model developed in Chapter 4.
A preliminary attempt at this is documented in Appendix F. However, it remains to
be seen how the notion of recognizability can be integrated into the logic developed in
Chapter 5. It is not clear that the traditional possible worlds semantics for belief that
we have adopted bestfitsour purposes. It would be worthwhile tofinda more natural
semantics for belief. A n interesting problem is to investigate whether the notion of
recognizability holds the key to defining a more natural semantics for belief.
Although we have used the model proposed in Chapter 6 to verify the correctness
of some existing bounds on rounds from the literature, the model should also provide
a means to investigate bounds for more complex protocol classes. It would also be
desirable to make our model applicable to a synchronous setting. Such a move seems
feasible since the definitions that we make to capture the notions related to rounds
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are essentially independent of the assumption that the system is asynchronous.

A

theoretically stimulating direction is to provide a formal semantics for the notion of
verifiable causality; this would compel us to develop a more solid foundation for the
model proposed in Chapter 6.
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Appendix A
B A N logic rules

A.l Message-meaning rules
P^Q&P,P<
P^Q^X

{X}K

P£&Q,P< {X}K-i

P\E,Q^P,P<(X)y

P£Q\-x
A.2

Nonce-verification rule

P^j(X),P^Q^X

A.3 Jurisdiction rule
P^Q\^X,P^Q^X
P^X

A.4 Belief rules
P |= X, P j= Y P^(X,Y) P^Q^(X,Y)
P^(X,Y)
F M
P^Q^X

A.5

Utterance rule

P^Q^(X,Y)
P^Q^X
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A.6. Message seeing rules

A.6

Message seeing rules

P < (X, Y)
P<X
P < (X)Y
P<X
P\EEQ&P,P«

{X}K

p <x
p

N&p, p< {X}K
p<\X

p

N^Q, p< {X}K-,
P<X

A.7

Freshness rule

P N jKjO
P^l(X,Y)

A.8 Shared key and shared secret rules
P^R&R' P^Q^R&R'
P^R' &R P^Q^R'& R
P^R^R' P^Q^R^R'
P^R'^R
P^Q^R'^R
A.9 Supplementary rules
P\^R\^Q&P, P<{X}K
P<X
P^Q\^H(X), P*X
P\=Q^X
P^Q^H(Xx,...,Xk), P<Xx,...,P<Xk
P^Q^(Xx,...,Xk)

Appendix B
G N Y logic rules

B.l

Rationality rule

If ^- is a rule, then for any principal P, so is p I cx,

B.2 Being-told rules
p< *x
Tl

P<X

T2

P < (X, Y)
P<X

T3

P<{X}K,
P<X

T4

P<{X}+K,
P<X

P3-K

T5

P<F(X,Y),
P<Y

P3X

P<{X}-K,

P3+K

T6

P3K

P.X

B.3

Possession rules

p<x
PI

PBX
P3X, PBY
P2 PB(X,Y), P3F(X,Y)
P 3 (X, Y)
P3

P3X
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B.4. Freshness rules

P4

P3 X
P 3 H(X)

P5

P3 F(X,Y), P3X
P3Y

P 9 K, P3X
P6 P 3 {X} , P 3 {xy >
K
K
P7

P9+AT, PBX
P 3 {X}+K

P8

P 3 -K, P3X
P 3 {X}-K

B.4 Freshness rules
P

Fl

N i(*)
P\=t{X,Y), P\=ftF(X))

P M |I(X), P 3 K
F2

p |= i({x}K), P N KixVK1)

F3
F4

P \= H(JQ, P 3 +AT
P |= |1({X}+K)

P rs H(X), P 3 -JT
P |= $({X}-K)

F5 P N tt(+^)
P

F6
F7
F8
F9
F10

N »(-#)

P N tt(-^)
P N «(+*)
P }= cb(X), P \= t{K), P3K
P NK{X}K), P

N»({*}*)

p F PM
P }= cb(X), P N »(-*), P 3 -A

Plilpru)

~FR(^mr

B.5. Recognizability rules

P Ntt(#PO),P 3 ff(X)
P

B.5

N »(*)

Recognizability rules
P

Rl

^ #*)
P M ( * , n p^4>(F(x))
P N #*), P 3 K
R2
P N #{*}*), P N </>({*}?)
R3 PNffl, P3+Ap 1= ^({X}+K)
R4
R5
R6

p 1= </>({*}-*)
P |= <p(X), P3X
P |= #ff (X))
P 3 #(X)
P N 4>(X)

B.6

M e s s a g e interpretation rules

P < *{*}*, P 3 JT, P N ^ Q , P Nfl*),P Ntt(AT,fl*)
P ^ Q h X, P N Q h {*}*, P N G 3 A-

12

13

14

P <J *{X, <S>}+K, P 3 (-K, S), P N ^ P,
P^P&Q,
P^^>(X,S), P^j(X,S,+K)

p^QY-

{x,<s>), P N Q h {*,<£>}+*, P |= Q 3 +ir

P< *H(X,<S>), P3(X,S), P^PAQ, P£$(X,S)
P^Q\^(X,<S>), P\=Q^H(X,<S>)
P<{X}-K, P3-rK, P^Q, P^cb(X)
P^Q^X,

P ^ Q h {X}-K

15

P<{X}-K, P3+K, P\Et$Q, P^cb(X), P£j(X,+K)
P^Q3(-K,X)

16

P^Q^X,
P N ilffl
P^Q3X

,,,

B. 7. Jurisdiction rules
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IT p NQh(^y)
PWQ^x
B.7 Jurisdiction rules
P ^ Q ^ C PNQNc
p^c"
J2 PN<5K<5N *, PNQh(*->c), p^)i(x)
PFQFC
J3 P N <3 b <2 N *, P N Q N Q N C
P~WQWC
B.8
lv

Never-originated-here rules

P < JX}K, P3K, P^phQ, P |=flX),P |= (g)(P)

P<{X,<S>}+K, P3(S,-K), P^+4P,
P\=P&Q, P |=flX,5),P |= ®(P)
12'
p t= Q M * , <5>), P N Q h {*, <^>}+x
13'

P<P/(X,<5>), P9(X,5), P^PAQ,
P$=<b(X,S), P£®(P)
P^Q\^(X,<S>), P |= Q (
~ # (*, < S >)

Appendix C
Modified G N Y logic
C.l
Tl

Being-told rules

P< *X
P<X

T2

P < (X, Y)
P<X

T3

P<{X}K,
P<X

T4

P<{X}+K,

P3K
P3-K

P<X

T5

P<F(X,Y), P3X
P<Y

T6

P<{X}-K, P3+K
P<X

T7

P<X~~>C
P<X

C.2 Possession rules
p<x

PI

P3X

P3

P 3 (X, Y)
P3X

P5

P9 F(X,Y), P3X
P3Y
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C.3 Freshness rules
F , P N « W , P3(x,y)

p~¥Wx)
F1„

P N IK*), P 3 F(X)
P N «(F(X))

P N tt(*), P 3 AT, P 9 {X}x
^ N «({*}*-)
P |= »W, P 3 #, P 3 {X}^1

p2„

pWmxW)
Fr

P N tt(*), P 3 +A-, P 3 {X}+K
P N »({*}+*)

P4,

P N ttffl, P 3 -K, P 3 {X}_K

P N K{x}-K)
P \= iJ(+AQ, P 3 -AP N tt(-^)

PN»(-n P3+AP N tt(+Ar)
F7,

P

F7„

P N fl*), P N fl W, P 3 K, P3 {X}J
P N «({*}*)

PR,

N fl*), P N fl W, P 3 ^ P 9 {X}y
P N »({*}*)

P N fl*), P N fl(+*Q, P 3 -rK, P3 {X}+K
P |= Jt({X}+Ar)

pq/ P N fl*), P N fl(-/Q, P 3 -K, P 3 {*}_K
p N *({*}-*)
pin,

F11,

P N fl(*), P 3 *, P 3 g(X)
p |= t)(p;(x))

P NITO), -P 3 ff(X), P 3 X
PM(*)

C.4. Recognizability rules

C.4

1

Recognizability rules

R1,

PNfl*), P3(*,y)
PNfl*,^)

R1„

P

Nfl*),P 3 P(X)
PNflP(*))

R2' P N fl*), P 3 K, P 3 {X}K

P N fl{*k)

1
R2" P N fl*), P 9 AT, P 3 {X}^

^ N fl{*}?)
P |=flX),P 3 +AT, P 9 { X } + g

R3'

P N fl{*W)
P E=flX),P 9 -K, P 3 {X}_ K
P N fl{*}-*)

R4'

P

R5'

C.5
n

|EEflX),P3X,

P3 H(X)
P \= cf>(H(X))

Message interpretation rules

P< *{X}K^C, P3K, P^P^Q, P^fl*), PNfl(*,^)
P^Q\^X, P ^ Q h {X}K ^C, P^Q3K
P < *{X, <S>}+^ ~> C, P 3 (-K, S), P (=t? P,

P N ^ g , PNfl*,£), P Ntt(*,fr+JQ

12

13

P< *H(X,<S>)^>C, P3(X,S),
P

14

15

P\EEP&Q,

Pf=jl(X,S)

N £ h (*> <^>), P N Q h #(*, <s>) ~>c

P < {X}_K ^C, P 3 +AT, P ^ Q, P M fl*)
p ^ Q h * , P N Q h {X}-K -> c
P<{X}_K,

P3+AT, P^tfQ, P^flX), P^jj(X,+A-)
PMQ3(-A^,X)

16 p ^ Q h*, ^Nfl(*)

P^Q3X

„7

C.6. Jurisdiction rules
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P^Q^(X,Y)
P^Q\-X
P^Q^X^C
PNQh*
I9

P^Q^X^(C,C)
P\EEQ \^X^C

C.6
JI

J2

p

Jurisdiction rules
c,P P\
N Q K c,
|= Q N c
P^C

P N l M i . * ' P N Q h (*- c), P N »(*)
P^Q^C

J3

C.7
;

II

12'

Never-Originated-Here rules

P < {X}K ^C, P3K, P^P&Q, P |= flX), P ^ ®(P)

p ^ Q h * , PNQh- {*k -> c
P«{X,<S>}+*^C, P 3(5,-1^,
P ^ P & Q , p^flx,s), P ^ ( P )

P:M^P,

p ^ g h (*, <<?>), P N Q h {*, <<?>}+* - c

, P<H(X,<S>)^C, P3(X,S), P^P^Q, P\=<f>(X,S), P|=®(P)
P^Q\^(X, <S>), P \= Q h H(X, <S>) ~> C
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Appendix D
Pathfindingprogram

The following Prolog procedure for path finding in DAGs is adopted from t
Bratko [65] with slight simplifications. It employs a brute force technique to determine
maximal paths, and is thus highly inefficient. W e nonetheless use it for the sake of
simplicity.
*/, lbr(Digraph, MaxPath, Bound):
'/, MaxPath is the longest path between
V, any pair of vertices in Digraph

lbr(Digraph, MaxPath, Bound) :path(_, _, Digraph, MaxPath, Bound),
not((path(_, _, Digraph, _, Cost),
Cost > Bound)).

'/. path (A, Z, Digraph, Path, Cost):
X Digraph is represented as
'/, digraph (Nodes, Edges), where
'/, Nodes is a list of vertices and
'/, Edges is a list of edges in Digraph

y
°/0 Path is an acyclic path with
•/, cost Cost from A to Z in Digraph
'/, p(X, Y) means there is an edge
'/. from X to Y in Digraph

path(A, Z, Digraph, Path, Cost) :-
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pathl(A, [Z], 1, Digraph, Path, Cost).

pathl(A, [AlPathl], Costl, _,
[AlPathl], Costl).
pathl(A, [YlPathl], Costl,
digraph(Nodes, Edges), Path, Cost) :member(p(X, Y ) , Edges),
Cost2 is Costl + 1,
pathl(A, [X, YlPathl], Cost2,
digraph(Nodes, Edges), Path, Cost).

Appendix E
A n informal approach to the analysis and
design of some key exchange protocols

In this appendix, we investigate the security of several existing key exchange p
using a methodology proposed by Boyd and M a o [45]. The main idea behind this
methodology is to view the security of key exchange protocols in terms of two design
principles based on confidentiality and authenticity properties. The purpose of this
appendix is to demonstrate the effectiveness of the above view by means of case studies
of some published protocols. Specifically, we will analyze several notable key exchange
protocols from the literature that are based on one-way functions. The analyses we
carry out provide valuable insight into the working of the protocols and reveal security
weaknesses in some of the protocols. Alternative protocols will be devised that can not
only be shown to be secure in a specific sense, but which are also simple and elegant
when compared with the protocols analyzed.
(The contents of this appendix are based on a recent work co-authored with Colin
Boyd [46], and an earlier work by the author [47]. Colin Boyd provided an unpublished
manuscript to the author, which formed a substantial basis for the joint work with the
author.)

E.l Introduction

Key exchange protocols involve an exchange of messages between two or more users
with the aim of establishing a shared key among the users. Such protocols employ
cryptographic functions to provide confidentiality and authenticity of the distributed
keys. A variety of such functions are available in practice, and it is important to select
them judiciously while designing protocols. Although the majority of key exchange
protocols found in the literature use either symmetric cryptosystems or public key
cryptosystems, such protocols can equally be designed using one-way hash functions.
The idea of using one-way hash functions as a basis for key exchange protocols appears
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to be due to Gong [48]. It has also been adopted by I B M in their KryptoKnight
authentication and key distribution system [49], [50].
A one-way hash function / can be characterized as follows (cf., e.g., Merkle [51]):
(1) Given x it is easy to calculate the hash value f(x); and (2) Given a hash value y,
it is computationally infeasible to find a value x such that f(x) = y. Moreover, the
function produces a fixed length output, but allows an input value of arbitrary length.
As noted by Anderson [52] and by Berson et al. [53], the above characterization of a
one-way hash function is not adequate for the security of key exchange protocols of the
type suggested by Gong and other similar protocols found in the literature. In particular, such protocols make use of a secret value in the input to the function, in a keyed
manner, so there are additional constraints governing the use of the function that do
not follow from the above definition, and which must therefore be made explicit. The
desired functions are commonly labeled as keyed hash functions or message authentication codes (MACs) [54]. The exact properties required of a keyed hash function may
well be application specific; however, for the protocols we are concerned with here it
appears suitable to assume the properties of a Secure Keyed One-Way Hash Function
( S K O W H F ) defined by Berson et al. [53]. For convenience we recall their definition
below.
A function g() that maps a key k and a second bit string x to a string of a fixed
length is a S K O W H F if it satisfies five additional properties:
1. Given k and x, it is easy to compute g(k,x)\
2. Given k and g(k,x), it is hard to compute x;
3. Given k it is hard to find two values x and y such that g(k,x) = g(k,y), but

A. Given (possibly many) pairs x and g(k,x), it is hard to compute k;
5. Without knowledge of k, it is hard to compute g(k, x) for any x.
W e also assume that the mapping from input to output has the property that it is
impossible to predict any portion of the output, other than by computing the function.
It is possible to construct keyed hash functions using conventional unkeyed hash
functions such as M D 5 [55]. There are some potential advantages of using one-way hash
functions instead of conventional cryptosystems in designing key exchange protocols.
Namely, that hash function implementations m a y have less export restrictions than
conventional cryptosystems and m a y also be faster as compared to such cryptosystems.

E.2. Channels for secure key exchange
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E.2 Channels for secure key exchange
We begin by briefly reviewing the methodology due to Boyd and Mao [45].
Cryptographic transformations can broadly be viewed to provide the following two
primitive security services:

• Confidentiality of a message guarantees that only the authorized users will be
able to read it.
• Authenticity of a message guarantees that only an authorized user could have
created it.

The authorized users here are defined by their possession of the required crypto
keys. The above two properties form the basis for the notion of abstract channels of
confidentiality or authentication that may be used to characterize a secure key exchange
protocol. The notation

S ^

A:m

denotes that m is sent by S over a confidentiality channel to A. It implies S knows no
one except A could possibly read m. The notation

A^-S:m

denotes that m is received by A over an authentication channel from S. It implie
A knows no one except S could have possibly sent m . The above notations differ
fundamentally from the conventional notation
S ->• A : m

which only indicates that m is meant to be received by A supposedly from S. It d
not imply that m remains confidential to A or that S has actually sent m.
The basic goal of a key exchange protocol is to establish a shared key between two
or more users for a subsequent session. W e recall below two principles for secure key
exchange (cf. Boyd and M a o [45]):
Key confidentiality The key must not be divulged to any unauthorized user. In
other words, there must exist a confidentiality channel from the generator of the
key to each recipient of the key.

E.2. Channels for secure key exchange
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K e y authenticity Each recipient of the key must be sure that the key comes from an
authorized user and is a new key for use with the stated users. In other words,
there must exist an authentication channel from the generator of the key to each
recipient of the key.

The first principle suggests that the new shared key is all that needs to be se
confidentiality channel from the key originator to a key recipient. The second principle
suggests that this key must also be sent along an authentication channel from the key
originator to the recipient together with a freshness identifier and the names of each
recipient of the key. Typically, the freshness identifier used is an unpredictable nonce
previously sent by the recipient.
It is easy to show that adherence to the above two principles suffices to guarantee
the security of the resulting protocol in the following sense [45]: The key recipients
know that the key must have newly originated from an authorized user and they also
know w h o else this key is shared with. This security guarantee is demonstrable in a
simple manner, without appealing to specific attacks.
In practice, a variety of concrete protocols may be designed by defining the required
confidentiality and authentication channels in various ways using the available cryptographic functions. O n the other hand, existing protocols can also be analyzed by
investigating how these channels are possibly realized in the protocols, even when they
might not have been specifically identified by the authors of the protocols. For a sample
application of such an approach on several existing protocols employing conventional
cryptosystems, cf. Boyd and M a o [56].
In the protocols considered in the following sections we shall focus only on key
exchange. Some of the existing protocols we analyze using the above approach appear
to include an additional feature that allows users to mutually confirm their receipt of
the session key. However, as explained later in the appendix this feature lies outside
the scope of the analysis approach. Therefore, we do not attempt to address key
confirmation while using the analysis approach.
For the sake of uniformity in presenting the protocols below, we make slight adjustments to the original notation used by the protocol authors. The notation ',' usually
denotes concatenation. Following standard practice, we extend the notation f(k, x) and
write f(k, xi,x2,..., xn) to mean that the second argument of / is the concatenation
of Xi,X2,...,Xn.
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Gong's Protocols

The first protocol suggested by Gong [48] is both novel and ingenious, and appea
to represent the original idea of using a one-way function as the basis for the security
of a key exchange protocol. The scenario is a typical one for such protocols; a server
S is trusted by a pair of users to distribute a session key for use in a subsequent
session between the users. The server initially shares a secret Pv with each user U.
The messages exchanged in a successful run of the protocol between A and B are as
follows [48, p. 9]:

1. A-^B: A,B,nA
2. B^S:
3. S -> B :

A,B,nA,nB
ns,f(PB,ns,nB,A)®(k,hA,hB),g(PB,k,hA,hB)

A. B^-A:

ns,hB

5. A^B:

hA

Here / and g are publicly known keyed one-way (hash) functions. The values nA and
nB are random values chosen for a one-time use (nonces) by A and B respectively. If,
for example, B receives a message containing nB, then B can be sure that the message
is new. The value ns is similarly a nonce chosen by S, but as we shall explain below, it
is for the purpose of confidentiality and not authentication. The values k (the shared
session key), hA, and hB are extracted using the following equation:

(k,hA,hB) = f(PA,ns,nA,B)

Here it is assumed that the procedure for extracting the fields k, hA, and hB fro
value computed as f(PA,ns,nA, B) is known in advance.
It is immediately apparent from the above equation that the protocol is highly
asymmetrical with respect to A and B. Both S and A contribute to the value of the
session key via ns and nA, respectively, but B has no influence on it. (Although J3's
n a m e appears in the above equation, it remainsfixedin every run.)
W e now isolate the confidentiality and authentication channels used to deliver k to
A and B respectively.

Channels from S to A We first note that k is generated by A and S jointly using
their shared secret PA-

W e can regard the value ns relayed by B to A (from S) as

analogous to k encrypted with PA. W e draw this analogy essentially by observing that
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PA is a secret value that is required to recover k using ns. Thus we may consider the
confidentiality channel from S to A:

S-^A:k
to be defined as
B ->• A:ns

where f(PA,ns, ...) = (k,...). Notice that the channel definition is quite restrictive in
the choice of the session key. The server S cannot choose the key value independently
of A. Furthermore, this value is the result of an application of a one-way function.
This implies that the key cannot be chosen to have specific structure.
Authentication of k to A is provided by the value hB relayed by B to A. The
properties we assumed of / imply that it is feasible to derive the value hB only with
the knowledge of PA. Furthermore, since only A and S share PA, A may be sure that S
must have originally sent hB, as A itself does not send it in the protocol. Additionally,
A may be sure that k and hB must be new since both are obtained as a function of
nA. Thus we may consider the authentication channel from S to A:

A<A- S:k,nA,B
to be defined as
B -* A : hB
where f(PA,..., nA, B) = (k,..., hB).
It is now apparent that the confidentiality and authentication functions are tied
together, and this appears to make the analysis complex.

Channels from S to B The authentication and confidentiality channels from
B are rather different.
W e may consider the confidentiality channel from S to B:

S -^ B:k
to be defined as

S^B:f(PB,ns,...)®k
Since ns is randomly chosen each time by S, we can consider f(PB,ns,- - -) to be
essentially random. Moreover, it is infeasible to form f(PB,...) without knowledge of
PB. So the confidentiality channel can be simply viewed as analogous to the Vernam
cipher with a non-repeating random ciphering key, known as the one-time pad (cf. [57]).
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W e may consider the authentication channel from S to B:

B^-S:k,nB,A
to be defined as
S '-• B : f(PB, - - - ,nB,A) ® (k,hA,hB),g(PB,k,hA,hB)
W e observe a curious feature of the channel definition. The authentication function is
coupled with key delivery in such a way that B has no real assurance that k is new.
Indeed, it is possible for A to circumvent this channel. Suppose that A knows an old
session key k' from a previous run of the protocol between some user X and B. Then
A can force B to accept k' for a new session with A, as follows. In the attacking run,
the first two protocol messages are exchanged as in a normal run.
1. A->B:

A,B,nA

2. B ->• S :

A,B,nA,nB

The next message from S which is actually meant for B is intercepted by A.
3. S->A:

ns,f(PB,ns,nB,A)®(k,hA,hB),g(PB,k,hA,hB)

Now A computes the value (k, hA, hB) = f(PA, ns, nA, B), and computes the exclusiveor (XOR) of this value with the intercepted value f(PB,ns,nB,A) © (k,hA,hB), to
extract f(PB,ns, nB, A). Then A pretends to be S and sends the following message to
B:
3'. A^B: ns,f(PB,ns,nB,A)®(k',h,x,h'B),g(PB,k',h'x,h,B)

Here we assume that h'x, h'B, and g(PB,k!, h'x, h'B) were recorded by A from the previ
ous run between X and B. The rest of of the protocol is then successfully completed
as follows.
4. B-+ A: ns,h'B
5. A -> B :

h'x

The above attack is rather unconventional, because here A itself purportedly defeats the security of the subsequent session with B. It is easily precluded under the
assumption that B trusts A to let a session key between the two to faithfully pass from
S to B. Nonetheless, such an assumption appears to be only implicit in Gong's discussion [48] and may be viewed as a potential weakness. In suggesting general design
guidelines for cryptographic protocols, Abadi and Needham [58] caution that such trust
assumptions may not always apply and should be adjudged carefully. The particular
assumption seems to arise in Gong's protocol not so much as a genuine requirement,
but rather as a result of a misplaced authentication channel.
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E.3.1 Gong's alternative protocol
In the same paper [48], Gong suggests an alternative protocol in which the responsibility
for key generation rests solely with S. The server S now randomly chooses all of k,
hA and hB to be of the appropriate size. And the message it sends is symmetric with
respect to A and B [48, p. 10]:
3. S -+ B : ns,f(PA,ns,nA,B)@(k,hA,hB),g(PA,k,hA,hB),
f(PB,ns, nB, A) © (k, hA,hB),g(PB,k, hA, hB)
A. B-+A:

ns,f(PA,ns,nA,B)@(k,hA,hB),g(PA,k,hA,hB),hB

The rest of the messages remain the same as in the previous protocol, and are omitted
for the sake of brevity.
The confidentiality and authentication channels to A and B are now essentially the
same as those to B in the original protocol. So the curious feature applies to both A
and B; each of them can make the other accept a previously shared old key. Again it
is crucial to make this assumption explicit.

E.4 A protocol of Bull, Gong and Sollins
We now explain how the analysis technique enables us to discover the cause of a
a protocol due to Bull et al. [59]. In this protocol, the message sent by S is somewhat
similar to the one in Gong's alternative protocol. A successful run of the protocol
between A and B can be given as follows.
1. A->B:
2. B^S:
3. S^B:

A,f(PA,B),nA
A,B,f(PB,S,A,f(PA,B),nA),nA,nB
f(PB,A,nB)@k,f(PB,A,nB,k),
f(PA,B,nA)®k,f(PA,B,nA,k)

A. B-+A:

f(PA,B,nA)@k,f(PA,B,nA,k)

It is easy to see that in this protocol the session key k is not sent over a confidentiality
channel from S. For note that S cannot possibly be sure that nA or nB is new. As a
result there is no guarantee that the session key is X O R e d with a new random value
each time. So we can regard the particular channels used by S as analogous to the
Vernam cipher with a possibly repeating ciphering key (cf. [57]). Thus in contrast to
Gong's protocols, the channels here no longer provide a confidentiality service. For
example, suppose each of k' (an old session key) and k (a new session key) is X O R e d
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with the same ciphering key x, giving the ciphertexts x 0 k' and x 0 k, respectively.
Then given k' we can easily break the ciphertext x@k by computing (x@k')@(x@k)®k',
to reveal k.
In more concrete terms, suppose that in the above protocol an attacker E knows an
old session key k', and that she has also recorded n'A, f(PA, B) and f(PA, B,n'A) 0 k',
all from the corresponding run. W e also make the reasonable assumption that S and
B ignore replays of nonces not generated by them. A n attacking run on the protocol
proceeds as follows, with E masquerading as A [47]:
1. E^B: A,f(PA,B),n'A
2. B->S:

A,B,f(PB,S,A,f(PA,B),n'A),n'A,nB

3. S^B:

f(PB,A,nB)@k,f(PB,A,nB,k)
f(PA,B,n'A)®k,f(PA,B,n'A,k)

A. B^E:

f(PA,B,n'A)®k,f(PA,B,n'A,k)

Although k is intended to be a new session key A and B, an attacker E can easily
compute
(f(PA, B, n'A) 0 k) 0 (f(PA, B, n'A) 0 k') 0 k'
to obtain k. At the end of the attacking run B believes k is shared with A, whereas
in fact it is shared with an impostor E; it is easy to construct a similar attack where
E masquerades as B to A.

This concludes the modus operandi of our attack on

the protocol. However, the gist of the above attack is that the protocol makes a
fundamentally wrong use of a cryptographic algorithm.
In the same work [47] where the above attack wasfirstpublished by us, we also
suggested the following improved protocol to counter this attack:
1. A-+ B :
2. B ->• S :
3. S^B:

A,nA
A,B,nA,nB
ns,f(PB,A,nB,ns)®k,f(PB,A,nB,k),
f(PA, B, nA, ns) 0 k, f(PA, B, nA, k)

A. B-+A:

ns,f(PA,B,nA,ns)®k,f(PA,B,nA,k)

Ironically, we later discovered that our improved protocol suffers from essentially the
same curious feature found in Gong's protocols. Observe that in this protocol k is
sent over a confidentiality channel from S to B. So the improved protocol does indeed represent a marked improvement over the protocol of Bull et al. However, the
confidentiality channel used in this protocol is still not quite in its simplest form. In
particular, it is unnecessary to include A's name and nB in defining this channel, since
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thesefieldsare already included in the authentication channel from S to B. In fact,
their inclusion in the confidentiality channel is not only superfluous but, as explained
below, also serves to potentially undermine the authentication channel.
Consider the confidentiality channel definition, inclusive of the superfluous elements:
S ^ B : f(PB,A,nB,ns)@k

And consider the authentication channel definition, which is actually in its ad
form:
S-+B:f(PB,A,nB,k)
It becomes apparent that the inclusion of redundantfieldsin the confidentiality channel
results in a striking similarity between the formats of the hashed components used in
the two channel definitions. This symmetry can be exploited to construct essentially
the same type of attack we demonstrated on Gong's protocols earlier. For instance, A
can force B to accept ns as a session key between the two by intercepting message 3
and replacing it with message 3', as follows.
3. S^A: ns,f(PB,A,nB,ns)®k,f(PB,A,nB,k),
f(PA, B, nA, ns) 0 k, f(PA, B, nA, k)
3'. A^B:

ns,f(PB,A,nB,ns)®nsJ(PB,A,nB,ns),...

Undoubtedly, it is possible to assume away such an attack by putting side conditions on
the protocol. For example, we can require that k and ns be somehow made distinct by a
protocol implementation. Or, as in Gong's protocols, we can make a trust assumption
on B's side about A's actions. Alternatively, here we can even eliminate such an
assumption, by requiring B to perform an additional check. Still further, the attack
can be avoided by constraining protocol implementations to follow a particular ordering
on the fields before hashing. (Such countermeasures are by no means exhaustive.) In
principle, however, such measures do very little to address the unnecessary confusion
of the confidentiality and authentication channels. (An essentially similar discussion
applies to the channels from S to A.)

E.5 KryptoKnight protocols

KryptoKnight [49], [50] is an authentication and key distribution system develo
I B M . The KryptoKnight protocols have been implemented as part of IBM's NetSP
(Network Security Program) system.

E.5. KryptoKnight protocols

E.5.1

151

Initial version

The original KryptoKnight mechanism described by Molva et al. [49] enable
to obtain a session key generated by S for use between A and B, as follows:
1. A -* S : nA
2. S^A:

nA,ns,B,T,f(PA,ns®B,nA,ns@S,T)®k

(A similar exchange also essentially takes place between S and B.) Here T is the
duration for which the session key k is meant to remain valid. In contrast to Gong's
protocols, ns is not chosen at random by S, but is obtained as the encryption of nA
under k using a non-reversible encryption function E:
ns = E(k,nA)

(E may be considered to have the same properties as /.) However, ns can b
as essentially random, since k is randomly chosen by S. Thus the confidentiality channel
from S to A is similar to that in Gong's alternative protocol.
The authentication channel from S to A is essentially based on the binding between
k and ns, albeit in a highly convoluted fashion. W e may consider the authentication
channel:

A^- S:k,nA,B
to be defined as

S^A:nsJ(PA,ns®B,...)®k
where ns = E(k,nA). Notice this channel definition appears rather peculiar when
compared with its counterpart from the protocol of Bull et al. Relatedly, the simplicity
associated with the latter definition is no longer preserved.

E.5.2 Recent version
The above key exchange mechanism appears to have been simplified by Bird et al. [50]
to derive some recent protocols of the KryptoKnight family. Although our analysis of
the original KryptoKnight mechanism did not reveal any specific weaknesses, we find
surprising failures in the recent protocols.
Let us consider a specific instance of the basic key exchange protocol of Bird et
al. [50, p. 35]:

1. A-+S:

B,nA

2. S^A:

T,f(PA,B,nA,T)®k
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It is apparent that this protocol provides neither session key confidentiality
thenticity. The cause for loss of confidentiality is similar to that in the protocol of Bull
et ai, which w e discussed in the previous section. O n the other hand, there is no authentication channel from S to A; A cannot be sure that the session key it supposedly
recovers upon a protocol execution is indeed from S.
W e note that several key exchange protocols proposed by Bird et al. ([50], pp.
36-38) are meant to cover the above instance as well, although the specific protocols
proposed there employ the following message format:

S -* A:ns,T,f(PA,nA,ns,S,B,T)@k,...
Unlike the original KryptoKnight mechanism, here ns is randomly chosen by S, independently of nA; nA itself is randomly chosen by A. Surprisingly, Bird et al. suggest
that the nonce ns is of no particular value in their protocols:
... the use of Nk [ns] in the tickets does not serve any particular purpose.
Nk [ns] is used here simply to preserve some homogeneity between ticket
format in all scenarios, but for no other significant purpose. ([50], p. 38)
Nevertheless, it is easy to see that ns is crucial for maintaining session key confidentiality in their protocols. Indeed, if we act on the above suggestion of Bird et al. and
omit ns from their protocols, then an attack similar to the one that we demonstrated
on the protocol of Bull et al. in the previous section follows immediately.
O n the other hand, Bird et al. admittedly allow loss of session key integrity. They
note that B can change the session key, without A's knowledge ([50], p. 37). However,
the resulting situation appears rather dubious with the protocols of Bird et ai, when
compared with Gong's protocols. For now B can even arrange that A and C share
the same session key, and thus authenticate each other, although each of them may
be purportedly authenticating B. Below we demonstrate an attack on one of their
proposed protocols: the A-B-K ticket distribution protocol (expanded version).

A

successful run of the protocol between A and B can be given as follows [50, pp. 37]:

1. A -^ B : A,nA
2. B -> S : nA,nB,A,B
3. S^B:
ns,T,f(PA,nA,ns,S,B,T)®k,
f(PB,nB,ns,S,A,T)®k
A. B^A:

ns,T,f(PA,nA,ns,S,B,T)®k

For simplicity of presentation, we have omitted certain message elements from the
original protocol since they do not affect our attack. In the following 'triangle' attack
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on the above protocol, B engages in two parallel runs of the protocol, one with A and
the other with C. S generates k and k' as the session keys for use between A and B,
and C and B, respectively; kx is a value chosen by B.

1. A-+B: A,nA
2. B-> S : nA,nB,A,B
3. S-+B: ns,T,f(PA,nA,ns,S,B,T)®k,
f(PB,nB,ns,S,A,T)®k
A. B->A:

ns,T,f(PA,nA,ns,S,B,T)®kx

V. C^B: C,nc
2'. B->S: nc,n'B,C,B
3'. S-^B:

n's,T,f(Pc,nc,n's,S,B,T)®k',
f(PB,n'B,n's,S,C,T)®k'

A'. B^C: n's,T,f(Pc,nc,n's,S,B,T)®kx
N o w A and C unexpectedly end up sharing kx, although they did not directly participate in a mutual run with each other.

E.6 Alternative designs using secure channels
The protocols examined in the previous sections reflect a mix-up of confidentiality
and authentication channels. In particular, these protocols exhibit confusion about
the purpose of the message fields and the use of cryptographic transformations. It
is tempting to speculate that this confusion might have even been the root of flaws
or unusual features in some of the protocols. W e can easily avoid such defects by
addressing the desired channels explicitly at the design stage itself. In fact, the same
technique w e used to analyze existing protocols can be applied equally well to design
new protocols that can be shown to be secure. A key exchange protocol is designed
by simply defining the required channels from the key originator to the key recipients.
W e illustrate this concept below by designing two concrete protocols using one-way
functions.

E.6.1 Three-party key exchange
Consider a conventional key exchange scenario where a shared key k needs to be established between two principals A and B via a trusted server S. T h e server S is assumed
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to share secrets PA and PB with A and B, respectively. The desired channels from S
to A are specified as [45]:

S^A: k
A^-S: k,A,B,N
where AT is a nonce used to convince A that k is new. The channels from S to B are
similarly specified. W e can look upon the above specification as a generic key exchange
protocol. A concrete protocol is derived from the specification by implementing the
required channels using the available cryptographic functions.
W e shall define the required confidentiality channel from S to A as:

S-+A:f{PA,ns)®k
where ns is a random value chosen by S. And we shall define the required
tion channel from 5 to A as:

S^A:f(PA,k,B,nA)

where nA is a random value chosen by A. Recall that the hash value f(PA,.
be formed without the knowledge of PA. Furthermore, PA is a shared secret between
A and S. W e can thus regard A's name as being implicitly included in the use of
PA, and thereby omit it from the actual definition. (The desired confidentiality and
authentication channels from S to B are similarly defined.)
W e assume that the ordering of messages is irrelevant, except for the constraint
that certain messages must necessarily precede others. A protocol that makes the
desired confidentiality and authentication channels concrete is now easily constructed
as follows:
1. A^fB:

A,B,nA

2. B -> S :

A,B,nA,nB

3. S-+B:
A. B^A:

ns,f(PB,ns)@k,f(PB,k,A,nB),f(PA,ns)®k,f(PA,k,B,nA)
ns,f(PA,ns)®k,f(PA,k,B,nA)

It is clear that the precise formulation of the channel requirements enables us to optimize the design by using exactly what is needed in each channel. The protocol is
conceptually simple and elegant—the confidentiality and authentication channels now
only contain those elements that are relevant to the function of each channel. Consequently, the channels are now transparent, which makes the purpose of the protocol
messages quite clear.
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E.6.2 Conference key exchange

The above design extends straightforwardly to a conference key protocol. Assume

there are n different participants from a set U = {Ux, U2,..., Un}, and that each Ut € U
shares a secret PU{ with S initially. Let k denote a conference key chosen by S to be
shared among the participants contained in U. Then each U{ e U generates its own
nonce, nVi, and carries out the following exchange with S:
1. Ui-^S: U,nVi
2. S-+UH

ns,f(PUt,ns)®k,f(PUt,k,U\Ui,nUi)

('\' denotes the set difference operator.)

E.7 Discussion
Throughout this appendix we have employed a methodology of Boyd and Mao [45]
to pinpoint problems of varying seriousness in several existing key exchange protocols
based on one-way functions. Furthermore, we used the insight gained from the analyses
carried out to design a simplified protocol which we claim is as secure as any published
protocol of its type, and still enjoys a transparent and elegant design. The simplicity
of this approach has further enabled us to design a new conference key protocol as an
obvious extension.
It m a y be argued that our protocols are susceptible to guessing attacks on the longterm secrets assumed initially if these secrets were user chosen passwords. However, all
the previous protocols we considered also have the same feature. Although we make
guessing infeasible by simply assuming that the initial secrets are well-chosen, it may
be desirable to relax this assumption and investigate alternative designs that allow
passwords to be used.
As noted by Boyd and M a o [45], their approach is targeted at key exchange only.
W e emphasize that it does not directly apply to the analysis of protocol properties
that are essentially independent of key exchange. W e illustrate this scope limitation
by means of an example here. Consider the following protocol due to Bull et al. [59]:

1. A->S

nA

2. S->A

ns, k 0 f(PA,nA, ns), f(k, ns), ns

3.

A^S

A. S-+A

f(k,ns)
f(k,nA)
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Here S generates two nonces ns and ns. Thefirsttwo messages constitute the key
exchange phase of the protocol: these messages are used to transfer a new session key
k from 5 to A for use between them. It is not difficult to isolate the confidentiality
and authentication channels used to transfer k from S to A. Indeed, the reason we
are giving this example is not because we are concerned with the key exchange phase
here. It is to show that the working of the subsequent phase lies outside the scope
the analysis approach that we have used so far. The phase consisting of the last two
messages essentially constitutes a handshake using the session key k. The intended
interpretation of this handshake is as follows: the third message is used to confirm A's
receipt of the session key; and the fourth message is used to confirm 5"s receipt of A's
confirmation. However, the latter message provides no such guarantee, as shown by an
attack w e found on this protocol earlier [47].
In the attacking run, an attacker E copies the opening message from A:
1. A -> S : nA (copied by E)
The next message from S, which is actually meant for B, is intercepted by E:

2. S -» E : ns,k® f(PA,nA,ns),f(k,ns),ns
N o w E simply replaces h~s with nA in the above message. She also sends the resulting
message to A pretending to be S:
2'. E^A: ns,k@ f(PA,nA,ns),f(k,ns),nA
She then prevents A's response from reaching S and instead plays it back to A:

3. A^E:

f(k,nA)

A. E^A:

f(k,nA)

At the end of the attacking run, A wrongly believes that S has responded to its
handshake message, although S in fact did not participate in the handshake.
The above attack essentially rests on the inability of a principal to detect a replay
of one of its own messages. Such attacks are not new; similar attacks have been
addressed in the past (cf., e.g., Mitchell [60]). For example, if the hash used as a
handshake message also includes the name of the originator then the above attack is
easily averted:

3. A - > 5 : f(k,ns,A)
A. S^A:

f(k,nA,S)
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Other possible solutions include the use of direction bits or of different hash functions
in the handshake messages. For a discussion on the use of similar countermeasures in
a more general setting, cf. Gong [21].

Appendix F
Modeling of recognizability
Treat this section as though it followed on directly from the end of Chapter 4.
The notion of recognizable messages essentially reflects the following intuition: (1)
if a principal P generates a message X, then X is recognizable by P; (2) any message
that can be possibly verified on the basis of P's recognizable messages, perhaps using
keys possessed by P, is also recognizable by P. The idea behind (2) is expanded as
follows: (2') if a message X is recognizable by P and Y = EK(X)

for some K such

that K~x is possessed by P, then Y is recognizable by P (since P can decrypt Y using
K

to reveal the recognizable message X); (2") if a message X is recognizable by P

and Y = EX(K)

for some K such that K is possessed by P, then Y is recognizable by

P (since P can encrypt the recognizable message X using K to obtain Y); (2'") if a
message X is recognizable by P and Y = HKX

for some K such that K is possessed

by P, then Y is recognizable by P (since P can hash the recognizable message X using

K to obtain Y); and (6) if a message X is recognizable by P and Y = Yx | • • • | Yk for
some Yx,..., Yk such that X = Yi for some i, then F is recognizable by P (since P can
reveal from Y the recognizable message X). W e fix the set of P's recognizable messages
for each time. The closure operation that we use in defining P's set of recognizable
messages at time t roughly captures amongst others the following statement:
(*) if a message X is in this set and Y = EK(X) for some K such that A-1 is in
the set of P's possessed messages at t, then Y is in the set of P's recognizable
messages at t, provided that some principal has encrypted X using K, and thus
constructed EK(X),

at a time earlier than t.

For each time t, we define the message set Mrecg(P,r,t) to model the intuitive
notion of recognizable messages.
Definition F.l
1. Let t = tfa^r). Then Mrecg(P,r,t) = 0.
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2. Let t > tfiTSt(r). Then Mrecg(P,r,t) is the smallest set of messages such that:

I. (Basis)
Mrecg(P,r,t- 1) U Sgenr(P,r,t- 1) C MreCg(P,r,t)
II. (Induction)
(a) EK(X) € A4rec5(P, r, t)

if (X, A') € £(r, t) and
A G Mrecg(P,r,t) and
A€A4 poss (P,r,t)

(b) AV(X) € A4rec^(P, r, i)

if (X, K) e S(r, t) and
X G Mrecg(P,r,t) and

A^eM^iV,*)
(c)

tfjcPOeAW^M)

if(X,A)€ft(r,i)and
X e Mrecg(P,r,t) and
A G MpoSs(P,r,t)

(d) Xx\---\Xk£Mrecg(P,r,t)

if (Xl5..., Xk) G C(r,t) and
Xi € Mrecg(P,r,t) for some i

L e m m a F.l For a//i, i' s«cfr t/iat t < t' the following holds:
Mrecg{P,r,t) Q Mrecg(P,r,t')
Definition F.2 Let i > 0.
1. Let t = tfostCr). Then A4lrec^(P,r,t) = 0 for all i.
2. Let t > ifirstCr). Then
_ J Mrecg(P, r, < - 1) U <S<,enr(P, r, < - 1) if t = 0

^ W P ' r '*> ~ j M ^ ( P , r, t) U 5

ifi > 0

where
5 = {£*(*) I (X, K) eS(r,t) and X G M ^ ( P , M ) and
K £ Mposs(P,r,t)}
U {£tf(X) | (X, AT) € S(r,t) and X € M\£g{Ptr,t) and
A - 1 € Mposs(P,r,t)}
U

{#K(X)

| (X, K) G rl(r,t) and X € M%lcg(P,r,t) and

K E Mposs(P,r,t)}
U{(Xx\---\Xk)\(Xx,..-,Xk)€C(r,t)and
Xj G M^^P,

r,t) for some j}.
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The following l e m m a is easily proved from Definition F.l and Definition F.2.

L e m m a F.2
Mrecg(P,r,t)

C M\ecg(P,r,t) C • • • C |J Mrecg(P,r,t) =

MTecg(P,r,t)

i=Q

L e m m a F.3
Mgenr(P,r,t) C Mrecg(P,r,t)
Proof. B y induction on t:

1. (Basis) Let t = tfirst(r). By definition 4.3 and definition F.l, Mgenr(P,r,t^st(r))
Mrecg(P,r,t^Tst(r)) = 0. Therefore, the required statement holds.
2. (Induction) Let t > tgrst(r) be arbitrary. We assume the inductive hypothesis:
Mgenr(P,r,t) C Mrecg(P,r,t); and we show this implies Mgenr(P,r,t + 1) C

A4 recy (P,r,t-r-l).
B y the inductive hypothesis it follows that Mgenr(P,r,t) U Sgenr(P,r,t) C
A ^ r e c ^ M j U S g e n r ^ r , * ) . By definition 4.3, A4^ enr (P,r, t+1) = A4ffenr(^,»",*)U
Sgenr(P,r,t), and, by definition F.2, A ^ ^ ( P , r , t + l ) = Mrecg(P,r,t)USgenr(P,r,t).
Hence Mgenr(P,r,t

+ 1) C M°recg(P,r,t + 1). By L e m m a F.2 it follows that

A4^enr(P,r,t-l-1) C A4recff(P,r,t + 1).
(This completes the proof of L e m m a F.3.)

•

L e m m a F.4
Mrecg(P,r,t) C Mgenr(r,t) U A W r M ) U Mhash(r,t) U A 4 c c m c ( M )
Proof. (Similar to proof of Lemma 4.11.) By induction on t:
1. (Basis) Let t = tfast(r).
0

and

B

^ definition 4 - 3 a n d definition F.l, A4rec^(P, r, tfa8t(r)) =

Mgenr(r,tfast(r)) U

jM enC r(M first (r))

U

A4/ias/l(r^first(r))U

MConc(r,£frrst(r)) = $• Therefore, the required statement holds.
2. (Induction) Let t > t^Tst(r) be arbitrary. W e assume the inductive hypothesis:
(HP1) for all t' < t, Mrecg(P,r,t') C

Mgenr(r,t')UMencr(r,t')UMhash(r,t')U

MConc(r,t'); and we show this impliesMrecg(P,r,t) C A40enr(r,i)UA4enCr(r,t)U
A4/, as />M) U A 4 c o n c M ) .
B y L e m m a F.2 it suffices to show that, for all Y and for all m , if y G M™ecg(P, r, t)
then y G Mgenr(r,t) U A4encr(r,t) U Xfcas/i(r,*) U A4conc(r,i). This assertion
is shown using induction on m :
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I. (Basis) Let m = 0. Suppose Y G M°recg(P,r,t). By definition F.2, Y G
Mrecg(P,r,t- 1) (J Sgenr(P,r,t - 1).
Case(i): Y G MKCg(P,r,t - 1). KP1 yields Y e Mgenr(r,t-1)U
l U M

)

hash(r^

Mencr(r,t-

~ 1) U A4conc(r,i - 1). By Lemma 4.6 it follows that

Y G A4^enr(r,t) U A4enCr(r,*) U Mhash(r,t) U A4COnc(r,i).
Case (ii): Y G Sgenr(P,r,t - 1).
By definition 4.2, P performs generate(Y) at i - 1, and therefore, by
definition 4.3, Y G Mgenr(r,t).
II. (Induction) Let m > 0 be arbitrary. W e assume the inductive hypothesis:
(HP2) for all Y, if Y G M™ecg(P, r, t) then y G Af genKr, t ) U M encr(r, t) U
•^hash(r^)

u

A4Conc(r,t); and we show this implies that, for all Y, if

y G A4™"g(P,r,t) then y G Mgenr(r,t) U A4enCr(r,t) U A4/,agft(r,t) U
MConc(r,t).
Suppose y G M^clg(P,r,t). By definition F.2,
y G M?ecg(P,r,t)
U

{£K(X)

| (X,K) G £(r,*) and X G M™ecg(P,r,t) and

AGA4 p o S S (P,r,0}
U

{£K(X)

| (X,tf) G S(r,t) and X G M™ecg(P,r,t) and

A^GAV^P,^)}
U

{#K(X)

| (X, A ) Gft(r,t)and X G M™ecg(P,r,t) and

AGA4^os5(P,r,t)}
U {(Xa | • • • | Xfc) | (X1?... ,Xk) G C(r,i) and
Xj G M™ecg(P,r,t) for some j}.
Case (A): y G M^ecg(P,r,t). HP2yieldSy G Mgenr(r,t)UMencr(r,t)l)Mhash(r,t)
MConc(r,t).
Case(B): y G {£*(*) I (*> *0

e

£(r,t) and X

G A4^ecy(P,r,i) and A

G

Mp0ss(P,r,t)}.
W e have y = EK(X) for some X and some A such that (X, A ) G £(r, i)
and X

G A4^cp(P,r,t) and AT G A/fposs^M)- By definition 4.3,

EK(X) G A W r M ) . Hence y G Mencr(r,t)Case (C): y G {£*(X) | (X, AT) G S(r,t) and X G M^ecg(P,r,t) and AT"1 G
A4poss(P,r,i)}.
Similar to Case (B).
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Case(D): Y G {HK(X)

\ (X,K) G H(r,t) and X

G M^cg(P,r,t) and K

G

MpoSs(P,r,t)}.
Similar to Case (B).

Case (E): Y G {(Xx \ - • - \ Xk) \ (Xx,...,Xk) G C(r,t) and Xj G M?ecg(P,r,t)
for some j}.
Similar to Case (B).
(This completes the proof of Lemma F.4.) •

The statement of Lemma F.4 is rather weak; it is apparent from the proof o
lemma that we can also obtain the following stronger statement: Mrecg(P,r,t) C
Mgenr(P,r,t) U Mencr(r,t) U Mhash(r,t) U MConc(r,t).
Lemma F.5 Let X G Mrecg(P,r,t). Then
(a) if (X,K) G S(r,t) for some K such that K G Mp0ss(P,r,t), then EK(X) G
Mrecg(P,r,t), and
(b) if (X,K) G £(r,t) for some K such that K'1 G Mp0ss(P,r,t), then EK(X) G
Mrecg(P,r,t), and
(c) if (X,K) G H(r,t) for some K such that K G Mposs(P,r,t), then HK(X)
Mrecg(P,r,t), and

(d) ifXx | • • • | Xfc G C(r,t) and X = X{ for some i, then Xx | • • • | Xk G M r

Proof. We only prove part (a); the remaining parts are proved similarly. S
(X, A") G £(r,t) for some A such that A G Mposs(P,r,t). By Lemma F.2 it suffices
to show that EK(X) G Mlrecg{P,r,t) for some /. Since X G Mrecg(P,r,t), it follows
by L e m m a F.2 that X G M^ecg(P, r, t) for some m. By definition F.2, M^g(P,
{EK(X)

r, t) D

| (X,AT) G ^(r,*) and X G M^ecg(P,r,t) and A G A4po55(P,r,t). Hence

EK(X)GA4^e+J(P,r,t).

D

Proposition F.l For each time t, the set Mrecg(P,r,t) is finite.
Proof. Follows from Lemma F.4 and Lemma 4.7. °
Corollary F.l For each time t, Mrecg(P,r,t) = Mkrecg(P,r,t) for some k.

